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The present thesis, "The legal framework of the external relations of 
the European Economic Com munity and the European Coal and Steel 
Com m unity w ith Lebanon", examines the legal aspects of the external 
relations of these two Communities with respect to Lebanon, with special 
reference to their common commercial policy and developm ent policy. 
In examining twenty five years of relationship between the two parties, 
the thesis endeavours to answer whether Lebanon, at any time, received 
special treatm ent from the EEC corresponding to the historical, political, 
economic, cultural and geographical close ties between them as reflected in 
the legal rules which provides the framework for the EEC-Lebanese trade 
and  com m ercial relations. The thesis, m oreover, evaluates the 
developments in the legal framework of these relations in the light of the 
developm ents in international trade rules and w hether the European 
Communities1 agreements w ith Lebanon responded to Lebanon's special 
characteristics and level of development and consequently responded to 
its special needs. Furthermore, the thesis assesses the contribution of the 
contractual relationship of the relevant parties to the developm ent of 
their trade relations, w ith particular emphasis on Lebanon's exports to the 
EEC markets.
The relationship between Lebanon and the European Communities 
passed through three stages in its form of developm ent, from  non- 
preferential trade arrangem ents to reciprocal partial preferential trade 
a rrangem ents and  thereafter to non-reciprocal p refe ren tia l trade  
arrangements.
Experience shows that where the right terms and suitable conditions
\V
were given, relations between the EEC and a less developed country can be 
fruitful. However, although Lebanon received preferential treatm ent 
w ithin the EEC Mediterranean policy, this preferential treatm ent proved 
to be fruitless. The European Economic C om m unity m oved half­
heartedly in developing the legal framework of its relations w ith Lebanon, 
thereby offering preferences to Lebanon on the one hand and making 
inroads into them on the other.
Following the adoption of preferential treatm ent w ithin their trade 
legal system, Lebanon’s exports to the EEC fell. In addition, the EEC 
development aid to Lebanon represents "a drop in the Ocean".
The justified conclusion is that any future equilibrium  in trade 
relations between both parties is not expected. Is it not now  the time for 
attem pting to develop a legal fram ework for integrating the natural 
regional markets of Lebanon?
V
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the legal framework of the relations between 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Coal and 
Steel Com m unity (ECSC), on the one hand, and Lebanon on the other. 
The extent of the EEC's international activities are bestowed upon it by 
virtue of the Treaty of Rome, in the fields of, inter alia, commercial policy, 
association, common agricultural policy, and, w ith  possible further 
am endm ents to the Treaty, to economic and m onetary union in the 
future. These activities are traditionally part of a state's foreign policy 
referred to as low politics. In fact, none of the treaties establishing the 
European Communities contains specific commitments, notw ithstanding 
recent and current attempts through the Single European Act (SEA) and 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), on the part of the mem ber states to 
collaborate in the formation of common high policies. Foreign policy as 
pertaining to states contains all aspects of a state's international activities 
(both high and  low politics) associated w ith the very definition of 
statehood. High politics of the foreign policy of the member states of the 
EEC, a m ost jealously guarded sphere of national sovereignty, rem ains 
within the competence of the member states. Hence, the activities of the 
European Com munities in the international sphere are referred to as 
external relations as opposed to foreign policy.l
The foreign policy of a state concerns a m ost controversial issue 
touching the heart of its sovereignty and sometimes reflecting its identity. 
The sensitivity of foreign policy m ay divide the people of that state, 
especially if the people possess m ulti-cultural elements. This w idely 
accepted view does not only apply to states, bu t also to international
1
organisations and in particular to the EEC: the interests (and sometimes 
selfishness) of the elements comprising the organisation may contest with 
each other. If this generally is true, then it is all the more evident in the 
case of a state like Lebanon. Lebanon’s foreign policy, including its foreign 
trade policy, is a most protracted and unsettled policy area, being in some 
aspects a main source of the civil wars since independence.
Prior to the independence of Lebanon in  1943, com m unities 
(confessional sects) forming Lebanon were divided on its foreign policy. 
Follow ing independence, a com prom ise was reached th rough  the 
unw ritten "National Pact" identifying Lebanon as having an "Arab face". 
This statem ent implicitly denies that Lebanon is an Arab country and 
leads to a conclusion that Lebanon has another (European) face. The 
popular jargon "aVum aVhanoun", (meaning the affectionate m other, 
referred to in the Arabic language as the very heart of the relationship 
between a m other and her child) the nickname of France in Lebanon, 
illustrates a strong emotional belief in having another (European) face in a 
major segment of the public opinion. Reaffirming this position of having 
bu t partially an Arab face, and despite declaring its readiness to do so, 
Lebanon refused to join the never implemented Arab Com mon M arket 
Treaty in 1964, under an allegation that such an undertaking w ould affect 
its special and  unique characteristics.2 Similarly, Lebanon d id  not 
im plem ent the Customs Union Agreement with Syria3 owing to similar 
assumptions.
In 1963, while Lebanon was engaged in its negotiations leading to the 
conclusion of the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreem ent w ith the 
EEC, the Foreign ministry issued a statement denying that Lebanon was 
attem pting to join the six European countries forming the EEC.4 It is safe 
to say that Lebanon has no right to join the Treaty of Rome, not least for
geographical limitations. Article 237 EEC specifies expressly the right of 
only the European countries to join the EEC. Hence, the statem ent was 
aim ed at directing public attention in Lebanon to the purpose of the 
negotiation which was to conclude an agreement with the EEC allowing 
Lebanon to enjoy some privileges which reflect the special ties and 
relationship between Lebanon and the some of the original member states 
of the EEC.
Typically, in international relations, special ties and relationships 
between states are formulated into binding rules in treaties granting some 
privileges not granted to any other state. For example, the relationship 
betw een Israel and U.S.A. is formulated in different defence and trade 
treaties. Recently, after a long period of confrontation, Lebanon concluded 
a "Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination Treaty" w ith Syria (1991) 
reaffirming their special relationship in different issues and reflecting the 
slogan "one people in two states".
An analysis of Lebanon’s perspective on its own relationship with 
the countries of W estern Europe in general, and France in particular, 
could be explained from  different points of view, nam ely historical, 
cultural, geographical and economic and political factors.
W ith regard to historical and political factors, present-day Lebanon 
d id  not exist prior to September 1920, the date when General G ouraud 
(the High French Commissioner to Syria and Lebanon during the French 
mandate) annexed some other cities to "Mount of Lebanon" declaring it as 
"Grand Liban". An autonomous province in 1860, the M ount of Lebanon 
em erged when the Ottoman Empire signed the "Reglement Organique" 
under direct supervision and with certain privileges, to the then European 
superpower, France, and other European countries. "Mount of Lebanon" 
was inhabited by two rival sects, Christian M aronites and Druze. As
3
m inority groups within the Muslim world in the Levant, seeking certainty 
and survival, these groups linked their existence w ith other external, 
pow erful countries. The French Catholic missionaries m otivated France 
into declaring itself as a protector of the Catholics in the Levant and were 
of great significance for the developm ent of the relationship between 
France and the Maronites of Lebanon.
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Maronites felt the 
taste for independence, albeit wanting French protection ou t of fear of 
other groups in the region, should the French leave the area. However, 
under the Sykes Picot Agreement, and upon the request of France, 
Lebanon became directly under French control, w ith Britain, France's 
partner in the Agreement, recognising the French special sphere of 
interest there. Subsequently, the Mount of Lebanon was expanded by the 
French to become the present day "Grand Liban" under the French 
m andate, and the independence of Lebanon was granted on 22 November 
1943. Moreover, prior to the independence of Lebanon, France introduced 
the constitutional law of Lebanon in May 1926 with a unique Article 95 
w hich recognised and form ulated a confessional political system  in 
Lebanon by which the Maronites have held power ever since. U nder this 
system, the President and the key posts of the states m ust be Maronites. 
Present-day Lebanon owes, therefore, its very existence to the French, and 
the special relations between the French and Lebanon via the ruling 
Maronites sect became closer. Lebanon’s issues were (and still) usually 
used as internal political subjects in France, particularly for opposition 
groups.5
Several factors can be identified which reflect the close ties between 
Lebanon and France. Cultural factors: The deep roots of the European 
presence in general, and the French in particular, in Lebanon led to the 
establishm ent, in  addition  to their political in terests, of cu ltu ral,
4
philanthropic and economic interests. The French had (and still have) 
extensive educational activities including the University of St. Joseph in 
Beirut, eighty French schools, hospitals, and orphanages. The French 
language became the first spoken language am ongst the Lebanese 
Christians. French educational and cultural interests extended to cover 
religious matters backed by the Churches (of both Lebanon and France).6
Economic factors: The French shaping of Lebanon did not limit itself 
to the political and  cultural life of Lebanon. The political economic 
structure in Lebanon was reshaped as well, 'by splitting off "Grand Liban" 
from its natural hinterland. The French not only confirmed the financial 
and  comm ercial hegem ony of Beirut over the  M ountain, b u t also 
strengthened a pattern  of economic activity in which agriculture and 
industry became m ore subordinate to banking and trade' activities.7 As a 
consequence, a particular characteristic of the Lebanese economy emerged. 
Its pattern  is well illustrated by the figures below  w hich show  the 
contribution of the various sectors to gross national income: in  1950, 
agriculture 20%; industry 13.5%; and trade 28.9%.8 The reshaping of the 
Lebanese economy, as the figures show, illustrates the transform ation 
from a m anufacturing and industrial based economy, albeit not very 
advanced, to an economy based on trade and services. Between 1950 and 
1957 the value of Lebanese commercial activities increased by 56.3% and in 
1957 itself contributed nearly a third of the Lebanese national product. A 
last feature of the Lebanese system as it developed during  the French 
M andate era was the pattern of economic activity. While "what rem ained 
of the silk industry was allowed to die off from w ant of support from the 
French and from the financiers of Beirut, the service sector continued to 
prosper, assisted by a policy of low tariffs and the creation of an infra­
structure of harbours and roads ideally suited to the further expansion of
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trade, and the new business of tourism".9 This process of reshaping 
Lebanon's economy was supported by a legal framework establishing a free 
m arket economic system, encompassing a free convertible currency, and 
possessing  a banking system  un ique in  the M iddle East. The 
intercorrelation of these elements, in amalgamation w ith the geographical 
proximity of Lebanon, made Lebanon an ideal gateway for Europe to the 
M iddle East, and in particular to the Arab world. The combination of 
these factors w ith the record of European states in the region, which left 
w ide m istrust and anti-Western feeling particularly after the Palestinian 
issue came into being, enabled Lebanon to believe that it had  unique 
features and, consequently, special relations w ith W estern Europe in 
general and France in particular. This relationship was form ulated into 
"special" commitments undertaken by some of the original m ember states 
of the EEC to contribute to Lebanese efforts in economic development.
On the other hand, the EEC external relations, including foreign trade 
policy, has not been established over night. In conformity w ith the life 
cycle theory of every single entity, the EEC, established in 1958, countered 
m any difficulties as regards defining its external relations policy.10 The 
crisis it went through in 1966 reflects one side of these difficulties. During 
the transitional (introductory and growth) stage, the EEC was keen to 
establish its external relations policy taking into consideration its inward- 
looking policy, as its first priority, on the one hand, and to strengthen the 
recognition of its independent international legal personality on the other. 
After all, the "primary objectives of the European Com m unity is not to 
create some kind of common policy for Europe’s relations with the world. 
The objective is unity (economic unity) which implies essentially inward- 
looking policy".11 This is evidenced by a handful of patchw ork fashion, 
incoherent and incomprehensive agreements w ith different th ird  states.12
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Nonetheless, the EEC "foreign policy is not a luxury for the Community, 
but a plain necessity".13 Reaching the maturity stage, the EEC established a 
more coherent external relations policy encompassing foreign trade policy 
and developm ent policy (attem pting to lay dow n the principles of its 
common foreign policy) within which the "Global" M editerranean policy 
and Lome" conventions were adopted.
The M editerranean policy was designed in such a w ay as to 
encompass crucial elements of cooperation with a view to prom ote social 
and  econom ic developm ent in the M editerranean countries. This 
cooperation com prises technical assistance, financial a id  and  the 
furthering of investment necessary to give substance to the move towards 
regional cooperation, the provision of free access and better conditions for 
m igrant w orkers em ployed in the Com m unity countries and  joint 
measures of environmental protection.
Therefore, the most promising approach to reconciling these different 
objectives w ould be to contribute to the economic developm ent of the 
M editerranean countries. One basic tenet of the M editerranean policy is 
that it claims to function by taking the level of economic developm ent of 
the respective countries into consideration and operates w ithin the efforts 
of these countries, and not in isolation from such efforts. It is thus 
expected to meet their special needs.
It is agreed by m ost economists tha t contribution to economic 
developm ent and economic growth is dependent on the availability of 
four elements, capital, (skilled) labour, raw  materials and technology. The 
problem in the developing countries is that not only are they deficient in 
some of these components, but are also hindered in their attem pts to 
obtain them. The Greek experience shows that, given the right terms and 
suitable conditions, association between a less developed country and a 
group of developed economies can enable the former to increase its pace of
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industrialisation and improve the welfare of its people.14
Lebanon, as one of the Mediterranean countries whose characteristics 
m atch m ost elements in EEC’s M editerranean policy, was the first to 
approach the EEC within the Arab world, and the first to conclude a trade 
agreement with the EEC involving reciprocal preferential trade treatment.
The present thesis attempts to examine exhaustively the substantive 
rules contained in the four Agreements concluded between the EEC and 
the ECSC on the one hand, and Lebanon on the other, before and after the 
M editerranean policy. The purpose of the study is to define whether 
Lebanon had, at any time, a special relationship with the EEC as reflected 
in the legal rules which provide the framework for the EEC-Lebanese trade 
and commercial relations. It is certainly the case that a section of the 
Lebanese elite, the Maronites, believed that Lebanon should be in position 
to exploit its unique situation vis-a-vis the EEC. Cultural, historical, 
geographical and economic and political factors, plus Lebanon's gateway 
position to the M iddle East could have provided the rationale for a 
distinctive pattern of agreements between the two partners. In conformity 
w ith such a belief, Lebanon presented a m em orandum  to the EEC in the 
early sixties requesting a preferential trade agreement. It is certain that 
such treatm ent violated (at that time) GATT rules which the EEC applies. 
Since Lebanon did not ask for a free trade area or for a customs union, 
exem pted under Article 24 GATT from MEN treatm ent, the Lebanese 
view is understood to be that a special relationship did exist and as such it 
should be reflected in a trade agreement.
On the other hand, the EEC addressed its attention to an outw ard 
looking policy following the Paris Summit in 1972. During that year, the 
Com m ission endeavoured to lend its help in finding solutions to 
problems posed by the development of the Community's special relations
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with the countries of the Mediterranean region. It is generally accepted by 
m ost w riters that the "relationship between the EEC and a num ber of 
developing countries has m ainly been determ ined by  a num ber of 
historical and political factors".15 Thus it is safe to say that "historical 
links, geographical proxim ity and a degree of in terdependence in a 
num ber of crucial areas combine to make the M editerranean region of 
special interest and special responsibility for the European Economic 
Community". Reaffirming this assum ption, the Communique" of the 
Paris Summit in 1972 called upon the Community to, "without detracting 
from  the advantages enjoyed by countries w ith which it has special 
relations, respond, even more than in the past, to the expectations of all 
developing countries". At this time, the non-European M editerranean 
countries were faced with the choice of aligning with one of the super 
powers who dominated the scene, the then Soviet Union and the U.S.A. 
Lebanon, was almost unique in sticking to the European choice and 
particularly France. Evidently, Lebanon was the only country in the Arab 
world who enjoyed the "special relations" referred to in Communique". 
Franco Malfatti, the President of the Commission in 1972, d id  not believe 
that "any one can contest the constructive role that can be played by the 
EEC in relieving the strains and pressures felt by the countries bordering 
the M editerranean".16
The present thesis examines the developing legal fram ew ork of 
relations between the EEC and the ECSC on the one hand, and Lebanon on 
the other. However, since the EEC is competent in the foreign trade field 
only, the thesis concentrates particularly on the EEC common commercial 
policy and  developm ent policy in an endeavour to exam ine the 
compatibility of the declared objectives of the relationship and evaluate 
the effects of the legal framework on the EEC foreign trade relations with
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respect to Lebanon. The Com m unique' of the Paris Summit in 1972, 
a ttached  "essential im portance ... to the  fu lfillm ent of the EEC 
commitments to the countries of the M editerranean Basin with which 
agreements have been or will be concluded, agreements which should be 
the subject of an overall and balanced approach". Taking into account the 
special characteristics and the level of economic developm ent of each 
country, "balanced approach" would refer to the advantages arising from 
the policy and not that all agreements should be identical. In other words, 
"balanced approach" in term of quality of advantages arising from this 
policy and not in terms of identicality of the agreements between the EEC 
and the M editerranean countries. Hence, the present thesis attempts to 
identify whether the European Communities agreements with Lebanon's 
responded to Lebanon is special characteristics and level of development, 
and consequently its special needs.
The present study is not intended to draw  a comparative analysis of 
the agreements between the EEC and Lebanon on the one hand, and EEC 
major bilateral agreem ents concluded with countries belonging to the 
same region on the other, since such an attem pt has been dealt w ith 
elsew here.17 However, some comparative reference are included, against 
this general rule, w herever this is necessary to underpin  the central 
argum ent of the thesis.
The EEC's foreign trade policy cannot be understood properly without 
some reference to the GATT, with all the EEC member states as contracting 
parties. It provides a fram ework for in ternational trade  relations. 
International trade law is an extremely complex matter, requiring special 
attention. The present thesis seeks to explore, through a historical 
exposition, the nature of these relations, adopting as a basic tool of analysis 
international trade rules.. This does not mean that it seeks to determine
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the compatibility of EEC policy with these rules, bu t rather that it analyses 
the developm ent of the legal framework of the EEC's relationship with 
Lebanon and the development of the norms of international trade.18
In exam ining the legal aspects of the relationship betw een two 
entities, interaction exists between legal, economic, political and social 
factors, and the case of Lebanon is no exception. In fact the correlation 
betw een these components has a dialectical dim ension based on the 
interrelation of effects. For the purpose of this study it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to discuss and analyse the legal fram ew ork of these 
relations in isolation from these factors.
Analyses of the EEC’s external relations and in particular, foreign 
trade policy w ith th ird  countries including developing countries in 
general and within the M editerranean policy in particular are numerous. 
However such studies cover mostly political and economic aspects rather 
than legal. The EEC's relationship w ith the individual M editerranean 
countries, and particularly the Mashreq countries, has not, to date, been 
evaluated from a legal perspective. The EEC’s relationship w ith Israel on 
the one hand and Lebanon on the other demonstrates the heart of this 
rela tionsh ip  since the Trade A greem ent w ith  Israel w as the first 
agreem ent w ith a non-European country causing controversy w ithin the 
EEC institutions, and the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement 
w ith Lebanon was "the first of its kind", let alone the first in the Arab 
world. Moreover, this Agreement was concluded at the time the Mashreq 
countries in particular, and the Arab countries in general, w ere cool 
tow ards the EEC viewing it at that time as a form of "neo-colonialism". 
This Agreem ent is significant, not because of its im pact on Lebanon's 
efforts tow ards economic developm ent, bu t because it illustrates the 
Community's practice in carrying into effect the commitments contained 
in the sixth and seventh indent of the preamble of the Treaty of Rome:
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"To ensure the progressive abolition of restriction on international trade; 
and to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas 
countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity". It 
is very enrichening for legal literature to evaluate the legal aspects of the 
EEC trade and cooperation relationship with Lebanon.
For a student of European law from the M editerranean region, there 
are three m ain reasons for undertaking the present study. The most 
param ount of these is to fill a striking deficiency in the legal literature in 
this area. Perhaps the main reason which explains the neglect of legal 
analysis of the EEC M editerranean region relationship is the m arked 
attention in the past to the economic aspects of the relationship. A major 
problem when undertaking a legal study here is the scarcity of prim ary 
data. The present thesis concentrates on an analysis of the available 
prim ary legal data, the texts of the agreements between Lebanon and the 
EEC, the decisions of the European Court of Justice (wherever relevant) 
and the explanations for the adoption of texts in a given m anner offered 
by the Com m unity institutions. W hat is lacking is an analysis of the 
minutes of the meetings held to negotiate the content of these agreements 
as such records are confidential. The thesis is, therefore, lim ited to an 
analysis of the available m aterials on the negotiations, such as the 
statements by the Commission published in the Bulletin of the European 
Communities. Attem pts were m ade to interview representatives of the 
European institu tions and certain of the key foreign m inistries, in 
particular the French. Such attem pts ended in a complete refusal to 
cooperate on the part of the representatives concerned.19 Further useful 
information could no doubt be elicited by such interviews. The sources of 
materials which have been used are mostly available in English, though a 
few official records in the Arabic language have been used.
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The second reason is tha t w riters tend  to analyse the EEC 
M editerranean policy as a whole and have not studied the relationship 
betw een ind iv idual M editerranean countries and the EEC, and  in 
particular the special characteristics of the Lebanese case. The relationship 
betw een the EEC and Lebanon has unfortunately not attracted writers 
from either side.
The third reason is that this is a new subject area for scholars from 
the M iddle East and the Arab W orld in particular. W ith the EEC legal 
order as a new phenomenon, and a civil war in Lebanon for the last 
sixteen years, there has been little scope for the subject to be introduced or 
examined. Indeed, the case is similar in all Arab countries, despite some 
attempts in English or French for academic purposes, but, not from a legal 
perspective.20
Relations between Lebanon and the original member states of the 
E uropean  C om m unities before the  incep tion  of the  EEC and  
encompassing different aspects of activities, including trade and technical 
cooperation w ith a view to contributing to the economic developm ent of 
Lebanon, have been of great importance. The First Chapter is devoted to 
an examination of the legal framework which regulates these relations. 
The objectives of the relevant treaties are exam ined, the substantive 
obligations arising therefrom are scrutinised w ith the focus on the trade 
arrangements and technical cooperation between the contracting parties.
Since analysing the legal aspects of foreign economic policy cannot be 
isolated from political and trade elements, trade flows for the respective 
periods of time are examined to illustrate the trade movements between 
Lebanon and the six original member states of the EEC, and thereafter, 
with the EEC and its member states. The outcome of these developments 
enables us to outline their contribution to the underlined  objectives
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declared in the preambles of the Agreements between Lebanon and the 
EEC. In addition, statistical trade figures are analysed enabling the research 
to draw  a framework relating to the importance of trade flows to and from 
Lebanon and, consequently, the balance of trade between Lebanon and the 
six original member states
It is widely accepted that fundamental to the thinking of the relevant 
countries throughout the world is the view that the international rules 
relevant to trade embodied in GATT, were established in the interests of 
the economically strong countries. These rules are still largely influenced 
by the economic superpowers. Against this backdrop, there was for 
Lebanon no interest in remaining a party to GATT and hence it w ithdrew 
in 1951. However, the cornerstone of GATT, Article i ,  MEN, was adopted 
by Lebanon in its agreements with the EEC. The Second Chapter examines 
the significance of incorporating this article in the Trade and Technical 
C ooperation Agreem ent betw een the EEC and Lebanon. Then the 
Agreement itself is analysed in its substantive and institutional elements, 
in addition to providing the general background of its conclusion. While 
the first enlargem ent of the EEC was underway, the Agreem ent was in 
operation, thus the legal implications of the first enlargem ent for the 
Agreement and subsequently for trade relations between Lebanon and the 
EEC is investigated. The establishment of the EEC required the member 
states to surrender their power in the fields of EEC activities. The second 
chapter includes a general examination of the powers of the EEC to 
conclude agreements with Lebanon. Moreover, it investigates the legal 
basis for concluding the Agreement by the mixed procedure as far as the 
EEC Treaty is concerned. It defines the EEC's arguments concerning the 
international trade rules behind the Agreement.
Chapter Three examines the reciprocal preferential Trade Agreement 
concluded in 1972. It exam ines w hether any developm ents in
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international trade regulations took place allowing the relations between 
the EEC and Lebanon to develop. In analysing the content of the 
Agreement a method similar to the Second Chapter is followed.
Chapter Four examines the Cooperation Agreement concluded under 
the auspices of the EEC Mediterranean policy still in operation. Following 
the evaluation of trade relations, a general background to the Agreement 
is draw n. The legal basis of the Agreement is examined taking into 
consideration developm ents incorporated into new international trade 
norms, since the EEC does not operate in isolation from the outside world. 
The objectives and  substance of the A greem ent are scru tin ised , 
emphasising, in addition the rights and obligations of each contracting 
party  arising from the development of the Agreement and w hether it 
achieved its objectives of contributing to the social and  economic 
development of Lebanon. Moreover, the legal implications arising from 
the EEC's southw ard enlargem ent (accession of Greece, Portugal and 
Spain) for the relations between the EEC and Lebanon is examined
Chapter Five examines the Agreement between the Member states of 
the ECSC and Lebanon. It highlights the lack of power of the ECSC to 
conclude or to participate in the Agreement. Since the Agreem ent was 
concluded in conjunction w ith  the Cooperation A greem ent, sim ilar 
points are not examined, although a similar methodology is followed.
Chapter Six examines the development cooperation policy of the EEC 
and its relevance to Lebanon, em bracing two dim ensions, financial 
cooperation and food aid policy. Having highlighted the legal basis of this 
policy, the em phasis is on answering the question w hether the EEC 
development policy responds to Lebanon's special needs.
The G eneral Conclusions discuss the question w hether Lebanon 
could be considered by any means and any time during its relationship
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w ith the EEC as having a special relationship w ith the European 
Com munities (the EEC and the ECSC). On the evidence of the legal 
fram ew ork it takes into account w hether the relationship w ithin the 
framework of the EEC's external policy could be deemed either beneficial, 
detrim ental or perhaps neutral or indifferent as regards the economic 
developm ent of Lebanon. In other words, whether these relations m et 
Lebanon's special characteristics and subsequently needs for its efforts in 
economic development. The present study summarises the expectations 
of a friendly th ird  developing country considering itself as particularly 
close to the C om m unity, and concludes that the outcom e of the 
relationship as regards expectations, is one of disappointment.
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sragp'u’EB
TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE SIX 
ORIGINAL MEMBERS PRIOR TO THE INCEPTION OF THE 
EEC (1958) UNTIL 1965.1 
l-INTRODUCTION
The importance of international trade and its sophistication drives 
states as participating parties to establish legal fram eworks for their 
m utual trade relations. Lebanon's most im portant trade partners are the 
Arab states particularly the Gulf countries, followed by W est European 
countries. The Arab countries represent the markets which absorb m ost of 
Lebanese exports, particularly agricultural products, w hile European 
countries are its major suppliers. Arab markets absorbed 65 per cent of 
Lebanon's total exports compared w ith 13 per cent as regards the six 
original member states of the EEC in 1965. The corresponding figures in 
1965 for imports from the original member states of the EEC accounted for 
about 45 per cent of its total imports.
International trade rules which regulate trade  betw een custom s 
territories are embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Lebanon, is not a contracting party to it: it joined GATT in 1949, 
and w ithdrew  in 1951. Consequently, Lebanese foreign trade relations 
have not been governed by GATT rules. Lebanese foreign trade policy 
operated through a network of bilateral instruments w ith most of its trade 
partners, that is in the form of (several) bilateral trade agreem ents w ith 
trade partners. These trade agreements became consequently the only 
source of knowledge of the Lebanese foreign trade legal system. The trade 
agreements in question include those concluded with some of the original 
member states of the EEC.
The present Chapter is devoted to the analysis of the legal aspects of
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trade agreements between Lebanon and the six original member states of 
the EEC prior to the inception of the latter in 1958. Firstly, the importance 
of trade w ith them will be demonstrated. Such an examination (of trade 
relations between the EEC and Lebanon) will make it possible to trace the 
effect of the establishm ent of the EEC on the flow of trade betw een 
Lebanon and its European trade partners. This will be followed by a 
survey of the implications of trade relations on the legal fram ework 
underlying them.
II THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN 
LEBANON AND THE SIX ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE 
EEC BEFORE ITS INCEPTION.
Although the main purpose of this Chapter is to present in the first 
place the basic legal structure underlying trade relations between the six 
original member states of the EEC and Lebanon w ithout aiming to give a 
complete background to the history of Lebanon’s external trade, it is still 
useful to describe briefly the political and economic structure of Lebanon. 
This is justified by the fact that political and economic interests constitute 
the background which influence and shape the legal issues associated with 
trade relations and trade agreements concluded between states. Moreover, 
the legal aspects of Lebanon's external trade system cannot be examined 
w ithout reference to the political environm ent and economic issues in 
Lebanon. A legal study on Lebanon’s foreign trade cannot exclude 
reference to historical, political, and economic aspects from an analysis. 
Political and economic data can provide support to conclusions in a legal 
analysis.
Trade relations between Lebanon and western European countries 
can be easily traced to a time prior to the independence of Lebanon in 1943. 
Lebanon was then a m andated territory with France as the m andate power 
playing the major role in the establishment of an economic infrastructure
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in Lebanon. Particular characteristics of the then em erging Lebanese 
economic pattern is illustrated by the figures below. These figures show 
the contribution of the various sectors to national income in 1950: 
agriculture 20%; industry 13.5%; and trade 28.9%.2 Between 1950 and 1957 
the value of Lebanese commercial activities increased by 56.3% and in 1957 
contributed nearly a third of the Lebanese national product.
The free economic market system, free transfer of currencies, and the 
existence of a banking system, unique in the Middle East, were advantages 
which enabled Lebanon to be (in economic terms) the most active country 
in the M iddle East. Consequently, external trade is a m ost im portant 
sector in the Lebanese economy. In 1971, Lebanon's imports am ounted to 
51% of its gross national income and 31% of its gross domestic product. In 
addition, external trade in Lebanon promoted the developm ent of other 
activities in the country, such as navigation, transport, and triangular 
trade.
The examination of trade relations between Lebanon and the six 
original member states of the EEC 1953-1958, that is, before the founding of 
the EEC, supplies a basis for an analysis of the impact of the establishment 
of the EEC on trade relations between Lebanon and west European states. 
While the European Coal and Steel Community was established earlier, in 
1957, Lebanon did not formalise its links with the ECSC until 1977, that is 
within the EEC global Mediterranean approach (fifteen years after Lebanon 
began negotiations for a trade agreement with the EEC).
A-IMPORTS
Im ports to Lebanon in general doubled between 1953 and 1957. 
Lebanese imports from the six original members, collectively, doubled in 
the same proportion as regards their value.3 However, the substantial 
increase in these im ports in relation to their percentage of the total 
Lebanese imports increased slightly, amounting to 23 per cent in 1953 and
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25 per cent in 1957 of total Lebanese imports. A question arises as to the 
importance of these imports from the original six members of the EEC. It 
may be raised in the light of the table below.
Fig -1.1- 
Flow of imports from the six original members to Lebanon. 
Value in mL£ (C.I.F)
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
BELGIUM1 8.02 9.74 14.65 20.07 18.01
FRANCE 32.75 38.91 52.25 54.42 52.32
GERMANY 13.67 23.93 34.01 39.71 43.97
ITALY 11.04 16.67 19.84 24.1 34.38
NETHER
LANDS
18.67 17.78 8.81 9.83 10.66
LEB T.I2 361.68 484.4 527.32 561.19 626.57
T.I S .O 3 84.24 107.03 129.56 148.13 159.34
Source:U.N, Yearbook of International Trade statistics,1957
(1): Throughout the Thesis, Belgium and Luxemburg figures are calculated together.
(2) Lebanese total imports.
(3):Lebanese total imports from the six original member states of the EEC.
During the years 1953-1957, Lebanon had trade relations w ith m ost of 
the EEC founder states, but France claimed the lion's share of Lebanese 
total imports; she was the biggest single exporting country to Lebanon. 
Imports from France counted for 68 per cent of the European share and 25 
per cent of total Lebanese imports in 1950,4 totalling L£ 80 m. The share
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of the other EEC founder states ranged between 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
at most, for the same year 1950, of Lebanese imports. However, imports 
from France fell in 1953 and later in 1957 regained their previous level 
w ith the same value of im ports in 1957. How ever, while Lebanese 
imports from France trebled between 1950 and 1957, the French share in 
the Lebanese market imports fell to 8 per cent of total Lebanese imports. 
Nonetheless, as regards the importance of French exports to Lebanon with 
reference to France’s European competitors, they were higher than exports 
to Lebanon from  the other six original m em bers. French exports 
represented in value 33 per cent of the European share in 1957 of the 
Lebanese market.
The share of French supplies in the Lebanese im port m arket was in 
competition w ith other European suppliers, particularly Germany and 
Italy. Exports from these countries to Lebanon increased in the years after 
1953 and their value trebled by 1957. This share in the Lebanese markets 
developed from 3.7 and 3 per cent in 1953 to 7 and 5.4 per cent in 1957 for 
Germany and Italy respectively. Their share, as far as imports from the six 
original members is concerned, doubled for the same period of time. They 
am ounted to 16 and 13 per cent in 1953, increasing to 27.6 and 21.5 for 
Germany and Italy in 1957 respectively.
The corresponding figures as regards the Benelux countries does not 
show an identical progress. Im ports from Belgium and Luxem bourg 
together contributed only 2.8 per cent of total im ports in 1953. They 
slightly increased to less than 3 per cent in 1957, though the value of these 
im ports doubled for the same period of time. Lebanon had relatively 
strong trade relations at that time with the Netherlands, which supplied 
the Lebanese market with 5 per cent of its imports in 1953. As such, the 
Netherlands was more im portant than the other original member state of 
the EEC save France. However, following the adoption of the boycott rules 
on Israeli goods in 1955,5 and owing to close trade relations between The 
N etherlands and Israel, Dutch products became subject to the rules of
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boycott of Arab countries, and Lebanese im ports of Dutch products 
decreased. In 1957 they were worth only 1.5 per cent of total Lebanese 
imports or 6 per cent of the European share in the Lebanese market.
Thus, Lebanese imports from the six original members prior to the 
inception of the EEC show that France was the major supplier to Lebanon 
with considerable competition from Germany and Italy. Imports from the 
Benelux countries rem ained m arginal in com parison w ith  o ther 
European countries.
B-EXPORTS
Lebanese exports in general developed, over the years, in proportion 
to its im ports by doubling between 1953 and 1957. The share of the six 
original members of the EEC in Lebanese exports represented 17 per cent of 
the total Lebanese exports in 1953. These exports fluctuated over the years 
and eventually decreased, by 1957 standards, w hen they am ounted to 
about 14 per cent of total Lebanese exports. This is well dem onstrated in 
the table below.
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Fig-1.2-
Lebanese exports to the six original Members of the EEC 
Value in mL£ (F.O.B)
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
BELGIUM 1.86 0.57 1.86 4.92 0.93
FRANCE 9.79 4.45 5.73 11.08 7.5
GERMANY 0.39 2.34 2.31 3.78 5.31
ITALY 2.63 2.87 3.17 .6.46 7.88
NTHRLND 0.67 1.35 1.07 0.34 0.64
T Leb.Expt 87.71 87.71 120.53 145.8 152.32
T Expts 
to the Six Orig
15.34 11.58 14.14 26 22.26
Source: U.N, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1957.
The above table indicates that in the founder members of the EEC, the 
French m arket was the most important for Lebanese exports. It absorbed 
11 per cent of total Lebanese exports to the EEC area. However, while this 
m arket rem ained more im portant than other m em bers’ m arkets until 
1957, Lebanese exports to France declined drastically in value and in 
substance, falling from 11 per cent in 1953 to 4 per cent of total Lebanese 
exports in 1957. As to their share of the six original members of the EEC, 
they were worth around 63 per cent in 1953 and likewise declined to 33 per 
cent in  1957. In contrast, Lebanese exports to G erm any and  Italy, 
insignificant in comparison w ith other European countries, expanded 
rapidly by 1957 as regards their value. In fact, they increased substantially 
as to their percentage of European imports from Lebanon and of total 
Lebanese exports as well. The German market absorbed 3 per cent of total 
Lebanese or 23 per cent of total members' imports from Lebanon , while
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the share of Italy was 5 per cent of total Lebanese exports worth 35 per cent 
of the original members' imports from Lebanon in 1957.
As regards Lebanese exports to the Benelux countries, they decreased 
in both value and substance. They were insignificant, am ounting to less 
than 3 per cent of total Lebanese exports in 1953. To the disadvantage of 
Lebanon, they declined to only one per cent of total Lebanese exports in 
1957. As to their share in comparison w ith the other six original 
members, they decreased from 17 per cent in 1953 to 7 per cent in 1957.
Therefore, similar to Lebanese imports from the six original members 
of the EEC, Lebanese exports to these countries were concentrated between 
Lebanon, on the one hand, and France , Germany and Italy on the other. 
Moreover, the French share of the Lebanese exports m arket declined as 
Italy and Germany improved their position. This indicates that on the eve 
of the inception of the EEC, Lebanon was in the process of a diversification 
of its trade flows in relation to the six original members of the EEC.
C-BALANCE OF TRADE
Trade relations between Lebanon and the six original members of the 
EEC suffered from significant deficits which doubled betw een 1953 and 
1957. They contributed to the total trade deficit of Lebanon by an average 
of between 25 per cent and 29 per cent in 1953 and 1957 respectively. The 
trade deficit resulted mainly from the poor perform ance of Lebanese 
exports to the markets of the six original members of the EEC, covering 
only 14 per cent of its imports from these countries. However, a question 
pertains as to whether such a trade deficit between Lebanon and the EEC 
countries w ould necessarily mean that it runs contrary to Lebanon’s 
interests. In fact, Lebanon's imports can be classified, according to the 
Lebanese Custom and Excise classification, into three categories: imports 
for internal consumption; imports for direct exports or as it is known 
triangular trade, and imports for manufacturing purposes directed towards
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exports.6 Moreover, at that time, Lebanon concluded different technical 
and cooperation agreements with some of the original m ember states of 
the EEC. This implies purchasing of capital product for developm ent 
purposes. Therefore, three categories of im ports out of four are for 
exporting purposes. Against these conditions, and since economic analysis 
is beyond the scope of this study, one can hardly judge the effect of the 
trade deficit on Lebanon.
It is generally accepted by economists that trade deficit could be 
detrimental if it affects the balance of payments in the long run. In other 
words, since Lebanon works as a gateway for Europe, it is likely that its 
trade deficit with the original member states may be overcome by its trade 
surplus w ith the Arab world. However, during the given period of time, 
Lebanon's trade deficit w ith the original m em ber states of the EEC 
contributed to 30 per cent of total Lebanon's trade deficit. Hence, it is 
logical to assume that Lebanon’s trade deficit with the EEC countries is 
largely influenced by the purchasing of capital products necessary for 
launching the process of economic developm ent in Lebanon. To 
u nderp in  such an assum ption, the im provem ent in  the econom ic 
development should be reflected in Lebanon's trade flow in the following 
years, particularly as regards Lebanon's exports to its m ain Arab m arkets 
and to the European markets. However, a persistent trade  deficit is 
certainly inimical to Lebanon's economic development and w ould have a 
direct effect on Lebanon's balance of payments. Consequently it w ould be 
detrimental to the external purchasing power of Lebanon, w ith subsequent 
effects on the economic and political relations with the major exporting 
countries to Lebanon, the original member states of the EEC.
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IN-LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN 
LEBANON AND THE SIX ORIGINAL MEMBERS PRIOR TO 
THE INCEPTION OF THE EEC,
The flow of trade between Lebanon and the six original members of 
the EEC shows that Lebanon has had relatively stronger relations w ith the 
form er colonial country France than w ith Germany and Italy. Trade 
relations w ith Benelux countries rem ained marginal in comparison w ith 
France, Germany and Italy. Consequently, the importance of such patterns 
of trade, seen from Lebanon's perspective, led her to m ake efforts to 
prom ote trade relations through norm ative m eans w ith  her m ain 
European trading partners. It is not therefore surprising to find that 
Lebanon, while concluding more than fifty different bilateral agreements 
with the six original members of the EEC, concluded seven agreements on 
trade, economic and technical cooperation, exclusively w ith France, Italy 
and Germany.7
The codification or legal regulation of trade relations betw een 
Lebanon and France led to the conclusion of the A gricultural and 
Technical Cooperation Agreem ent in 1951,8 Exchange of Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement in 19559 and the Economic Cooperation 
Agreement in 1967.10
A num ber of agreem ents were concluded w ith Italy before the 
inception of the EEC. Amongst these agreem ents, relevant to trade, 
economic and  technical cooperation, are the Friendship, Trade, and  
N avigation Treaty, of 1949,11 and the Exchange of Trade Agreem ent 
concluded in 1950,12 the Trade A greem ent in  1955,13 and  another 
Agreem ent on Economic and Technical Cooperation also concluded in 
1955.14
In addition, Lebanon had concluded six agreements w ith the Federal 
Republic of Germany. These included, the Payments Agreem ent (1951), 
M ost Favoured N ation A greem ent (1951), an Exchange of T rade
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Agreem ent (1951), replaced by another Exchange of Trade Agreem ent 
(1954), and an Economic Cooperation Agreement in the same year, in
addition to exchanges of letters.15
Lebanon had  thus concluded trade, econom ic and  technical
cooperation agreements in addition to some financial arrangements, with 
France, Germ any and Italy, bu t it m ade no effort to establish treaty 
relationships with the Benelux countries.
The analysis of the substantive rights and duties arising from the 
afore m entioned agreem ents are analysed below under the following 
headings.
1 - Aims and objectives;
2 - MFN treatment;
3 - Economic and technical cooperation;
4 - Financial cooperation;
5 - Common institutions.
A-AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Each of the agreements which Lebanon concluded w ith France, Italy 
and G erm any opened w ith  a pream ble setting o u t expressly  the 
resolutions and the political intentions of the contracting parties.
The m ain objectives, according to the pream bles, concerned two 
points, trade and economic development. The trade agreements aim ed at 
enhancing and developing trade relations on a reciprocal basis. The 
economic cooperation agreements aimed at strengthening and developing 
the economic and technical cooperation between the contracting parties 
w ith  a view  to contributing to the process of Lebanon’s econom ic 
development. However, the agreements used different m eans to reach 
these objectives.
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The preambles of the trade agreements between France and Lebanon 
referred to the intention of the contracting parties to intensify and develop 
m utual trade. The trade agreements were concluded at the same time as 
other economic and technical cooperation agreem ents encom passing 
agricultural and industrial fields. The Agricultural Technical Cooperation 
Agreement aimed at enhancing and advancing the agricultural sector of 
the Lebanese economy. The industrial field received similar attention in 
the Economic Cooperation Agreement intended to provide Lebanon with 
technical assistance with a view to increasing its productivity.
The respective agreem ents of Lebanon w ith  Italy and Germany 
similarly covered trade, economic and technical cooperation w ith respect 
to agriculture and industry. The objectives of these agreements resemble, 
in broader terms, the aims and objectives of the agreements w ith France, 
for strengthening trade relations between the contracting parties. As 
regards economic cooperation, the preambles of the agreem ents w ith 
Germany and Italy provided for technical and economic assistance to be 
offered by the developed contracting party to Lebanon to contribute to the 
process of the economic development of Lebanon.
The technical cooperation agreements with Germany and Italy state 
expressly a commitment to contribute to the economic developm ent of 
Lebanon. This differs from the preamble of the agreements w ith France 
which expressed, in broader terms, only an intention to contribute to 
increasing the level of productivity of Lebanon. This difference is clearly 
manifested in the detailed provisions of the agreements.
B-THE MOST FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT
Lebanon became a contracting party to GATT on 30 October 1947, and 
signed in addition, the provisional protocol and  all o ther relevant 
protocols related to GATT, until its withdrawal in 1951. Lebanon did  not 
provide any explanation for its withdrawal.
30
The principal provision of GATT is the MFN clause which is based 
on reciprocity, equality and universality between all the contracting parties 
prior to recent developments in the area of international developm ent 
law as part of the GATT system.16 It seems that Lebanon found no interest 
in opening its markets to all the contracting parties to GATT on an MFN 
basis. Its participation in GATT probably became a burden rather than an 
advantage. Consequently, Lebanon ceased to apply the MFN clause in its 
relations with its former GATT partners. It negotiated instead trade 
agreements w ith different countries with whom it had a significant flow 
of trade.
The MFN clause in GATT covers in broad terms all trade activities. It 
relates not only to customs duties but also to any advantages, favours and 
privileges accorded to imports and exports from one contracting party  to 
another. Once the most favoured nation treatment is accorded to a GATT 
contracting party, it has to be extended unconditionally and immediately 
as to like products in question to all other contracting parties. The 
application of this provision is subject, however, to formal derogations 
embodied in the GATT text.
The rights and duties arising from the application of the MFN clause 
were adopted by Lebanon in its contractual trade relationships w ith all its 
trade partners, particularly in its trade agreements with France, Germany 
and Italy. However, after Lebanon withdrew from GATT, it had  to spell 
out in detail the rights and duties related to the MFN clause covering the 
areas intended for most favoured treatment.
At the early stage of trade cooperation between Lebanon and France, 
the application of the MFN treatment was limited to specific areas of trade. 
The contracting parties granted each other MFN treatm ent concerning 
products originating in their territories and imported into the territory of 
the other party. The MFN treatment covered all fees levied on imports 
and  exports; regulations relating to taxes, form alities, and  licenses 
concerning imports, exports and transit trade.
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A lthough the MFN clause was confined to these areas, some 
advantages or privileges were accorded, or were to be granted under 
certain circumstances, for exemption from the application of the MFN 
treatment. The MFN clause did not apply to privileges which France had 
granted to territories within the "Union Frangaise", or to any advantages 
offered or to be offered by Lebanon to the member states of the Arab 
League, particularly to Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen and 
Libya. Moreover, the most favoured nation treatm ent did not apply to 
countries adjacent to either party. The same applied to other privileges 
consequent to the establishment of a customs union or a free trade area as 
recognised under Article XXIV GATT. Similarly, the advantages to be 
enjoyed or granted through the participation of either party  in any 
economic or trade organisation were waived from the m ost favoured 
nation treatment.
The trade agreements w ith Italy covered areas sim ilar to those 
embodied in the agreements with France. Both parties granted each other 
the MFN treatment, but some traditional waivers were granted. The MFN 
treatment covered, in addition, customs duties, any other duties or charges 
having equivalent effect, the m ethods of applying such m easures, the 
form alities relating to exports and im ports, beside all the available 
facilities related to trade. Under Article 6 of the agreement between Italy 
and Lebanon, certain advantages were excluded from the application of 
the MFN treatment. Thus, the MFN treatment between Italy and Lebanon 
did not apply to advantages accorded to adjacent countries w ith a view to 
"facilitating frontier zone trade", or to other advantages granted to a third 
party with the aim of forming a customs union, or a free trade area or as 
required by such a customs union or a free trade area. In addition, the 
advantages granted by Lebanon to the member states of the Arab League, 
and by Italy to the member states of the ECSC, Libya, San Marino, Vatican, 
and Somali land were exempted from the application of the MFN clause.
Lebanon and Germany, devoted a separate agreem ent to MFN
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treatment, the Most Favoured Nation Agreements concluded at Rome on 
16 October 1951; it coincided w ith the w ithdraw al of Lebanon from 
GATT. 17
According to this Agreement, both parties offered each other MFN 
treatment, particularly concerning customs duties, charges having similar 
effect, and all other levies. In addition, any other procedures which might 
facilitate the m utual trade relations between both countries, particularly 
the entry of shipping to the ports of both parties, and granting the use of 
all available facilities were subject to MFN treatment. Moreover, the most 
favoured nation treatm ent covered the authorization of im portation and 
exportation wherever such was needed. The agreement further stated that 
the entry of industrial and trade professionals of both nationalities to the 
territories of either party, including residency and the establishm ent of 
economic and trade activities were encom passed by MFN treatm ent.18 
However, the regulation of the activities of such establishment and firms 
is governed by another separate agreement. The MFN Agreem ent also 
p rovided  tha t both  parties , according to their respective national 
regulations, were to offer natural and legal persons the same treatm ent as 
their own nationals, specifically concerning industrial property as regards 
imports or exports from one party to another.
As in the case of the MFN clauses agreed with Italy, the agreement 
betw een Germany and Lebanon provided for similar exceptions. The 
m ost favoured nation treatm ent did not apply to privileges provided to 
adjacent countries for facilitating trade between the neighbouring states for 
promoting frontier zone traffic, neither did it apply to advantages granted 
to other countries for the formation of a customs union, or a free trade 
area. It also excluded special privileges and advantages which Lebanon 
offered to the independent Arab states at that time such as Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt.
It is clear that the privileges and advantages arising from MFN 
treatm ent betw een Lebanon and France, Italy and Germ any covered
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sim ilar areas. The agreement with Germany did not confine itself to 
them , as it additionally included more detailed provisions relating to 
persons who wished to undertake trade and economic activities. Identical 
exceptions provided in the agreements were otherwise repeated always. 
The exceptions to the MFN seem to constitute a policy by Lebanon as it 
incorporated identical exceptions in every trade agreement concluded with 
other countries.
C-TRADE COOPERATION
The trade agreem ents betw een Lebanon and the three original 
members of the EEC were not confined to MFN treatment, even if such 
treatm ent was the major instrument for developing trade relations. The 
agreem ents embraced several articles for liberalisation of trade, laying 
dow n specific arrangements (where relevant) to quantitative restrictions 
or quotas, in addition to other arrangem ents relating to im ports and 
exports betw een the contracting parties. These arrangem ents were 
intended to underpin the MFN clause in achieving the objectives of the 
trade agreements.
The trade agreements with France provided that the im port of French 
products w ould be subject to Lebanese national legislation in force and 
applicable towards all third countries, although certain Arab countries 
were offered greater privileges . In addition, Lebanon had to facilitate and 
France had to authorise the flow of products originating in Lebanon and 
specified in a list annexed to the Trade Agreement. The list systematically 
outlined the quotas which were allocated to Lebanon, as well as an import 
calendar applicable to Lebanese exports, subject to modification by a simple 
exchange of letters by both governments during the im plem entation of 
the agreement.
In the agreements of 1949 between Lebanon and Italy, the contracting 
parties were committed not to disturb their reciprocal trade by enacting
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economic and technical cooperation was conditional, sim ilar to the 
arrangem ent w ith France, in the sense that specialized German firms had 
to take part, totally or partially, in the execution of the  im portan t 
construction projects provided those firms enjoyed the w idest advantages 
envisaged under the Lebanese legal system.
A financial arrangement was provided as well to underpin economic 
and technical cooperation. For that purpose, paym ent for equipm ent 
would be m et according to certain specified procedures, whereas all other 
payments would be subject to the payment agreement concluded in 1954. 
However, where the Lebanese government was engaged in the projects, 
the payment was to be subject to special protocols.
E-COMMON INSTITUTIONS
The contractual relationship between Lebanon and France, Germany 
and Italy provided for the setting up of common institutions to supervise 
and help in the implementation of the agreements. These bodies, w ith 
different names in each agreement, were given specified tasks.
In the Agreements with France, the parties established an "Economic 
Cooperation Committee" with a view to examining the best possibilities 
for explo iting  m ost usefully  Lebanese econom ic resources. The 
C om m ittee w ou ld  be com posed of rep resen ta tives of the  tw o 
governments, assisted by experts and appointed by the authorities of the 
respective countries.
In executing its task, the Committee was to enjoy the necessary 
collaboration of all the respective ministerial departments of both parties. 
Moreover, as regards the tasks of the Committee, it had  to examine all 
projects w hich em erged consequent to the im plem entation  of the 
Agreement. Furthermore, it was to encourage and promote the exchange 
of technical information and ideas between the contracting parties.
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The contracting parties established another independent Mixed 
Commission composed, similar to the Committee, of representatives of 
both governments. However, the Mixed Commission was assigned the 
task of examining and proposing the means of developing the relations 
betw een both countries. It had the pow er to recom m end possible 
solutions to problems which might emerge during the implementation of 
the Agreement. Lastly, the Commission would be convened once a year 
upon a request of either party.
The Trade Agreem ent betw een Italy and Lebanon established a 
similar joint body, the Mixed Commission, w ith the task of developing 
economic relations between both parties and dealing w ith the problems 
that m ight emerge while the Agreement was being implemented.
The Economic Agreem ent w ith Italy established another Mixed 
Commission composed of representatives of both parties, assisted by 
Lebanese and Italian experts. Its task was to deliver recom mendations 
concerning projects, investments required, and paym ent arrangem ents. 
The Commission was to prom ote the exchange of ideas and technical 
information. It could organise training periods for technical personnel 
from both countries.
The Mixed Commission experienced a widening in its scope of tasks. 
These tasks ranged from overcoming the difficulties which m ight emerge 
during  the application of the Agreem ent to exam ining in detail the 
economic relations betw een both countries, and prov id ing  essential 
proposals to help enhance and develop relations. In addition, the Mixed 
Commission had to work out the statistical data for the rate of exchange 
and the balance of payments of both parties.
The Agreem ent w ith Germany chose different means for the joint 
institutions entrusted with more limited tasks. The contracting parties to 
the Agreem ent established a "Bureau de Recherches et d 'O rien tation  
Economiques" or Bureau of research and economic orientation. It had the 
task of providing the necessary orientation planning and aid to German
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firms wishing to contribute to the development of the Lebanese economy.
IV-CONCLUSIONS
Trade relations between Lebanon and the six original members of the 
EEC p redate  Lebanese independence. These relations involved a 
continuous trade deficit for Lebanon irrespective of w hether Lebanon’s 
trade  aspects are taken collectively or individually. H ow ever, the 
im portance of the trade flow varied relatively between one country and 
another. Lebanon had more significant trade relations w ith France, Italy 
and Germ any than with the other original members, leading to the 
adoption  of a trade relationship, based on agreem ents w ith France 
Germ any and Italy. There are two likely reasons for Lebanon’s trade 
deficit w ith the EEC countries. Either Lebanon's imports from the original 
m em ber states of the EEC were for export purposes particularly to its 
principal markets (Arab markets) or the deficit resulted from purchasing 
capital products necessary for its endeavour towards a process of economic 
development. In the following Chapters, trade flows will continue to be 
analysed in order to reveal the probability of these assumptions.
The analysis of the legal aspects of the contractual trade relationship 
betw een Lebanon and France, Italy and Germany dem onstrates that the 
prom otion and the development of trade between the parties form ed the 
principal aim of their agreements. However, the contracting parties made 
no reference to the differences in their level of economic development. 
To underp in  the achievement of the objectives, the contracting parties 
extended their cooperation to economic and technical fields designed to 
bring  about conditions to help Lebanon in its efforts to develop 
economically.
To achieve their aims and objectives, the contracting parties granted 
each other MFN treatment, with respect to areas relating to trade activities.
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This was effected in similar, but not identical manner, in every agreement 
between Lebanon and each of the three original members. The agreement 
w ith Germany extended such treatment to cover treatm ent for personnel 
involved in trade. In addition, the contracting parties undertook further 
commitments for liberalising trade, particularly the reduction of non-tariff 
barriers im peding trade besides necessary measures to facilitate m utual 
trade relations. However, certain m easures were exem pted from the 
application of both MFN treatment and liberalisation clauses. In addition 
to the traditional exceptions embodied in GATT, and in conformity with 
its foreign trade policy, Lebanon treated certain advantages accorded to the 
Arab countries as excluded from the application of MFN treatment. The 
liberalisation clauses were, however, more detailed in the case of the 
agreem ent with Italy, whereas it was incorporated in m ore general and 
b roader term s in the Agreem ents w ith France and G erm any. The 
Agreement with Italy alone included exceptions to liberalising trade with 
Lebanon, particularly as regards non-tariff barriers.
Lebanon and France, Italy and Germ any did  no t restrict their 
cooperation  to the trade  field. The in te rdependence  betw een  
strengthening  trade on the one hand, and economic and  technical 
cooperation on the other, was recognised as a condition to achieve the 
envisaged objectives, particularly  in the case of relations betw een 
developed and less developed countries. Economic and technical 
cooperation was based on respect for the m utual in terests of the 
contracting parties. The interests of the developed contracting parties was 
m anifested in the incorporation of certain provisions which linked such 
cooperation to the execution of projects by firms of the relevant developed 
cooperating contracting party. This approach was app lied  to all 
agreem ents w ith  the three original m em bers, pa rticu la rly  to the 
agreem ents between Lebanon and France and Germany. Economic and 
technical cooperation was backed by some m odest financial arrangements 
aim ed at facilitating trade, in addition to the acquisition of technical
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equipm ent necessary for the execution of the agreed projects.
The major apparatus of cooperation and fostering cooperation in 
areas of in terest to the parties was the establishm ent of common 
institutions. These, though given different names, had sim ilar tasks to 
perform . The Economic C ooperation C om m ittee, com posed of 
representatives of Lebanon and France, had to m ake the best use of 
Lebanese resources. The Mixed Com m ission was responsib le  for 
proposing  the m eans of developing relations betw een France and 
Lebanon. Two Mixed Commissions were established betw een Lebanon 
and Italy, w ith  the task of delivering recom m endations concerning 
projects to be executed in Lebanon and of helping the im plementation of 
the Agreement. The Agreement with Germany established a Bureau de 
Recherches et d'O rientation Economiques with the task of providing the 
necessary orientation and aid to German firms wishing to contribute to 
developing the Lebanese economy.
The contractual relationship betw een Lebanon and the original 
m embers of the EEC, at the time of the conclusion of the agreements, 
could be divided into two categories: trade and technical cooperation.
As regards trade, the relationship governing the contracting parties 
m ay be described as one of normal trade relations betw een two equal 
parties, bu t they were not on an equal footing as regards their balance of 
trade  or their level of economic developm ent. This indicates that, 
although Lebanon has characteristics which enable her to claim that she 
possesses strong historical and political links w ith some of the original 
m ember states of the EEC, relations between them were not codified in 
their trade agreements into binding undertakings, let alone preferential 
treatment. Nonetheless, a strong and friendly relationship was translated 
into technical cooperation commitments undertaken by the relevant states 
w ith a view to contributing to Lebanon's endeavour to bring about the 
necessary conditions for her economic development. N otw ithstanding, 
the interest of the original member states were taken into account in
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im plem enting the relevant agreement.
This contractual relationship governed the attitude of the contracting 
parties from the adoption of the Agreements until the inception of the 
European Economic Community. However, following the establishm ent 
of the EEC, the member states had, during the transitional period, to 
"coordinate their trade relations with th ird  countries". Therefore, the 
agreem ent between Lebanon and the relevant original mem ber states had 
either to expire or be renewed. Since the m ember states are no longer 
com petent in  this field, Lebanon had  to form ulate its contractual 
relationship w ith the member states via the EEC. A Trade and Technical 
Cooperation Agreement, was thus concluded between the EEC and its 
member states on the one hand and Lebanon on the other.
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47

THE PHASE OF NON-PREFERENTIAL TRADE RELATIONS
(1965-1972)
1-INTRODUCTION
Prior to the inception of the European Economic Com munity (EEC),1 
Lebanon enjoyed a treaty relationship with three original members of the 
Com m unity regulating, inter alia, trade relations and the commitments 
arising from  the economic and technical cooperation of the relevant 
contracting parties. The member states of the EEC are, as a group, the 
second major im portant trade partner of Lebanon. Their trade relations 
contributed to a quarter of the needs and absorbed one sixth of the total 
exports of Lebanon. Their relations as regards economic and technical 
cooperation aimed at contributing to efforts m ade by Lebanon to promote 
its economic development.
Following the establishment of the EEC a new era of trade relations 
between Lebanon and the member states of the EEC emerged. Lebanon's 
interest was manifested in the pledge given by- Lebanon to ensure the 
developm ent of its exports and to increase the level of technical and 
economic cooperation with the member states of the EEC. However, the 
development of Lebanese exports to the EEC could not be achieved unless 
Lebanon was to increase its productive capacity and to dism antle barriers 
to its exports. This raised the need for strengthening its existing trade and 
technical cooperation with the EEC member states.
Subsequent to the inception of the EEC and, particularly, w ith  the 
developm ent of its common commercial policy, the m em ber states lost 
their privileges in having bilateral trade agreements w ith th ird  parties. 
The EEC became the exclusive organ qualified to handle trade relations on 
behalf of its member states.
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The extent to which the EEC is legally qualified to undertake such a 
task is of great im portance and needs some recapitu lation. This 
im portance is clearly m anifested already in the fact tha t Lebanon 
recognised the new entity and entered into a trade agreement w ith it.
II-LEGAL PERSONALITY AND THE TREATY MAKING POWER 
OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
A-LEGAL PERSONALITY
In general, a legal person is "an entity, subject of law  capable of 
entering in to  binding  relations, possessing rights and  undertak ing  
duties".2 At the international level, the International Court of Justice, in 
its advisory opinion on the Reparations Case U.N v. Israel,3 defined the 
U.N - and by implication laid down a cornerstone for the definition of the 
international legal personality of international organisations- as a, "subject 
of international law and capable of possessing international rights and 
duties and having the capacity to m aintain its rights by bringing  
international claims".4
There has been considerable debate in the past as to w hether or not 
international organisations could possess international legal personality. 
However, it is now  universally accepted that international organisations 
are capable of possessing international legal personality albeit w ith limited 
functions.5
Indeed, different theories6 have been devoted to the international 
legal personality of international organisations. They all affirm that, if an 
international organisation is entrusted w ith certain functions a t the 
international level, independently from its mem bers states, it should 
possess legal personality as a necessary prerequisite for its actions. This 
view is based on ICJ's advisory opinion in the Reparations Case which 
stipulated that the U.N "could not carry out the intentions of its founders
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if it was devoid of international personality".7
The practice of international organisations shows that more than a 
quarter of treaties are concluded by international organisations w ith 
sovereign states or other international organisations.8 This involvement 
has never been challenged by states either as m em ber states of an 
international organisation or as treaty partners.9
These developments have accelerated the demise of the traditional 
theory  w hich basically proceeded from  the assum ption  th a t an 
international organisation cannot possess legal personality since such a 
qualification belongs only to states.10 Following recent developments in 
Eastern Europe, after perestroika, the traditional view is no longer held 
even by the USSR. In fact, its basic pillar no longer exists, as the theory’s 
existence was heavily politically motivated in the era of the cold war. 
Consequently, socialist legal writers now show their receptivity towards 
the legal personality of international organisations, particularly tow ards 
w estern  legal theories11 on the in ternational legal personality  of 
international organisations.
Therefore, following the unchallenged practice of in ternational 
organisations, in view of the principles of customary rules of international 
law, accompanied with opinio juris, one can assert that the international 
personality  of in ternational organisations has becom e un iversally  
recognised as part of, and governed by, a corpus of international law.12
The EEC, therefore, as an international organisation,13 p o ssesses  
international personality by virtue of the norms of international law. In 
fact, this legal personality of the EEC is recognised in the Treaty of Rome, 
w here A rt 210 EEC confirms that "the Com m unity shall have legal 
personality". This article, strictly speaking, does not confer the legal 
personality upon the EEC; it only provides a conspicuous proof of the 
intention of the framers of the EEC Treaty to recognise the Com m unity’s 
legal personality.
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B-TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE EEC
In 1957, the six original m ember states founded the European 
Economic Community ( hereinafter referred to as EEC). In the Treaty of 
Rome the founders committed themselves through the organisation, 
am ongst other things, to prom ote "an ever closer union" am ong the 
peoples of Europe and to prom ote the "harmonious developm ent of 
economic activities".14
By creating the EEC for an unlimited duration, and in order to fulfil 
its objectives, the six original member states endowed the EEC w ith the 
pow er, albeit w ith in  lim ited fields, to act independen tly  at the 
international level. For the purpose of achieving its entrusted objectives, 
the EEC exercises its power in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty 
of Rome. As such, the EEC is distinct from its mem ber states, and 
accordingly, th ird  countries can no longer, after the transitional period, 
have direct relations in the form of concluding treaties w ith the member 
states w ithin the areas of the EEC's competences.
It has been shown above that the legal personality of an international 
organisation is attributed to it by virtue of international law. However, 
the pertinent question, as far as the EEC as an organisation is concerned, is 
whether or not it possesses an absolute or limited competence.
Unlike states, whose international personality carries inherent treaty 
m aking competences,15 the EEC as an international organisation does not. 
The treaty m aking competence of an international organisation is an 
attribute of both its constitutional documents and additional recognised 
practice.
In the field of external relations, the Treaty of Rome confers upon the 
EEC an express pow er to undertake obligations by concluding  
international agreements with third parties in four main areas:
1- Commercial and trade agreements;
2- Association with other states;
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3- Cooperation with international organisations;
4- A dm ission of th ird  European states to m em bership in the 
C om m unity.16
Commercial and trade agreements, which concern am ongst other 
sources the common commercial policy,17 irrespective of whether they are 
b ila tera l or m ultila tera l agreem ents encom pass ta riff  and  trade  
agreem ents, export policy m easures to pro tect in ternational trade 
(safeguard m easures), and uniformity in m easures of liberalization of 
trade.18
The EEC is empowered to conclude treaties or agreements with third 
parties where they are necessary to fulfil the common commercial policy 
by virtue of Art 111 and 113 EEC. The former article deals w ith the 
transitional period, whereas the latter has been d ted  frequently, especially 
whenever a trade or tariff agreement is being concluded by the Council, as 
a legal basis for such an agreement.
A rt 113 EEC para 2 sets out the procedures for negotiating an 
envisaged agreement with a third state in addition to the measures which 
ought to be taken in order to conclude the ag reem ent. Moreover, within 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the concept of the 
common commercial policy has been in terpreted  in a w ide sense.19 
Article 113 EEC has to be considered in the light of the overall aims of the 
common commercial policy. This implies that the EEC is competent in all 
issues related to the common commercial policy.20
Another area where the EEC is given an express authority to conclude 
agreements w ith third states is association agreements. Article 238 EEC 
expressly authorizes the EEC to conclude association agreem ents w ith 
third parties. It empowers the EEC to "conclude with third states, a union 
of states or an international organisation agreem ents establishing an 
association involving reciprocal rights and obligations".21 Association 
agreem ents play an im portant role in the EEC's international relations. 
They have in the past been considered to be a prelim inary step in the
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process that leads to accession to the EEC. As such, the association 
agreem ent w ith  Greece, Portugal and Spain led to these countries 
accession to the EEC. The association agreement with Turkey, which was 
concluded nearly thirty years ago, has been deem ed by the EEC as a 
substitute for membership although Turkey has applied for membership 
in 1987.22
Moreover, the Treaty, with due regard to historical relations w ith the 
"overseas countries and territories",23 has enabled the EEC to conclude 
m ultilateral association agreements w ith most of the form er colonies of 
the member states.24
Furtherm ore, the establishm ent and m aintenance of appropriate  
relations w ith all international organisations, and particularly w ith the 
organs of the U.N and GATT, has been provided for expressly by Articles 
224 -231 EEC. Amongst them, is A rt 229 which stipulates that the 
Commission has to ensure the maintenance of all appropriate relations 
w ith the organs of the U.N, and the GATT, whereas the Com m unity 
(EEC) establishes a form of "cooperation w ith the Council of Europe".25 
The pow er to conclude agreements governing the adm ission of any 
European state is governed expressly by Art 237 EEC.
C-THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPETENCE OF THE EEC.
A lthough the Treaty of Rome has clearly established, by virtue of 
certain rules, the competence of the EEC, these provisions, nevertheless, 
are by no means exhaustive. It could be inferred from the practice of the 
EEC tha t such provisions are not considered as the only basis of 
competence. The ICJ stressed that the U.N m ust be considered to have 
such powers which (as competences), "though not expressly provided in 
its charter are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential 
to the performance of its duties".26 Thus, an international organisation 
which possesses international personality by virtue of international law,
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does not sim ultaneously hold an inherent treaty m aking competence. 
The latter is considered to be derived either from an express provision of 
the organisation 's constitutional docum ents, or im plicitly through its 
general objectives and functions entrusted to it and which are expected to 
be discharged.27 The latter forms the legal basis of the organisation's 
recognised practice.
The European Court of Justice has played a significant role in 
defining the Community's legal order and clarifying the scope of the 
EEC's au thority  in external relations as a field covering the whole 
spectrum  of objectives of the Treaty of Rome, to which should be added 
any other provisions or rules adopted internally by the EEC institutions. 
In C om m ission v. Council Re the European Road Transport Agreement 
(hereinafter ERTA)28 the Court adduced the theory of parallelism "in foro 
interno in foro externo".29 In its decision, the ECJ established a firm 
foothold for the process of developing the Com munity’s legal order. In 
answering whether or not the member states of the Com m unity or the 
Community exclusively had the power to enter into the ERTA, the Court 
went beyond the express provisions which grant treaty making powers to 
the EEC. It said "such authority arises not only from  an express
conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow from other provisions
of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the fram ework of those 
provisions, by the Community institutions".30
How ever, this theory did  not go unchallenged. Judge Pescatore 
affirm ed the view that "any lim itation of the sovereignty of states in 
matters of treaties cannot be im plicit... it m ust be expressly provided for in 
the constituent treaty".31 This was consistent with the view of the EEC 
Council of Ministers who opposed the theory of parallelism 32
Despite the Court's decision in ERTA, another problem  presented 
itself again, as to whether or not the mere existence of internal legislative 
pow er is sufficient to assume capacity to act at the international level, or 
should such an internal legislative power be exercised as a prerequisite for
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assuming such a capacity by the EEC. By implication, this has given rise to 
the question as to w hether or not the m ember states m ay retain any 
concurrent, residual, or transitional powers.
It seems, in principle, that whenever the Treaty expressly provides for 
an external power, the member states m ust refrain from any action which 
m ight "jeopardize the attainm ent of the objectives of the treaty".33 
Instead , m em ber states should  facilitate the  achievem ent of the 
Com munity’s task. If the member states retain such a concurrent power, 
the divergence of the substantive interest of the member states might lead 
the latter to undertake commitments at the international level which may 
not be consistent w ith their pledge towards the Com munity and which 
ultim ately w ould jeopardize the achievements (purposes) of the EEC. 
M oreover, once the Com munity has established its common policies 
which require high levels of uniformity, the member states m ust refrain 
from assuming any concurrent powers "since any step taken outside the 
fram ework of the Community institutions w ould be incom patible w ith 
the un ity  of the common m arket and the uniform  application of 
com m unity law".34 However, one might argue that collective action by 
the m ember states would not hinder the unity of the common market; 
neither w ould it jeopardize the uniformity of Community law  or weaken 
its legal order. It is interesting to distinguish between collective action 
w ithin the sphere and supervision of the EEC where the latter delegates 
such power, for different reasons, to the member states, in order to achieve 
the objectives of the Treaty, and collective action outside the sphere of the 
EEC institutions.35 The Court responds to the above assumption by saying 
that the Com munity alone "is in a position to assum e and carry out 
contractual obligations towards third countries affecting the whole sphere 
of application of the Community legal system".36
Later, the Court confirmed its position in the Local Cost S tandard 
Case.37 Answering the question whether the member states presum ed any
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concurrent pow er "in the field of the understanding", the Court, after 
examining the nature of the understanding, concluded that it fell within 
the am bit of the common commercial policy. Subsequently, w hen a 
common policy is established, it is intended to serve the interest of the 
mem ber states, and, therefore, it w ould be inconsistent if the m ember 
states had concurrent powers in the same field.
In retrospect, as to the question of exclusiveness, in  fact, the Court 
highlighted this issue when it was questioned on whether or not the EEC 
holds an exclusive power irrespective of w hether such pow er is being 
exercised or not by the Community.
The Court dealt with the question whether or not the mere existence 
of an internal Community power is sufficient to prevent the m em ber 
states from assuming any powers in two cases. In Kramer,38 after asserting 
the Com m unity’s authority to enter into international comm itm ents,39 
the Court considered that the member states may retain the pow er to 
regulate  the unexercised area of the C om m unity’s in ternal pow er, 
provided that they do not impair Community rules.40
The second instance was the European Laying -up Fund for Inland 
W aterway Vessels.41 On delivering its opinion on whether the internal 
power of the Community could be extended to the external field, the ECJ 
went further than the earlier cases. Since Arts 74 and 75 EEC lay down 
provisions for the establishm ent of a Com m on T ransport Policy 
(hereinafter CTP) realising the fact that the internal measures of the CTP 
had  not been implemented, the Court assum ed that the Com m unity 
exclusively, had the competence to enter into international agreements, 
though it authorised the member states to participate in the agreement on 
the ground of special circumstances.42 It is clear that the Court gave no 
priority to internal or external measures which may be first taken, since 
the Court in this case extended the doctrine of parallelism even to cover 
unexercised internal power. In its opinion, the Court said that "the treaty 
making power of the Community flows by implication from provisions of
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the Treaty creating the internal power and in so far as the participation of 
the Com m unity (in the international agreement) is necessary for the 
attainm ent of one of the objectives of the Treaty".43
H ow ever, those developm ents (as regards C om m unity  law) 
concerning the scope of the EEC's competence, have been confronted with 
major difficulties at the international level concerning the accession of the 
EEC to international organisations, especially to those of the U.N family. 
Even where the EEC possesses an exclusive power to participate and act at 
the international level, particular arrangements had to be m ade, in order 
to maintain the presence or at least the consent of the EEC.44
The conclusion that the EEC possesses legal personality by virtue of 
international law, is recognised under Art 210 EEC. It is com petent to 
conclude treaties with a third party in areas expressly provided by the 
Treaty provisions, by the act of its institutions and for other relevant 
measures .
The Court clarified the powers of the EEC to cover other areas not 
expressly provided for by the Treaty and enlarged the concept of implied 
powers to cover areas where no exercise of such granted pow ers has yet 
been exercised. It left no room for concurrent powers to be assum ed by the 
member states unless the technical circumstances for such a case provided 
otherwise.
Regarding the capacity of the EEC to conclude trade agreements with 
Lebanon, it is beyond any doubt that the EEC is fully com petent to 
conclude such agreements and Lebanon recognised such pow ers and 
established a mission at the seat of the EEC.
Ill-TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EEC AND LEBANON 
PRIOR TO THE NON-PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENT
Following the inception of the EEC, Lebanon had to reorganize its 
flow of trade with its European partners as a direct consequence of the
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creation of a customs union. Such a customs union entails the m utual 
elimination of all tariff barriers among its member states and the setting 
up  of a common external tariff system (hereinafter called CET) on goods 
im ported  from  non-m em ber countries.45 M oreover, Lebanon, at that 
time, had to review its relations with the member states of the EEC since it 
w ould no longer be able, especially after the end of the transitional period, 
to m aintain direct relations with them in the field of competences of the 
EEC, especially since already existing agreements w ith the mem ber states 
would either expire or be terminated.
Consequently, Lebanese trade relations w ith the original m em ber 
states of the EEC would be affected in two ways. Firstly, depending on the 
new level of the common external tariff (whether it was decreased or 
increased), the flow of trade, particularly  exports, w ould  either be 
developed or would deteriorate. Secondly, in principle, the comparative 
advantages of Lebanese exports, if any, to the EEC would be countered by 
the elimination of tariff barriers between the member states of the EEC and 
consequently, trade would be diverted in the interests of the m em ber 
states (internal trade).46 Subsequently, exports would be deflected between 
Lebanon, on the one hand, and different member states on the other. This 
raised the question as to to what extent Lebanon's trade relations w ith the 
m em ber states of the EEC w ould be affected consequent to the 
establishment of the EEC leading Lebanon to engage in a trade agreement 
with the new entity.
A-IMPORTS
The impact of the inception of the EEC, which is more than a mere 
customs union, on trade relations w ith Lebanon did  no t take place 
instantly. Following the establishment of the EEC, trade relations had  to 
go through a transitional period during  which the CET w as to be 
consolidated against third countries, and existing trade agreem ents w ith
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third countries were to be harmonised.47 Consequently, exports of a third 
party into the EEC would be subject to the new common external tariff. It 
was these exports which were most affected by the creation of a customs 
union. On the other hand, imports from the EEC into a non-member state 
w ould either be subject to counter measures or rem ain unchanged. It 
w ould, therefore, not be surprising if Lebanese trade relations w ith the 
original mem ber states m aintained their position, as regards im ports, 
following the establishment of the Community. This point deserves two 
remarks. Firstly, general trends in Lebanese trade show that the flow of 
im ports had over the years increased in both value and substance.48 
Lebanese imports from the EEC member states trebled in value from £L145 
m to £L585 between 1958 and 1965. Secondly, the fact that Lebanon's trade 
agreements with France, Italy and Germany were operative at that time 
might have resulted in active trade between them and Lebanon.49
In 1958,50 Lebanese im ports from  the E uropean  C om m unity  
increased slightly to over 28 per cent of the total Lebanese im ports 
compared with figures for the previous years, though it was less than by 8 
per cent of its share in 1950. The EEC share fluctuated then till it reached 
its peak of 32 per cent of the total Lebanese imports in 1965. In that year 
the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and 
Lebanon was concluded. Similarly, imports from indiv idual m em ber 
states were affected after the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome. The 
flow of the imports in question is illustrated by the following table.
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FIGURE NO 2.1
Lebanese imports from the Member States of the EEC post Treaty of Rome.
Value in m L£ (C.I.F)
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
BELG & LUX 17.16 17.38 27.08 31.34 29.43 29.54 29.53 37.91
FRANCE 47.71 50.97 64.25 70.5 64.8 79.26 88.6 254.2
GERMANY 38.51 55.92 71.92 78.27. 68.78 77.04 89.73 145.77
ITALY 31.9 37.88 48.96 56.23 54.98 59.84 74.09 111.46
NTHRLND 10.66 14.54 18.34 20.16 21.65 23.16 24.8 36.43
IMPORTS 
FROM M.S
145.94 176.73 230.55 256.5 239.64 268.64 306.75 585.77
T.LEBIMPTS 518.33 699.83 854.6 1061.3 1049.56 996.59 1194.88 1791.87
Source:UN. INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS, V .l, 1965.51
The above table shows that, with the implementation of the Treaty of 
Rome, the importance of trade with the member states of the EEC, shifted 
between them  as sources of Lebanese imports. As such, EEC exports to 
Lebanon became more evenly distributed among its member states. Thus 
France no longer claimed the uncontested major share of total Lebanese 
trade. Its exports had been overtaken by Germany, and, to some extent, by 
Italy as one of the major competitors, particularly in 1960-61 and 1964. The 
share of the Benelux countries was negligible com pared w ith  other 
member states of the EEC not reaching more than two per cent of total 
Lebanese imports in 1965. The French share fluctuated betw een 6 and 9 
per cent, save in 1965 when it was 14 per cent. The German share in the 
Lebanese market was nearly 8 per cent of the total Lebanese imports over
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all the years while the Italian exports to Lebanon remained constant at a 
level between 5 and 6 per cent. The diversity of Lebanese imports from 
other member states of the EEC other than France could be affected, as 
mentioned earlier, by the fact that Lebanon had concluded different trade 
and technical cooperation agreements with Germany and Italy alongside 
the agreement with France. By the terms of those agreements, in addition 
to facilitating trade and granting each other MFN treatm ent, technical 
cooperation took place between them and Lebanon. The technical 
cooperation included the implementation of different economic projects 
entailing the purchase of capital equipm ent necessary for such projects 
from Italy and Germany.
Therefore, following the creation of the EEC, the im ports from the 
latter to Lebanon im proved dramatically. Prior to EEC's inception, 
Lebanon's imports from its member states doubled, w hereas after the 
establishment of the EEC these imports improved more than four times, 
(which is more than the increase in Lebanese total imports) . Indeed, the 
substantial improvement of these imports as a percentage of total imports 
is shown by an increase to 32 per cent compared with 26 per cent just 
before the creation of the EEC.
B-EXPORTS
Lebanese exports to the member states of the EEC were subject to the 
newly established tariff barriers.52 It is not surprising to find that exports 
from Lebanon to the EEC countries, after the Treaty of Rome, did  not 
im prove as substantially as imports did, though their value increased. 
The table below shows the trends in Lebanese exports to the member states 
of the EEC after the inception of the latter.
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FIGURE NO 2.2
Exports from Lebanon to the EEC Member States post Treaty of Rome.
Value in m L£ (F.O.B)
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
BELG&LUX 0.48 0.89 0.64 0.59 0.95 1.77 1.72 2.17
FRANCE 7.39 3.29 2.27 1.69 5.34 7.54 4.98 8.61
GERMANY 3.5 2.87 1.71 1.96 6.48 8.24 6.29 6.12
ITALY 3.22 4.4 5.43 3.88 9.25 8.92 7.16 10.55
NTHRLND 0.64 0.04 0.31 0.54 1.6 1.88 1.9 1.47
T. Expt to EEC 15.23 11.49 10.36 8.66 23.26 28.35 22,22 28.92
Total Leb Expt no 139.1 218 4397.2 192 196.3 216 324.0(
Source: UN. INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS, V .l
The above table shows that Lebanese total exports, w orth £L110m in 
1958, parallel to an increase in imports, trebled by 1965, though less in 
relative terms than the increase in imports. However, although Lebanese 
capacity to export increased, the level of exports to the EEC deteriorated 
sharply. They represented a value of nearly £L15 million in 1958 or 13.8 
per cent of total Lebanese exports. Thereafter, they gradually decreased in 
value and percentage, reaching their lowest point of less than 2 per cent of 
total Lebanese exports in 1961. This deterioration was a direct consequence 
of the creation of the EEC and the establishment of a Com m unity CET 
with high levels of duties beside an inward looking policy of its member 
states. However, following the first general reduction in the level of 
duties as a result of the GATT Kennedy Round, Lebanese exports to the
s 62
EEC increased slightly over the years but never exceeded 9 per cent of total 
Lebanese exports. Subsequently, Lebanon exports concentrated on Arab 
markets as a principal destination where no real trade barriers existed.
Contrary to a policy prior to the establishment of the EEC, and within 
the small share of Lebanese exports to the EEC, Lebanon no longer 
concentrated only on the French market as a target for its exports as far as 
European markets were concerned. It diversified its export trade between 
France, Germany and Italy. Moreover, Lebanese exports to Germany and 
Italy outpaced the share of exports to France. After 1959 Italy became the 
m ost im portant m arket am ong Lebanon's European partners w ith a 
highest share of some 30 per cent in total exports to the EEC, increasing 
gradually over the years up to 36 per cent in 1965. Trade relations with 
Germ any followed the same trend as w ith regard to Italy. Though 
quantitatively less it had significance for Lebanon.
C-BALANCE OF TRADE
It is clear that an imbalance prevailed in the terms of trade between 
Lebanon and the member states of the EEC. The imbalance, existing 
already prior to the establishment of the EEC, was accelerated by the high 
level of the CET which the EEC adopted. It was a major obstacle to 
Lebanese exports to the EEC. Consequently, Lebanon's trade relations with 
the original member states of the EEC showed a larger gap in Lebanon's 
trade deficit following the inception of the EEC. The trade deficit, in 
favour of the original member states, increased four fold and contributed 
by 40 per cent to the Lebanon's general trade deficit. Lebanese exports to 
the EEC did not am ount to more than 10 per cent of Lebanese im ports 
from the EEC (the range was between 3 and 10 per cent).
Needless to say, from Lebanon’s perspective, the im provem ent of 
trade relations with the EEC and its member states by developing exports 
became an essential strategic necessity. A better balance of trade would
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enhance Lebanon's balance of paym ents, contributing in tu rn  to the 
process of economic development in Lebanon through the availability of 
capital resources.
Earlier in the Chapter (balance of trade), it was stated that the increase 
in Lebanese imports from the EEC member states could be related to two 
m ajor item s; im ports for export purposes and  im ports of capital 
equipm ent. As to total Lebanese exports, they continued to im prove 
rapidly but deteriorated sharply consequent to the establishm ent of the 
EEC, w ith a sharp deterioration in Lebanon's (negative) total balance of 
trade, w ith a value changing from £L408m in 1958 to L£1667m in 1965. 
The deterioration in the total balance of trade was directly connected to 
Lebanon's trade with the EEC, with a direct effect on Lebanon’s (negative) 
balance of trade between 1958 and 1965. This negative balance increased 
from -130 in 1959 to -279 in 1965.53 Taking this developm ent into 
consideration, it would in principle be almost inevitable for Lebanon to 
seek better access for its exports to EEC markets. Backed by its historical, 
political and cultural links, in addition to the state of relations between the 
EEC and Israel,54 Lebanon assumed that the member states could provide 
some "needed" special or preferential treatm ent. H ow ever, as the 
mem ber states were no longer competent in the field of external trade, 
Lebanon's desire and need to boost trade w ith the EEC could only be 
achieved by concluding a new trade agreement encompassing preferential 
arrangements with the EEC and not with the member states.
Ill-THE TRADE AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION  
AGREEMENT (1965)
A-GENERAL BACKGROUND.
W hen the Lebanese government sought to strengthen its relations 
w ith the EEC and its members states, it was influenced no t only by
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economic considerations, but also by political, historical and cultural ones 
as well. During the early sixties, the political environm ent in the Arab 
world was hostile towards Western Europe, particularly after the tripartite 
attack in 1956 on Egypt. Lebanon, however, sought, for m any reasons, 
strong links with W estern European countries. Lebanon's readiness to 
strengthen its political links w ith such countries aimed at countering 
pressure exerted by Pan Arabism.
Econom ically, Lebanon surv ived  th rough  trad e  and  foreign 
investm ent, particularly in the financial sector. In the trade  sector, 
agricultural products were the pillar of its exports, namely fresh vegetables 
and fruit, particularly lemons, bananas, and apples. Following the 
inception of the EEC, with adverse consequences for trade relations with 
its member states, Lebanese exports faced a high level of EEC im port duties 
which severely im peded the flow of Lebanese products to the EEC 
countries.
Lebanon had ties of economic cooperation w ith France, Italy and 
Germany; it was in the interest of Lebanon to maintain these ties. They 
were -as show n in the first chapter- formalized by m eans of bilateral 
treaties concluded between Lebanon and some of the original m em ber 
states of the EEC. However, Lebanon had to face the fact that, from a legal 
perspective, concluded treaties and agreements would expire in due time, 
if not term inated or renewed, and, therefore, Lebanon w ould no longer 
benefit from such agreements w ith individual member states, after the 
transfer of powers in the field of commercial policy to the EEC. Lebanon 
was also observing the Israeli application to the EEC for preferential trade 
arrangements and detailed discussions within the EEC on the best w ay for 
providing favourable treatment.
Against this backdrop, Lebanon authorised its mission in Brussels to 
explore possibilities of form alizing relations w ith  the EEC as a 
Community. From the outset, Lebanon hoped to secure preferential trade 
treatm ent, in keeping w ith the political and economic su p p o rt by
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governm ents of the EEC for Lebanon.55 Lebanon hoped that the EEC 
would offer specific trade concessions to Lebanon.
A state should have a m inim um  level of know ledge concerning 
international trade rules to be taken into consideration when negotiating a 
trade agreement between two parties, one of whom is a contracting party 
to GATT. Lebanon w ould have to be aware, not least as a former 
contracting party to GATT, that any contracting party to GATT such as the 
EEC and its m ember states, would not be able to extend preferential 
treatm ent to any country, unless the favourable treatm ent in question 
w ould be unconditionally and immediately extended to all other states 
who are contracting parties to GATT. Therefore, the conclusion which 
may be draw n from the Lebanese request for preferential treatm ent is that 
Lebanon's "special" relations with the EEC m ember states w ould enable 
the EEC to exempt relations with Lebanon from the application of the 
MFN clause. Lebanon did not request preferential treatm ent falling 
within the ambit of Article XXIV of GATT. The GATT however, system 
provides for itself special relations exempted from the application of the 
MFN clause in specified cases. Otherwise, the Lebanese request w ould be 
irrational.
On 2nd October 1962, the Lebanese mission in Brussels transm itted a 
m em orandum  to the EEC proposing exploratory talks w ith a view  to 
developing economic relations.56 On the basis of this initiative, the 
officials of the EEC showed readiness to consider the form al Lebanese 
contact seriously and positively.57 The Council of Ministers of the EEC 
consequently agreed, at its meeting on 22-23 October 1962, that exploratory 
talks should begin between the interested parties.58
Lebanon's prim ary interest, according to the m em orandum , was 
in tended from an economic and trade perspective, to im prove the 
stubborn trade deficit, to promote exports of Lebanese agricultural products 
to the EEC, exports of oil to Europe and to encourage E uropean 
investment in Lebanon. To this end, Lebanon requested the EEC to offer
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one way tariff concessions identical to the treatment granted to Israel, and 
technical assistance in the industrial, hydroelectric, civil aviation, and 
tourism fields. This was tantamount to special preferential treatment.
H ow ever, the Lebanese dem ands faced . some difficulties. As 
explained earlier, while conditions for imports to the EEC were very rigid, 
the m ember states of the EEC were no longer individually, capable of 
providing Lebanon with any preferential treatm ent because they lacked 
capacity to do so. Again, from a legal perspective, the EEC was not capable 
of providing Lebanon with special preferential treatment,59 because such 
treatm ent could constitute a violation of GATT's provisions, unless the 
arrangem ent in question was to lead to the establishment of a free trade 
area, customs union or an association based on reciprocal rights. It should 
be borne in m ind that the debate on non-reciprocal preferential treatment 
was only beginning at the time. Were the EEC to offer erga omnes tariff 
cuts, Lebanon would gain nothing.
Moreover, European investment in Lebanon was beyond the capacity 
of both the EEC and its member states. Their free market economy system 
did  not entail state-intervention affecting such issues. Furtherm ore, 
capital investm ent belonged to the private sector based  on "fair 
competition" in the market. Hence, foreign inward investment depended 
heavily on incentives which the Lebanese governm ent (or any host 
government) would be able to offer to foreign investors.
Lebanese interest in oil exports was of great importance, even though 
Lebanon was not and is not an oil producing country. Lebanese interest in 
oil exports is based on the fact that most of Iraqi and Saudi oil was exported 
through pipelines from both countries to terminals in Lebanon and from 
there to Europe. Lebanon exported Saudi and the Iraqi oil and secured 
income therefrom.
The prom otion of Lebanese exports to the EEC m arket is related to 
Lebanon's productive capabilities entailing the need to secure preferential 
treatm ent for enabling exports to reach the European market. Lebanon's
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principal interest was in this respect the export of agricultural products. In 
I960, Lebanon was capable of producing 100 tons of oranges, 35 tons of 
lemons and 53 tons of apples. Out of that productive capacity, Lebanon 
exported to its main trade partners (the Arab countries) 70 tons of oranges, 
20 tons of lemons and 49 tons of apples. The rest was for internal 
c o n su m p tio n .60 H ad Lebanese production of fruits increased later, 
according to estimates of the Lebanese Fruit Office, Lebanon w ould have 
not been able to export yearly to Europe more than 1.6 tons of apples, 5 
tons of lemons and 5 tons of oranges.61
Concerning fruit, the six original member states of the EEC did not 
produce any bananas, and only produced 200,000 tons of lemons estimated 
to be 10% of EEC consumption. Similarly, apple production did not satisfy 
m arket consumption in the EEC.62 Moreover, most of the EEC member 
states d id  not apply quantitative restrictions in the form  of quotas 
applicable to Lebanon as to imported lemons, bananas, and apples. If any 
member state applied such quotas, it already had offered special quotas to 
Lebanon.63
Despite the capacity of the EEC markets to absorb Lebanese exports, 
Lebanon was incapable of producing export products oriented to the needs 
of the EEC. This may lead one to question the rationale behind the 
Lebanese application to the EEC for favourable treatment, despite its small 
share in the EEC. We may however note Lebanon's ambition to offset its 
trade deficit with the Community. Unlike its attitude tow ards Israel, the 
EEC was determined not to treat Lebanon's requests favourably.64 It is not 
surprising that negotiations following the Lebanese m em orandum  and 
the EEC Coundl's decision for exploratory talks with Lebanon, reached an 
impasse. In the view of the EEC, it was in the absence of part IV of GATT 
and GSP, impossible to respond to the Lebanese request positively. 
C onsequently, Lebanon revised its requests and  subm itted  a new  
m em orandum  to the EEC in February 1964. The m em orandum  requested 
the opening of negotiations for a commercial and technical cooperation
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agreem ent.65 On 9th - 10th of March 1964 the Council decided to open 
negotiations.66 At its session on 13-15th April 1964, the EEC Council,67 
instructed the Commission, in  accordance w ith the Treaty of Rome, to 
resum e negotiations with Lebanon aim ed at a m utual MFN treatm ent, 
coordination of the member states technical assistance to Lebanon and the 
establishment of the necessary common institutions.
The negotiations took place from 13th to 15th May 1964.68 The EEC 
delegation was headed by the Director General for External Relations, and 
the Lebanese delegation was led by the Head of the Lebanese Mission to 
Brussels. The negotiations covered the advantages of the MFN clause in 
addition to proposals by both parties. The negotiations were resum ed in 
early July 1964. A "satisfactory agreement" on trade and technical 
cooperation was initialled on the 9th of March 1965 and signed w ith all 
relevant docum ents in Brussels on 21st May 1965.69 It was the first 
Agreement on Trade and Technical Cooperation reached by the EEC and 
its member states with a non-member country. The European Parliament 
approved the conclusion of the Agreement,70 and called for a uniform 
arrangement to be applied with respect to all the M editerranean countries 
p rior to the com pletion of the common commercial policy.71 The 
national procedures for the ratification of the agreement were completed 
by all relevant parties in 1967. The Agreement entered into force in the 
same year.
B-THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT.
The Treaty of Rome empowers the EEC to conclude agreements with 
third parties, within the ambit of its competences, and when it engages in 
relations at the international level, it has no t only to respect its 
constitutional document, but also the norms of international law  in the 
relevant field. Thus, if the EEC practice was inconsistent w ith its treaty 
m aking pow ers, this w ould be in violation of its constitu tional
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documents, possibly in term inating the practice in question. The EEC 
argued that, if it offered preferential treatment to Lebanon, such a practice 
w ould be deem ed to be incompatible with the norm s of international 
trade law: it would be in violation of GATT rules. W hat then is the legal 
basis of the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement at both internal 
and external levels.
i-THE INTERNAL OR COMMUNITY LEVEL
As the EEC is expressly empowered to conclude trade agreements 
w ith third countries, even during the transitional period, the Council of 
the EEC, in ratifying the Trade Agreement, had cited Articles 111, 114 and 
228 as a legal basis for concluding the Agreem ent.72 However, the 
Agreement was not concluded by the Council exclusively. The member 
states joined the EEC in the conclusion of the Agreement by means of a 
mixed procedure w ithout any legal explanation for it. How ever, the 
question which ought to be considered is whether the cited articles were 
suffieicent to confer upon the EEC the necessary powers to conclude the 
Agreement.
The Trade Agreement was concluded in 1965, that is, during  the 
transitional period due to expire formally by 1969. It expired eighteen 
months earlier by virtue of the Council's decision in 1968. In 1965, the 
common commercial policy was not completed and the EEC legal order 
was not very clear: the legal position of the EEC had then no t been 
explained by the ECJ through the evolution of its jurisprudence on the 
competences of the EEC. Therefore, one can w onder w hether the 
conclusion of the Trade Agreement during the transitional period m ay be 
invoked as a reason for the participation of the m ember states in the 
Agreement. In other words, did the member states possess concurrent 
powers during the transitional stage?
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As to the common commercial policy, the Treaty of Rome devoted 
Article 111 EEC to deal with the transitional period. This article asks the 
member states "to coordinate their trade relations with third countries so 
as to bring about by the end of the transitional period the conditions 
needed for implementing a common policy in the field of external trade". 
This means that, though trade relations of the member states w ith third 
parties then existing would not be affected by the Treaty, the member states 
w ere required to elim inate any incom patibilities w ith  the Treaty.73 
However, the member states were not entitled to engage in new  trade 
agreements with third parties, as such power was transferred by the EEC 
Treaty to the institutions of the EEC. Article 111 EEC expressly authorised 
the EEC to conclude trade agreements with third countries in respect of the 
common customs tariff. When authorised by the Council, in response to a 
Commission recommendation, according to Para (2) of the same Article 
111 EEC, the Commission may conduct the negotiations on a proposed 
trade agreement. The general scope of the Trade Agreement shows that it 
was entirely devoted to trade issues dealing with MFN treatm ent which 
falls under the commercial policy of the EEC and, consequently, w ithin 
EEC competence. Art 111(2) and (3) EEC are similar to Art 113 (3) and (4). 
It means that in conjunction with Art 5 EEC, the m em ber states are 
prevented from undertaking any measures which could jeopardize the 
attainm ent of the objectives of the Community. With regard to the Trade 
Agreement concluded with Lebanon, according to Art 111 EEC, there could 
subsequently no longer be any question of autonomous national capacity 
to be exploited by the member states during the transitional period.74
A rt 228 EEC, on the other hand, w as cited in the A greem ent 
presum ably because it provides procedures for the conclusion of such 
agreements w ithin the scope of the EEC Treaty. The Article expressly 
binds the institutions of the Community as well as its member states.
As mentioned earlier, the EEC is competent to act in m any areas at 
international level. Art 113 EEC explicitly confers upon the EEC the power
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to conclude trade agreem ents w ith th ird  countries, but, this Article 
concerns the post-transitional period. After the transitional period, when 
the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement had to be renewed, Art 
113 EEC was d ted  as a legal basis for the Council's decision.75
As the Treaty of Rome vests pow ers in the EEC to conclude 
agreements w ith third countries, this power becomes exclusively enjoyed 
by the EEC represented by its competent organs. This gives rise to the 
question as to why the member states joined the agreement with Lebanon, 
even though the EEC is competent to conclude trade agreem ents w ith 
third countries
The EEC Treaty provides no provisions identical to A rt 102 of 
Euratom  by which, expressly or implicitly, one or more m em ber states 
may join the EEC in concluding an envisaged agreement. Nevertheless, 
in the light of the practice of the EEC, similar agreements w ith different 
third states were concluded in the form of mixed agreements.
In general, according to of Ehlerman, the use of mixed agreem ent 
procedures is related to external and internal factors.76
The most im portant external reason is the negative attitude of some 
states towards the recognition of the EEC as a legal person capable of acting 
at the international level. This stand used to be explained by reasons of 
ideology, alongside the fact that the Treaty establishing the EEC does not 
create duties for third parties. Moreover, the participation of the member 
states, removes from the third party's perspective, any legal uncertainty of 
such a proposed agreement; it consequently ensures total respect for the 
undertaking (for the agreement) and for the EEC as well.77
The internal factors justifying resort to the form of mixed procedures, 
concern the consideration that the proposed undertakings could be either 
broader than the EEC competences, or may cover certain fields where the 
members states retain a residual power.78
As far as the the first assumption is concerned, and as regards the case 
relating to Lebanon, it should be remembered that Lebanon adopted a
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constitution derived from the French constitution. This means that, in 
addition to its liberal and m arket oriented economy and democratic 
regim e, Lebanon reflects a w estern understanding  of the theory of 
international law. Relations between Lebanon and the founder states of 
the EEC were good, as shown by the variety of treaties concluded between 
Lebanon and three of the six original members states. Furthermore, the 
practice of the French m andate in Lebanon (before its independence) 
became a m ain source of international law  in Lebanon,79 w ith  an 
understanding favourable to western theories of international law. Above 
all, Lebanon as a small and poor developing country had (and has) little 
influence, if any, in the international sphere. This may explain, especially 
politically or ideologically and less so legally why Lebanon could not reject 
or be hostile towards the legal personality of the EEC. Since the inception 
of the EEC, Lebanon has in fact recognised the new entity and established 
diplom atic links w ith it. The recognition by a th ird  sta te  of an 
international organisation as a legal person com petent to act at the 
international level leaves no justification for asking its m ember states to 
join, in the area of the organisation's competences, either the negotiation 
or the ratification of a proposed agreem ent w ith the organisation. 
Therefore, regard ing  the first assum ption, there seem s to be no 
justification for resort to the use of mixed procedures. Nevertheless, 
Lebanon had no interest to object, and did not object to the member states 
of the EEC joining their Com munity in the conclusion of the Trade 
Agreement, particularly as it had and has (as a non-member) no say in 
internal Com m unity matters. The participation of the m em ber states 
increased, on the other hand, the certainty of the Trade Agreem ent and 
imposed duties on the member states to fulfil the Trade Agreement.
The other reason for the adoption of a mixed agreem ent m ay be 
explained by internal reasons, the most im portant point being that the 
Trade Agreem ent exceeds the EEC’s explicit (and even implicit) treaty 
making-powers. An examination of the Trade Agreem ent m ay reveal
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whether there was a need for resort to use of the mixed procedure. It is 
necessary to establish the demarcation of powers of the EEC on the one 
hand, and the member states on the other, in order to establish that the 
use of a m ixed agreem ent is conditioned by C om m unity 's internal 
reasons.
The general scope of the Trade Agreement covers : (a) a MFN clause, 
and its traditional exceptions; (b) the establishm ent of tw o common 
institu tions, the joint comm ittee and  the joint technical group; (c) 
technical cooperation.
The m ost-favoured nation treatm ent, in addition to its exceptions, 
concerns duties and charges relating to imports and exports. In other 
words, this part of the Agreement deals w ith issues falling w ithin the 
scope of Art. I l l  EEC during the transitional period, and Art 113 EEC post 
in the transitional period. From a legal point of view ,it means that the 
EEC is, in this respect, competent to conclude treaties with third parties.
Technical cooperation, on the other hand, is aim ed at increasing 
technical assistance granted to Lebanon by the EEC Member States.80 This 
part of the Trade Agreement neither was or is covered by any express 
provision in the EEC Treaty, particularly w ith reference to those Articles 
which empowered the EEC to conclude agreements with third states. On 
this issue, Han Van Houtte has a different view.81 He says that technical 
cooperation is a m atter covered by A rt 238 EEC, consequently, technical 
cooperation is within the competence of the EEC. A plain reading of this 
Article shows that it confers powers upon the EEC to conclude, w ith third 
states, a union of states or an international organisation, association 
agreements based on reciprocal rights and duties. It does not explicitly 
authorise any form of technical cooperation. However, as Van H outte 
argues, the Council could have d ted  Art 238 as a legal basis for the Trade 
Agreement. In opposition to this view, Parry and H ardy82 argue that 
technical cooperation measures provided in the Trade Agreem ent are not 
w ithin the competence of the EEC. Furthermore, Art VIE of the Trade
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Agreem ent involves, inter alia, the sending of experts and teachers to 
Lebanon and the training of Lebanese citizens in commercial, educational 
and industrial establishments in the member states. This has financial 
implications. Since Art VIII (c) provides that Lebanon assumes a part of 
the adm inistrative costs involved in the im plem entation of related 
projects, the w ord "such part" m eans tha t m ost of the financial 
implications which result from technical cooperation will be a burden on 
the member states of the EEC though each specific case shall be determined 
by m utual agreement.
The Articles cited by the Council as a legal basis for the Trade 
Agreement apply only to the fields of trade and tariffs. The Articles do not 
cover financial assistance granted to third parties. This may be considered 
to have been the case even more so during the transitional period when 
no independent financial resources were provided. To supplem ent this 
deficiency, the member states added their own authority as they did  in 
the case of other similar agreements.83
By analogy, the European Court of Justice, in its opinion on the 
N atural Rubber Agreement,84 answering the question w hether or not the 
member states are capable of participating in the Agreement, said that as 
the m atter (the Agreement) considered by the Court fell w ithin the C.C.P, 
the Commission had exclusive competence to participate in  the Draft 
A greem ent. N evertheless, since the financial im plications of the 
Agreement were not yet settled, and until this issue was settled internally, 
the member states might, participate in the Agreement.85
There are therefore, two reasons underlying the participation of the 
member states in the Trade Agreement with Lebanon : Firstly, the Trade 
A greem ent w ent beyond the treaty m aking-powers of the EEC, and 
secondly , the financial im plications w hich arose from  technical 
cooperation were to be borne directly by the member states, implying the 
participation of the latter.
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ii-THE EXTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
As already stated above, when the EEC concludes a trade agreement 
w ith a third party, it has to do so within its field of competence and, in 
compliance with the norms of international law. The international rules 
which regulate world trade are embodied in the General Agreem ent on 
Tariff and Trade. The EEC and its member states are contracting parties to 
GATT and consequently governed by its provisions. Lebanon however, 
since its w ithdraw al from GATT, has enjoyed only observer status, and 
,not a contracting party, is consequently not bound by GATT provisions.86 
As explained earlier, the EEC argued that any preferential treatm ent to be 
accorded to Lebanon would be in violation of Article 1 of GATT. One 
may, however, wonder whether the GATT rules were considered to be 
exhausted for seeking "dispensation" from the application of the MFN 
clause for granting Lebanon tariff concessions.
From the outset, the EEC did not show Lebanon much sym pathy or 
by to understand its needs or work out the best means to m eet them  
without infringing international trade norms embodied in GATT. During 
the discussion of the Israeli application, the EEC ruled out the possibility of 
creating a free trade area with that country on political grounds fearing 
that this w ould annoy Arab countries.87 Such a political element did not 
exist in the case of Lebanon. EEC's attitude towards Lebanon at that time 
w ould therefore be, free of the need to find a political modus vivendi 
relating to the EEC external policy. This left the Com m ission to 
concentrate on the technical issues of that policy in the negotiations with 
Lebanon, w ithout profoundly investigating Lebanese needs. In addition, 
existence of the political links (which Lebanon used to claim it enjoyed 
w ith respect to some member states of the EEC) was not reflected when 
deliberating within the EEC institutions, on the Lebanese application with 
a view to extending preferential treatment to Lebanon. One m ay question
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w hy the Com mission d id  not suggest any d ispensation  from  the 
application of Article 1 of GATT.
Article 1 of the General Agreement does not perm it any contracting 
party to offer any advantage to any other country unless such treatm ent 
im m ediately and unconditionally is extended to all other contracting 
GATT parties. However, the practical application of this obligation is 
possible to minimise through different derogations. These derogations 
can be found in GATT provisions with the m eaning and scope agreed 
upon by the Contracting Parties to GATT. 88
According to GATT provisions, historical preferential treatm ent in 
existence before the creation of GATT and specified in annexes A, B, C and 
D have been maintained by GATT.89 Moreover, derogations from MFN 
treatm ent are extended to facilitate frontier traffic,90 customs union,91 free 
trade areas,92 and the conclusion of interim agreements leading either to 
the formation of a customs union or a free trade area.93 A further waiver 
from MFN treatm ent is perm itted under exceptional circumstances in 
accordance with Article XXV GATT.94
Among the above derogations, there are two Articles under which 
the EEC m ight waive the application of the MFN clause. These are 
Articles XXIV and XXV of GATT.
At an earlier stage of its appearance in the international sphere, the 
EEC was not prepared to engage in agreements w ith a view to forming 
either a customs union or a free trade area, unless such agreem ent was 
deemed to be a preliminary step for joining the EEC.95 However, from a 
legal standpoint, and apart from an economic perspective, there w as a 
possibility of concluding an interim agreement leading in the long term  to 
the formation of a free trade area with Lebanon.
An interim  agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area 
entails that, "duties, charges and o ther restric tive  regu la tions of 
commerce" are to be substantially eliminated on all trade betw een the
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contracting parties [Art XXIV: 8 (b)]. Nevertheless, such suppression of the 
barriers to trade are not required to be reciprocated immediately. Instead, 
an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area may be 
subject to a plan or schedule for such form ation w ithin a reasonable 
length of time. Therefore, by adopting such a method, the EEC w ould 
have been able to grant Lebanon tariff concessions, w ith  or w ithout 
receiving immediate reciprocity, without violating the rules of GATT.
Furtherm ore, the EEC could have sought special dispensation on 
grounds based on GATT Article XXV. The needs of Lebanon could have 
been invoked as exceptional circumstances w ith a view  to w aiving 
obligations im posed by the MFN clause. A lthough recognising the 
exceptional circumstances of Lebanon required the approval of the vast 
majority of votes of the contracting parties to GATT [two third majority, 
see BISD 5 S/25, & Art XXV (4) of GATT], the EEC was reluctant to seek 
dispensation from the obligations of Article 1 GATT on such grounds.
The EEC a ttitude  tow ards the application  by L ebanon and  
consequently its alleged adherence to international trade  rules could 
therefore be justified on political rather than legal grounds. This m ay be 
clearly contested in the EEC view as regards the application to the EEC by 
Israel for tariff concessions. Therefore, Lebanese ambitions to gain some 
preferential treatment reflecting the historical, cultural, and political links 
w ith some of the EEC original member states of the EEC failed to be 
translated into legal reality.
C-THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT
The Trade and Technical Cooperation A greem ent opens w ith  a 
preamble of four paragraphs which set out the intentions and the general 
objectives of the contracting parties in concise and plain language. The 
Agreement is then divided into two parts, covering trade activities and
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technical cooperation.
It was a non-preferential agreem ent aim ed at strengthening the 
existing relationship between the six original member states of the EEC 
and Lebanon, in the economic and trade fields, by means of developing 
trade  relations and increasing the effectiveness of their technical 
cooperation.
i-AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The pream ble of the Trade Agreement refers to the reasons and 
purposes behind the adoption of the Agreement. Both the Com munity 
(including its member states) and Lebanon expressed their determ ination 
to "consolidate and extend their economic and trade relations" since they 
realised the importance of a harmonious development of trade between 
themselves. However, while serving as a guideline to the intentions of 
both parties towards their envisaged trade and technical cooperation, the 
preamble of the Agreement set no specific or detailed objectives as the 
ultim ate end, nor did the contracting parties undertake comm itm ents 
towards the elimination of the obstacles to trade. After the preamble, the 
rights and the commitments of the parties in the field of trade were set 
out. Thereafter, the EEC paid little attention to contributing to the process 
of economic development in Lebanon. It is clear that the pream ble does 
not help to show how to eradicate the gap, in both economic development 
and trade deficit, between the contracting parties.
As far as technical cooperation is concerned, the EEC and its member 
states undertook to coordinate measures for the purpose of increasing and 
prom oting "the technical assistance granted to Lebanon, besides the best 
possible use of the material and the hum an resources assigned to that 
assistance". The Trade Agreem ent m ade no m ention of any specific 
objectives in this field. This could be related to the fact that, at that time, 
the transitional period was in operation and the respective powers of the
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EEC had not been elaborated. Moreover, the economic issue was not dealt 
w ith within the EEC, but was left within the jurisdiction of the member 
states. Similarly, the financial sector received no specific attention in the 
preamble. The m ember states bore the financial cost of the technical 
cooperation.
ii-MOST FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT.
Concerning trade issues, the two parties granted each other m ost 
favoured nation treatm ent.96 The scope of this clause was extended to 
encompass duties and charges on imports and exports and all related 
formalities from one party to another.
This principle, as a traditionally recognised one (explained earlier in 
the present thesis), is subject however, to certain derogations from its 
application, in the form of exceptions. For example, it does not apply to 
nations engaged in a customs union, or in a free trade area; neither is it 
applicable to certain countries falling within the ambit of A rt XXV GATT. 
Moreover, most favoured nation treatm ent does not affect the special 
relations or advantages, for example granted by Lebanon to adjacent states 
in order to facilitate frontier zone traffic, or other advantages aw arded by 
Lebanon to the member states of the Arab League.
The most favoured nation clause, as it stands, is a cardinal principle 
of GATT serving world trade . It is internationally recognised that this 
c la u se 97 is based on two fundam ental legal principles: equality  of 
trea tm en t and im plied reciprocity betw een states in  the  field  of 
international trade relations.
During the early sixties, this provision was profoundly criticised by 
different legal writers and international authorities. It was said that as a 
cornerstone of GATT, the significance of the MFN clause stemm ed from 
the fact that its original authors enjoyed, between themselves, the same 
level of development. However, as a principle the MFN clause proved to
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be inoperative as new countries with unequal grow th levels became 
involved in international trade.98 The lim itations of the clause were 
identified by legal writers and experts on developing countries. The thrust 
of their argum ent was based on the fact that equality between unequal 
states as regards trade relations entails unequal tre a tm e n t."  This 
argum ent however fell, however, short of meeting the aspirations of the 
developing countries, since the distinction between equality and similarity 
(or identical terms) is not drawn carefully. As regards trade relations and 
the issue of economic development, two unequal parties in terms of 
economic developm ent necessarly not entail unequal treatm ent. The 
natu ra l resources of different countries could com pensate for the 
disadvantages of a less developed country and provide a potential capacity 
neutralising such inequality and consequently advancing or enhancing 
the process of economic development. This point may lead one to classify 
countries according to their level of economic development on one hand, 
and to their potential capacity on the other. For example, the rich oil 
producer countries could not be treated on footing identical to that of 
other poor countries in terms of natural resources, even though both may 
possess low levels of economic development. Therefore, inequalities 
should not be interpreted only according to the level of developm ent 
criterion, bu t should refer also to the potential capacity of the given 
country. In o ther w ords, unequal parties in term s of econom ic 
developm ent m ay receive unequal treatm ent, p rov ided  th a t such 
treatm ent is compatible with the degree of the needs and w ants of that 
given country. Therefore, the country which needs m uch m ore should 
receive better treatment than other countries that need less.
By analogy, one wonders how the MFN principle could be expected to 
operate well for the achievement of the objectives which were referred to 
in the Trade and Technical agreement between Lebanon and the EEC.
Prior to the Trade Agreement, Lebanon incorporated the MFN clause 
in all relevant agreements with the former mem ber states of the EEC.
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However, it is w orth repeating that Lebanon w ithdrew  from GATT in 
1951. The mere fact of this withdrawal shows that Lebanon is not legally 
bound to extend the MFN clause to third countries unless its interests 
require it to do so through bilateral arrangements. It can be questioned 
whether Lebanon's interests are served by the inclusion of the MFN clause 
since trade between Lebanon and the m ember states of the EEC was 
characterised by a chronic deficit. Pursuing such relations on an equal 
footing by means of homogeneous and identical terms as was proposed in 
the Trade Agreement, given the huge gap in the level of development 
between both parties, together with the fact that Lebanon is a poor country 
in terms of natural resources, would lead only to an increase in the trade 
deficit of Lebanon. On a wider scale, at international level, it sap the 
international legal order of trade.100 Consequently Lebanon, a weak state 
(developing country), would no longer be able to afford to import from the 
member states, owing to its lack of counterpart products in exchange for 
such exports. This inevitably would lead to the commercial and possibly 
financial collapse of a weak country like Lebanon w ith recessional 
consequences in the strong nations. Therefore, this clause as it stands 
could not be helpful in consolidating and extending trade relations 
betw een the contracting parties nor helping the harm onisation of the 
developm ent of trade. These objectives could only be achieved by 
acknowledging a principle of equality based on the substantive needs of a 
country and not on homogeneous and identical terms.101 In other words, 
if the EEC were to recognise the substantive needs of Lebanon, it should do 
so by meeting them through offering asymmetric treatm ent geared to the 
needs of Lebanon's level of economic development. However, the EEC’s 
view was that the international trade legal order prevented the EEC from 
providing Lebanon treatment in accordance with its substantive needs and 
wants.102
Assuming this to be the case, one could ask a legitimate question: on 
what legal basis did the EEC offer Israel tariff concessions regarding specific
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Israeli goods, though on a temporary basis, in 1964.103 Were the selective 
tem porary tariff concessions offered by the EEC to Israel contrary to the 
rules of GATT?
The key factor in the argum ent related to these questions thereto is 
whether there are specified waivers as regards the EEC, perm itted by either 
the rules of GATT or the provisions of the Trade Agreem ent (between 
Lebanon and EEC) since the Agreement between Israel and the EEC was 
concluded on 4th June 1964104 a few years before the incorporation of part 
IV of GATT and the establishment of a General System of Preferences 
(hereinafter called GSP). Part IV of GATT and the GSP recognise the 
problem of development in developing countries105 and the latter allows 
the developed countries to gran t the developing countries trade 
preferences without being bound by extending such preferential treatment 
to other developed countries.
The agreement between Israel and the EEC106 entitles the former to 
selective tariff cuts on several industrial and agricultural products, though 
on a temporary basis.107
In principle, any tariff concessions made by one country subject to 
GATT rules to another country (whether or not a contracting party  to 
GATT) entitles other contracting parties to invoke their rights for similar 
treatment. Therefore, it is not surprising that the contracting Parties to 
GATT are reluctant to make tariff concessions outside GATT tariff 
negotiations. However, the pro-Israeli argum ent viewed the EEC's tariff 
concessions to Israel as a suspension of these tariffs ra ther than 
preferential treatm ent.108 A tariff suspension differs from tariff reduction 
in so far as the former is granted on a tem porary basis.109 Henig argues 
that a suspension of tariffs could later be consolidated in the context of 
general tariff negotiations when reciprocity might be obtained from other 
countries benefitting from the lower tariff.110
The legal effectiveness of the "suspension" of the rate of tariffs, 
according to the agreement between Israel and the EEC, em anated from
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Art 2 of that agreem ent which calls for immediate acceleration of the 
higher tariff of some member states to the suspended level. This tariff cut 
p rov ided  better access for Israeli products into the EEC m arkets 
consequently leading to conditions of imperfect competition with other 
similar third countries exports. Therefore, this form of tariff concessions 
advantaged Israeli exports to the EEC markets.
The MFN clause states that any "advantages, favours, privileges, or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in 
or destined  for any country shall be accorded im m ediately  and 
unconditionally to the like products originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties". As such, the EEC had to extend 
the advantages and favours (which took the form of tariff cuts, and 
acceleration of the application of the CET to the level of the suspended 
tariffs) to Lebanon by virtue of their MFN treatm ent clause. Otherwise, 
unless the EEC had sought special dispensation from GATT rules, it would 
have been acting in violation of GATT rules on the one hand, and its 
commitments tow ard Lebanon on the other.
A thorough and profound reading of the derogations from the MFN 
clause under Article 1 para 2 reveals that such derogations concern 
historical trade relations existing before the establishm ent of GATT.111 
Since Israel was founded after GATT, there is obviously no connection 
betw een the said derogations and the case of the EEC and  Israeli 
agreem ent. M oreover, the agreem ent was far from  establishing a 
prospective customs union or a free trade area or even an interim  
agreem ent w ith an intention to lead to a customs union or a free trade 
area.
Furtherm ore, Article III of the Trade Agreem ent w ith  Lebanon, 
which entitled the EEC and its member states to derogate from applying 
the MFN clause to Lebanon in accordance w ith Article XXV GATT, 
provided that such a derogation, would only be admissible w ithin the
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fram ew ork of GATT112 and may be perm itted in accordance w ith the 
procedures set out for that purpose.113
Two conditions m ust be met under Article XXV GATT114 in order to 
have a country granted a waiver from applying the MFN clause. Firstly, 
Article XXV GATT, entitles the Contracting Parties to define "certain 
categories of exceptional circumstances. This means a discretionary power 
has been retained by the contracting parties to accom m odate such 
exceptional circumstances according to their interests. H ow ever, it 
imposes a substantive prerequisite to make use of such waivers. This 
prerequisite includes, in addition to the procedures and voting system 
(two th irds m ajority approval), that such derogations should not be 
provided elsewhere under the General Agreement. The second condition 
is that the necessity of such a waiver m ust be dem onstrated. The EEC 
neither requested nor was granted such a waiver.115
Moreover, the last permissible waiver granted to the EEC was in 
Article III (e) of the Trade Agreement w ith Lebanon. How ever, the 
beneficiaries of this waiver were well defined in Protocol 1 annexed to the 
Trade Agreement, which denies any favourable treatm ent to Israel.
Therefore, the practice of the EEC as far as the agreement with Israel is 
concerned, shows that the agreement ran contrary to the principle of 
m ultila tera lism  upon  w hich GATT is built, albeit tha t the  tariff 
preferences were on tem porary grounds, and as such the practice 
constitutes an effectual means of obviating the rules of GATT.
Be that as it may, one w onders w hether Lebanon, desp ite  its 
w ithdraw al from GATT, could invoke this precedent to seek preferences 
similar to those which were granted to Israel, according to the MFN clause 
between Lebanon and the EEC?
It is well known, according to the norms of international law, that an 
agreem ent between two or more subjects of international law  does not 
create obligations or grant advantages to third parties.116 In this context it 
should be pointed out that, the application of the MFN clause between
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Israel, the EEC and its member states was subject to GATT rules; the 
application of the MFN clause as regards Lebanon and the EEC was subject 
to their Trade Agreement. Moreover, regarding GATT provisions, EEC 
practice involves ambivalence towards the MFN clause since it granted 
Israel preferential treatm ent w ithout resorting to any justified waiver in 
accordance w ith GATT procedures. Furtherm ore, the MFN treatm ent 
extends any advantages or preferential treatm ent to any  p roduct 
o rig inating  or destined  for any o ther country  im m edia te ly  and 
unconditionally to a like product originating or destined for the territories 
of all other contracting parties. However, since the tw o provisions of 
MFN, as found in (1) GATT and (2) the Agreement w ith Lebanon are in 
identical terms, Lebanon and the EEC may be considered to be bound by 
the commitments and enjoy the advantages which arise from the MFN 
clause. Therefore, by the term s of the Trade Agreem ent, the M ost 
Favoured Nation treatm ent should apply to "imports into the m em ber 
states of the EEC of products originating in Lebanon". Consequently, 
Lebanon should enjoy at least similar and identical advantages to these 
granted by the EEC to Israel, even if only on a tem porary basis. However, 
if Lebanon was to be granted advantages similar to those of Israel, would it 
be under an obligation to accord Israel the same advantages granted to the 
EEC?
The application of the MFN clause between the EEC and Lebanon is 
governed by their bilateral Trade Agreement and not by a m ultilateral 
agreement. By virtue of its Trade Agreement, Lebanon is comm itted to 
extend any advantages it may grant to any country to the EEC. This does 
not create any right for a third country which is not bound by a similar 
agreement w ith Lebanon. Consequently, Lebanon is under no obligation 
to accord Israel any advantages similar to those granted to the EEC.
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iii-TECHNICAL COOPERATION
EEC-Lebanese technical cooperation took place for the first time in 
1965. This cooperation aimed to coordinate and intensify the technical 
assistance from the member states of the EEC to Lebanon. It was intended 
to make the best use of the material and hum an resources available in 
Lebanon in her interest. By virtue of the Trade and Technical Cooperation 
Agreem ent the member states of the EEC undertook to send experts, 
specialists and technical staff to public, educational and research bodies in 
Lebanon.117
Through cooperation Lebanon was provided w ith the necessary 
hum an resources, and the technical capital equipm ent, w ith a view  to 
enhancing the quality of the educational, research, and public bodies in 
Lebanon. The more important technical assistance provided to Lebanon at 
that tim e w as training of Lebanese technicians. R elated train ing  
program m es took place in public bodies, educational and  research 
establishm ents, and industrial, agricultural, commercial, and  banking 
undertakings in the member states of the EEC. It was hoped this would 
lead, inevitably, to a transfer of know how to Lebanon.
Lebanon's undertaking in this cooperation was, inter alia, to facilitate 
the execution of the relevant technical cooperation measures. Lebanon 
pledged to abolish consequently all duties, charges having equivalent 
effect and any other fiscal charges relating to the equipm ent supplied to 
Lebanon. In addition, private belongings of the European personnel who 
were involved in the execution of the agreed projects were exempted from 
similar charges. Moreover, Lebanon had to provide lands and premises 
w herever necessary, besides taking part in the adm inistrative costs in 
individual cases.118 It is clear that the technical cooperation between the 
EEC and Lebanon was an implicit succession to the earlier technical 
cooperation agreements between Lebanon and the original m em ber states 
of the EEC, the burden of the technical cooperation rem aining on the
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member states.
D-INSTITUTIONAL CONTENT
The Agreem ent established a Joint Committee representing all the 
in terested  parties, which had the task of superv ising  the p roper 
application of the Agreem ent of studying the developm ent of trade 
rela tions betw een the EEC m em ber states and  Lebanon; and  of 
recommending any possible furtherance of their trade.
Moreover, a Joint Technical Group was established w ith particular 
interest in technical cooperation. It was assisted by experts representing all 
parties. Its task was to examine Lebanese requests. The Group was to 
report the outcome to all its parties. These conclusions should have been 
taken into consideration when even a decision on technical cooperation 
was to be made. The Group also supervised the execution of the agreed 
projects.
E-RELEVANT PROTOCOLS
The Trade Agreem ent was supplem ented by tw o protocols; a 
declaration of intent and a joint declaration annexed to the Agreement.
The protocols concern the internal German trade in goods of German 
origin, and the exceptions to the MFN clause as regards the Vatican City 
and the Republic of San Marino. Further, it covers the m arket of oranges 
in the Community. The declaration of intent pertained to the grant of 
credit insurance to those Community exporters who trade w ith Lebanon 
in accordance with the national legislation of every concerned party. The 
joint declaration reaffirmed the readiness of the member states of the EEC 
and Lebanon to apply the articles of the Agreement in accordance w ith the 
national legislation of each country. Lastly, the Trade Agreem ent was 
originally concluded for three years. It was, however, renewed every year
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until it was replaced by the Cooperation Agreement in 1977.
H ad Lebanon achieved its objectives and, subsequently d id  the new 
Trade Agreement bring about any developments in the relations between 
the interested parties? Alternatively , was it disappointing for Lebanon? 
Did it serve a political means only?
From the outset, Lebanon was overly ambitious towards its relations 
w ith the EEC, presumably relying on its historic relations w ith France. 
However, relations between states are governed by more than moral and 
emotional issues. Economically, Lebanon was in no desperate need for 
preferential treatment, particularly in the presence of Arab markets which 
absorbed most Lebanese exports. Moreover, the lack of productive capacity 
for exporting purposes in agriculture and manufactured goods at that time 
made the question of penetrating the EEC market largely irrelevant. The 
absence of international developments left Lebanon with no justification 
for dem anding preferential treatment. Therefore, it is more than likely 
that the Lebanese m em orandum  to the EEC was politically m otivated 
rather than anything else. In the end, Lebanon and the EEC reached no 
more than a traditional trade agreement, though Lebanon continued to 
receive technical assistance.
V-THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIRST ENLARGEMENT ON 
THE TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE 
EEC
Similar to the formation of a customs union, the accession of new 
m em ber states into the EEC will have various political, economic and 
legal implications both within the EEC itself and within the new member 
states in addition to their external relations.119
Politically, the accession of a European state to the EEC m ay bring the 
new state and a third country into a direct relationship which they may 
have previously had no interest to maintain. Moreover, the accession
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may put the new member state face to face with certain political issues in 
which it previously had no say. For example, the Palestinian cause 
became an issue for Ireland. The Irish Foreign Minister said in 1974 that
w ith countries throughout the world between whom and ourselves, until 
last year, there was virtually no political and economic contact".120
The economic impact of the enlargement of the EEC internally, (on 
the EEC itself and its member states), and externally (on a third party) has 
been discussed intensively by academic writers.121 However, concerning 
the implication of the enlargement on the external relations of the EEC 
and its new  mem ber states w ith Lebanon in particular has not been 
analysed. The question which ought to be tackled in this respect is to what 
extent the first enlargement had an impact on trade relations and the legal 
framework of such relations between the EEC and its acceding countries 
on the one hand, and Lebanon on the other? The answer to such question 
entails as a background an analysis of trade between Lebanon and the new 
member states prior to the date of their accession.
A-THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN 
LEBANON AND THE NEW MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC 
PRIOR TO THEIR ACCESSION.
Trade relations between Lebanon and the new member states prior to 
their accession to the EEC was no less significant than the trade w ith the 
six original member states. This is particularly the case w ith the U.K. The 
three new member states, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom had 
different level of trade transactions with Lebanon.
i-IMPORTS
Similar to other EEC member states, Lebanon's trade relations w ith
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the new m ember states involved in the first Com m unity enlargem ent 
could be traced back to years before Lebanese independence. This applies 
particularly to trade relations with the United Kingdom. The tables below 
show that, among the acceding countries, the U.K was the most im portant 
trade partner for Lebanon.
Figure No 2.3
Lebanese imports from the new member states prior to their accession
Value in 000$ (C.I.F)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
U.K 34980 38541 42057 50263 67025 92009
DENMARK 6614 6918 8070 8888 12093 8604
IRELAND 624 667 1048 774 1437 —
EEC(9) 204214 212461 223797 290339 361886 549441
T.LEB. IMPT 521142 531983 567489 677121 849347 122522
SOURCE: UN International Traade Statistics, V.I, (1972&1973)
As regards imports, the U.K was, among the acceding countries, the 
most im portant supplier to the Lebanese market. Its imports to Lebanon 
had nearly trebled by 1973. As such, the U.K share was equivalent to 6.7 
per cent of total Lebanese imports in 1968, and improved to over 7.5 per 
cent in 1973. Moreover, in substance, British exports to Lebanon as regards 
the European share in the Lebanese m arket and the total Lebanese 
imports, increased slightly, but continuously, over the years until the year 
of accession. The corresponding figures for Denmark in the Lebanese 
m arket were less important. Its exports to Lebanon corresponded always 
to less than 2 per cent of the total market. The trade relations between
91
Lebanon and Ireland were negligible.
In comparison with other individual member states of the EEC, trade 
relations w ith the U.K were as important as those w ith Germany, France 
and Italy, though the U.K was trailing behind them as one of the major 
suppliers to Lebanon.
ii-EXPORTS
The U.K was a principal market for Lebanese exports not only among 
the acceding European countries but also as far as all the member states of 
the EEC are concerned. Lebanese exports to the U.K m ultiplied five times 
betw een 1968 and 1973. In comparison w ith the six original mem ber 
states, their imports from Lebanon show that they always lagged behind 
those of Great Britain.122 Moreover, while the percentage of Lebanese 
exports to the six original countries was declining , exports to the U.K were 
in substance improving between 1968 and 1973.
Figure No 2.4
Lebanese exports to the new member states prior to their accession
Value in 000$ (C.I.F)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
U.K 5639 5628 4614 8313 12950 25351
DENMARK 1590 1133 893 735 4921 2380
IRELAND 0 55 9 370 21 58
EEC(9) 17525 19477 19499 26621 37424 58363
T.L.EXPT 146048 170476 197833 256039 350605 502467
SOURCE: U.N. International Trade Statistics,V.I, (1972&1973)
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The above table shows that Lebanese exports to the U.K were slightly 
less than 4 per cent of total Lebanese exports in 1968, developing steadily 
and reaching their peak in 1973 with over 4 per cent of the total exports.
 The corresponding figures for the Danish market were less important
for Lebanese exports. Moreover, Danish imports from Lebanon decreased 
over the years. As regards Ireland, along with its exports to Lebanon, Irish 
imports from Lebanon remained negligible.
Therefore, trade relations between Lebanon and the U.K, among the 
new  m embers, were of great significance to Lebanon, concerning both 
im ports and, especially, exports. This im portance m anifested itself 
through expanding Lebanese exports to its market, consequently helping 
to narrow  the trade deficit between both countries. However, after the first 
enlargement of the EEC, trends in trade have changed dramatically as far 
as the acceding countries are concerned. Imports into Lebanon from the 
U.K between 1977 and 1979 fell from 17 per cent to 10 per cent of total EEC 
exports to Lebanon. Moreover, Lebanese exports to the U.K between 1977 
and 1979 fell from 43 per cent of EEC imports from Lebanon to 32 per cent.
Similarly,the corresponding figures for Lebanese imports and exports 
as regards Denmark and Ireland deteriorated sharply. This deterioration 
of trade between Lebanon and the acceding countries could be attributed to 
two factors:
1-The diversion of trade as a consequence of accession, and
2-special circumstances which Lebanon has experienced since 1974.
Accession of new states to the EEC, entailing as it did the elimination
of trade barriers between the original and the acceding mem ber states, 
m inim ised the comparative advantage of Lebanese exports to the new 
member states. Subsequently, Lebanese exports found themselves on a 
footing of inequality w ith the member states of the EEC. M oreover, 
Lebanese exports had to face a new wall of customs duties likely to be 
different from the earlier ones. Furthermore, some products m ay have 
fallen within the category of sensitive products within the EEC countries,
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by virtue of adopting the EEC acts. Consequently new barriers had to be 
encountered by the relevant products.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that soon after the first 
enlargem ent of the EEC, Lebanon experienced- a continuous severe civil 
w ar w ith  major devastation to the infra-structure of the Lebanese 
economy, consequently, disturbing the growth of national production and, 
exports toward the EEC. However, total Lebanese exports have developed 
steadily. Therefore, it is likely that it is deviation of trade which lies 
behind the deterioration of trade between Lebanon and the acceding 
countries.
B-THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIRST ENLARGEMENT 
ON THE EEC RELATIONS WITH LEBANON.
The legal impact of the first enlargement is reflected in the internal 
and external spheres. Internally, various constitutional and institutional 
changes have taken effect in both the Community and individual acceding 
mem ber states.123 Externally, trade and legal changes may place burdens 
on th ird  parties, particularly if any such third party  enjoys preferential 
treatm ent with any of the acceding countries.
As far as the Community is concerned, several am endm ents were 
m ade to the Treaty of Rome, particularly as regards institutional changes. 
As to the new member states, they were under an obligation to amend 
their constitutional provisions particularly where these provisions were 
not in conformity with the Treaty of Rome.
Regarding the external implications of the enlargem ent on the legal 
fram ew ork of trade relations w ith th ird  countries, such im plications 
would be likely to be related to in the following:
1-The th ird  party  has no legal fram ework governing its trade 
relations with either the EEC or its new member states.
2-Experience gathered from all existing legal fram eworks of trade
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relations between the new member state and a third party, particularly if 
there has been any kind of special relation with a historical or colonial 
background sim ilar to the case of the U.K and the Com m onw ealth 
countries.124-------------------------------------------------•
3- A third party's arrangement between the EEC itself and its member 
states jointly.
It w ould be superficial to assume that since a third country had no 
legal framework governing its trade relations with either the EEC itself or 
its new member states, it would not be affected by the enlargem ent of the 
EEC.
A part from any economic and trade consequences of enlargem ent, 
entry into the EEC entails for the member states the adoption, amongst 
other things, of the CCP and CAP. Therewith, a new wall of trade barriers 
is created consequent to the application of the above two policies of CCP 
and CAP, particularly if the CET involves higher levels than  existing 
tariffs. Moreover, some products which are in trade prior to the accession 
m ay fall into the red zone of sensitive products depriving therew ith the 
th ird  country from seeking certain m arkets or even looking for fair 
competition in the acceding countries. Subsequently, third county exports 
to the new member states of the EEC may face new regulations. However, 
assum ing that a third country had a bilateral agreem ent w ith any of the 
acceding countries, one wonders what would have been the implication of 
accession of on a third country.
Once a European country joins the EEC, it is governed by Art 234 EEC, 
which determ ines that the rights and obligations of p re  EEC Treaties 
involving non-member states "shall not be affected by the provisions of 
this treaty" despite the fact that the member states are required to take due 
steps to amend or withdraw from treaties the provisions of which are not 
compatible w ith the EEC Treaty. The question arises as to the position of 
previous provisions of the treaties concluded w ith th ird  parties which 
cover wholly or partly the areas of Community competences since the
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new m ember state would no longer have the power to im plem ent such 
provisions according to Community law. After the transitional period, 
the EEC Treaty prohibited any m em ber state from undertak ing  any 
m easures w hich fall w ithin the powers (as-far as external trade  is 
concerned) of the EEC and are controlled by EEC institutions. The member 
states m ust refrain from any action which may jeopardize the attainm ent 
of the objectives of the EEC, and also should ensure the fulfillm ent of 
their obligations. Therefore the new member state has either to transfer 
its powers to the EEC institutions or seek special authorisation to conduct 
such relations.125 This explains why, unless special arrangem ents are be 
m ade through the EEC institutions, a new  m ember state w ould have 
either to am end any agreement with a third country, and subsequently 
impose new customs duties and regulations in conformity w ith the CET, 
or dem and the term ination of the supposed agreem ent w ith  the th ird  
party. Consequently, the latter may lose any advantages or preferences 
that it hitherto enjoyed.
Lebanese foreign relations records show that prior to the accession of 
the new  European states to the EEC, Lebanon had no bilateral legal 
fram ework which regulated its trade relations with these new  m em ber 
states. Lebanon concluded a Trade and Technical Agreement in 1965 w ith 
the EEC and its member states.
From the date of accession, the new member states become bound by 
acts ad o p ted  by  the  in stitu tio n s  of the  C om m unity  (acquos 
C om m unita ire).126 Consequently, agreements concluded betw een the 
Com m unity and a th ird  party  are acts of the institu tions of the 
Com m unity and as such are directly binding on the m em ber states, 
including any new member states.127 Thus, the latter have to undertake 
to accede to such agreements.128 As far as the Lebanon is concerned, Art 8 
of the Act of Accession, (taking into consideration the necessary 
transitional period) referred to the fact that the new member states shall be 
subject to protocols to be concluded with the third party that is Lebanon as
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a party  to the agreement concluded jointly by the EEC and the original 
m em ber states, w ith  particu lar reference to th ird  countries in the 
M editerranean region, of which Lebanon is one. How ever, since the 
Trade and  Technical Agreem ent of 196b w as a straightforw ard MFN 
agreement, it did not necessitate a transitional period . Consequently, in 
1973,129 Lebanon on the one hand and the EEC and its m em ber states 
acting jointly on the other, concluded a protocol by which the new 
member states became contracting parties to the Agreement.
As far as the substance of the Agreement is concerned, the protocol 
bound the new member states and Lebanon to grant each other MFN 
treatm ent with no discrimination between any of the member states of the 
EEC.
VI-CONCLUSIONS
Following the establishment of the EEC, Lebanon’s exports to the 
individual original member states were adversely affected. In contrast, its 
imports expanded, resulting in a widening trade deficit which led Lebanon 
to seek to develop the level of cooperation w ith the EEC and its member 
states, aimed at securing Lebanon better access for its exports to the EEC 
markets. Lebanon's interest in this respect was shown by the pledge to 
ensure continuity and development in relations with EEC member states.
Lebanon and the member states could no longer engage in trade 
agreements outside the framework offered by the EEC which, by virtue of 
the norm s of in ternational law , possesses legal pe rsonality  and  
com petence anchored in its constituent T reaty to conclude trade  
agreem ents w ith th ird  states. Such a pow er springs from  express 
provisions in its constitutional documents in addition to the im plicit 
powers recognised by the ECJ over the years.
With this reality in mind, since Lebanon considered itself possessing 
strong political links w ith some of the EEC m em ber states, Lebanon
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subm itted a m em orandum  to the EEC seeking preferential treatm ent at 
least similar to that extended to Israel. Consequently, however, a simple 
MFN trade agreement was concluded between the parties, m arking the 
first step in their long-term relations.—The Agreem ent com prised two 
subjects trade and technical cooperation.
As regards trade, the Agreement led to d isappoin tm ent for the 
Lebanese governm ent since Lebanon was denied any trade preferences 
from the EEC owing to international legal barriers according to the EEC 
view. Indeed, preferential treatment is provided only in conformity with 
the rules of GATT. These rules, perm it, however, w aivers from the 
application of the MFN clause under different GATT Articles in particular 
Article XXIV GATT. An interim agreement leading to the formation of a 
free trade area between Lebanon and the EEC would be permissible under 
this Article, by which Lebanon could receive preferential treatm ent 
according to a set timetable at the end of which Lebanon w ould provide 
the EEC reciprocal preferential treatment. Such a possibility, w ould satisfy 
Lebanon’s needs for better access to the EEC markets w ithout flouting 
international trade rules and would translate political links between the 
EEC and Lebanon into real and effective measures anchored in a treaty. 
However, the EEC turned down the Lebanese request while offering Israel 
limited tariff concessions, thus flouting its international obligations under 
GATT and the Trade Agreement with Lebanon.
Assuming that a special relationship between Lebanon and the EEC 
m ember states did exist, a simple MFN agreem ent w ould question the 
rationality (correctness) of such an assumption.
As far as technical cooperation incorporated in the Agreem ent is 
concerned, it could be considered as a continuation of their previous 
cooperation between the relevant mem ber states and Lebanon. The 
implementation of technical cooperation was left m ainly to the m ember 
states of the EEC.
Following the first enlargem ent of the EEC, w ith  already  no
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provisional preferences in the Trade Agreement, the legal implications of 
the enlargem ent were bound to remain rather formal for Lebanon. That 
is, the enlargem ent did not bring or involve any new  a substantive 
advantages for Lebanon. ■
EEC legal practice with Lebanon as regards the Trade Agreement 
could be attributed to three factors:
1- The Trade Agreem ent was concluded during  the transitional 
period when EEC's external policy was not yet fully elaborated.
2- Political relations between Lebanon and some of the member states 
were not strong enough or were not sufficiently experienced for securing 
for Lebanon’s exports better access to the EEC markets
3- The Trade Agreement served merely to succeed the previous trade 
and technical cooperation agreements between Lebanon and the relevant 
original member states with no development.
Against this background, it w ould be safe to conclude that the 
Agreement does not support the claim that Lebanon's historical, political, 
cultural and geographical links w ith the EEC m ember states could be 
considered  as corresponding to a special re la tionsh ip  w ith  the 
Community. The Agreement even indicates quite the opposite: a country 
next door to Lebanon, Israel, was granted preferential treatm ent and better 
access to EEC markets despite the fact that it did not have that historical 
and cultural and political relationship which it has been claimed Lebanon 
had  w ith  the EEC mem ber states. M oreover, trade and technical 
cooperation did not effect any progress in the legal fram ework of the 
relationship between the EEC and Lebanon. Lastly, there was never any 
pretence that the Trade Agreement satisfied the objectives laid down in its 
preamble, let alone the expectations of Lebanon.
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g iw o ’ub if casus
THE PARTIAL RECIPROCAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PHASE 
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EEC AND LEBANON (1972-
1977).
I-INTRODUCTION
In 1965 the EEC had argued that its international legal commitments 
prevented the conclusion of a preferential trade agreement w ith Lebanon. 
Indeed, according to GATT's MFN provision, which is based on non­
discrimination and equality of treatment, any preferential treatm ent to be 
offered by the EEC and its member states to Lebanon would have had to be 
generalised and extended to all the other GATT contracting parties.
Due to the persisten t com plaints of the developing countries, 
especially through the years that followed the conclusion of the Trade 
Agreement of 1965, the international community witnessed, for the first 
time, developm ents in the international economic legal o rder to the 
advantage of the developing countries. These developm ents led to the 
introduction of Part IV of GATT, and, thereafter, the enabling clause into 
the sphere of w orld trade law. M oreover, a G eneralised System of 
Preferences was introduced into the sphere of international trade relations 
through the efforts of UNCTAD. Such developments in the international 
economic legal order enabled the developed countries to offer trade 
preferences to the developing countries w ithout being fully committed to 
extend such preferences to other developed countries.
On the other hand there was a considerable debate at that time within 
the EEC institutions as to whether or not the EEC should grant Israel 
fu rther preferential trade  arrangem ents. In fact, no tw ithstand ing  
providing the chances for better access to the EEC m arkets which were 
provided for Israeli products in the Agreement of 1964 through various
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tariff cuts, Israel expressed its dissatisfaction demanding further significant 
preferential trade arrangements. The Israeli application for preferential 
trade agreem ent divided the Council of the EEC into two camps. The
w hile France, backed by Italy, adopted an anti- Israeli stance. A 
compromise was reached via a set of quid pro quo deals prom ising a 
balanced treatment between Israel and the Arab countries. Consequently, 
Lebanon, inspired by France decided to apply to conclude a preferential 
trade agreement with the EEC.
Lebanon believed and was even convinced that such developments 
w ould eventually lead to the elim ination of the in ternational legal 
barriers, which the EEC resorted to during the negotiations of the Trade 
Agreem ent of 1965, as well as the political resentm ent of the EEC 
institutions for providing preferential treatment. In particular, Lebanon 
assum ed that it w ould be possible to negotiate a preferential trade 
agreement with the EEC in order to enable Lebanon to develop its trade 
and thereby remedy its trade imbalance with the Community.
The present chapter will focus particularly, on the second phase of the 
legal framework which regulated trade relations between Lebanon and the 
EEC. The examination necessary for it will be undertaken w ithin the 
context of international trade developments. However, for the sake of a 
wider understanding of the issue, an attem pt will be m ade to examine the 
impact of the first Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1965 on 
the pattern of trade flows between the EEC and Lebanon.
II-TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EEC AND LEBANON 
POST THE TRADE AGREEMENT (1967-1973).
The pream ble of the Trade Agreement expressed the aims of the 
contracting parties: to "consolidate and extend the economic and trade 
relations" between Lebanon and the EEC. The latter argued that such
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developments in trade would be achieved only through MFN treatm ent 
and turned down the Lebanese suggestion for preferential treatm ent to 
achieve such objectives. In fact, the Trade Agreem ent was a m ere 
reflection of the MEN clause which precipitated the question regarding the 
viability of this Trade Agreement. In other words, one can argue whether 
or not the Agreement was successful in meeting the objectives outlined by 
the preamble.
In order to show the success or otherwise of the Trade Agreement, it 
is necessary to examine the relevant trade figures.
A-IMPORTS
By and large, since the entry into force of the Trade Agreement, 
Lebanese imports from the EEC experienced a considerable improvement 
in both value and substance. This is well illustrated in the table below;
Figure No 3.1 
Lebanese imports from the EEC post trade post Trade Agreement 
Value in 0 0 0 $  (C.I.F)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
BEL-LUX 11074 11903 12153 13671 17081 29654 34761
FRANCE 40940 46572 41865 47737 65805 78494 131256
GERMANY 41635 49364 57302 60324 76272 93090 142880
ITALY 36785 42036 43745 45781 58015 76638 112289
NTHRLND 11492 13197 13391 12988 17627 17438 26299
EEC(6) 141925 163072 168456 180501 234800 294314 447485
TOTAL 471027 521142 531983 567483 677121 849347 12245Z
Source: U.N. International Trade Statistics, V.I.
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Lebanese imports from the EEC counted for 30 per cent of its total 
needs in 1967. These imports improved steadily over the years until they 
counted for over 36 per cent in 1973. The value of these im ports in the 
Lebanese m arket trebled during the above m entioned period of time, 
whereas total Lebanese imports did not expand at the same rate. This 
suggests that the EEC exports to Lebanon achieved their objectives through 
the Trade Agreement, i.e, the EEC consolidated and extended its trade 
relations with Lebanon.
A further question arises as to whether or not such an improvement 
in EEC exports to Lebanon was equally felt by all the member states of the 
EEC.
Lebanese imports from individual member states of the EEC could be 
divided into two groups: the dom inant and the marginal groups. The 
former consists of Germany, France, and Italy. These countries used to 
have, as individuals before the inception of the EEC, different legal 
frameworks of trade relations with Lebanon.
The latter group which consists of the Benelux countries, d id  not 
engage, before the conclusion of the Trade Agreement in 1965, in any kind 
of bilateral trade agreements with Lebanon.
Germ any was amongst the member states of the EEC, the m ost 
important supplier to the Lebanese market. It occupied the major share of 
EEC exports to Lebanon with 29 per cent in 1967. This figure grew steadily 
over the years until it reached its peak in 1973 with slightly below 32 per 
cent of the EEC share. In terms of Lebanese global im ports, German 
exports to Lebanon counted for more than 8 per cent of the Lebanese 
market in 1967. They also rose over the years and were worth over 11 per 
cent of the total Lebanese imports in 1973. These figures reflect vital 
developments in German exports to Lebanon in both value and substance. 
Similarly, French exports to Lebanon expanded over the years though they 
were slightly less significant than those of Germany. They totalled 28 per 
cent of the EEC share in 1967 or 7.8 per cent of total Lebanese imports.
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They increased constantly till they reached their peak in 1973, when they 
were w orth 29 per cent of the EEC share or just over 9 per cent of total 
Lebanese imports. The position of Italy, as regards Lebanese imports, 
although not as im portant as that of Germany and France, showed an 
increase. Its exports to Lebanon counted for 25 per cent of the total EEC 
exports to Lebanon or 7.8 per cent of the Lebanese total imports in 1967. 
These imports trebled by 1973. However, its share among other member 
states m aintained its same level, and counted for slightly over 25 per cent 
of the EEC share (over 9 per cent of the total Lebanese imports) in 1972, 
though they declined slightly the following year.
Lebanese im ports from the Benelux countries w itnessed a similar 
expansion, however in relative, and not in real terms. As such, although 
the value of Belgian and Luxemburg's exports to Lebanon trebled during 
that seven year period, their percentage within the Com munity's share 
was less significant. Subsequently, these imports increased in the earlier 
years from 2 per cent in 1967 to 3.4 per cent in 1972 of Lebanese total 
imports. However, in the following year, they decreased to 2.8 per cent. 
As regards their share in EEC exports to Lebanon, they declined slightly, 
from 7 per cent in 1967 to 6.6 per cent in 1973 of the EEC exports to 
Lebanon. Similarly, Lebanese imports from the N etherlands expanded 
nearly twice in value, but in real terms they decreased from 8.4 per cent in 
1976 to less than 6 per cent in 1973 of the EEC exports to Lebanon or from 
2.4 per cent to 2 per cent of the total Lebanese imports.
Therefore, imports from the EEC to Lebanon during the relevant 
period, experienced continuous expansion. In particular Germany, France 
and Italy, improved their position as they supplied 86 per cent of Lebanese 
imports from the EEC.
B-EXPORTS
The m ain object of the Trade Agreem ent was to m aintain and
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develop trade relations between the contracting parties. It gave special 
consideration to the harmonisation of such trade. Thus, as trade flows 
relate to imports and exports, Lebanon's exports were expected to achieve 
considerable improvements in the markets of the mem ber states of the 
EEC in order to achieve entirely the objectives of the Trade Agreement. 
This gives rise to the question whether or not the Trade Agreem ent 
contributed to the expansion of Lebanese exports to  the EEC in  a 
proportion  sim ilar to the EEC' exports to Lebanon. This m ay be 
discovered through an examination of the trade figures shown in the table 
below.
Figure 3.2 
Lebanese exports to the EEC post Trade Agreement 
Value in 000$ (C.I.F)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
BEL-LUX 550 826 1029 1690 2675 2778 3928
FRANCE 2995 3017 3488 4155 4512 5584 7297
GERMANY 2105 2429 2471 3046 4364 3894 7457
ITALY 3063 5639 6528 4614 8313 12950 8710
NTHRLND 394 810 587 1015 828 1798 3182
EEC(6) 9107 12721 14103 14520 20692 27004 30574
TOTAL 119267 146048 170476 197833 256039 350605 50246
Source: U.N International Trade Statistics, V.I
The above table reveals that Lebanese exports to the EEC increased 
only three times in value as compared with the four-fold increase in 
Lebanese total exports during the same period of time. However, in real
116
terms, they decreased gradually over the years from 7.6 per cent in 1967 to 
6 per cent in 1973 of total Lebanese exports.
As far as individual member states’ trade with Lebanon is concerned, 
one could classify such trade into two groups, how ever w ith inverse 
consequences.
Regarding Germany, France and Italy, the table dem onstrates that 
Lebanese exports to these countries expanded over the years. Indeed, the 
German m arket expanded more than three times in volume for Lebanese 
exports. The other two markets, in Italy and France grew less than three 
and two times respectively. However, a thorough analysis of these exports 
reveals the contrary. As a m atter of substance, total Lebanese exports 
developed more than four times. This suggests that although Lebanese 
exports to these countries grew, they were declining relative to the growth 
of total Lebanese exports. This may be clearly proved through the decline 
of Lebanese exports to these markets, falling from 89 per cent to 76 per cent 
as regards the EEC market. The above table shows that German imports 
from Lebanon, although barely increasing by 1 per cent throughout the six 
year period as regards EEC imports from Lebanon, decreased from less 
than two per cent in 1967 to 1.4 per cent of the total Lebanese exports in 
1973.
Italian imports from Lebanon declined from 34 per cent in 1967 to 26 
per cent of the EEC market in 1973 or 2.6 per cent to 1.7 per cent of the total 
Lebanese exports in 1973.
Lebanese exports to France follow a similar pattern. They declined 
from 32 per cent in 1967 to less than 24 per cent in 1973 of the EEC imports 
from Lebanon. Similarly, these exports decreased in relation to total 
Lebanese exports, falling from 2.5 per cent in 1967 to 1.4 per cent in 1973.
Lebanese exports to the Benelux countries expanded over the years in 
both value and volume. Together, markets in Belgium and Luxemburg 
absorbed 6 per cent of the Lebanese exports to the EEC in 1967. They 
increased over time with a peak in 1973 and counted for slightly less than
117
13 per cent of the EEC imports from Lebanon. Similarly, Lebanese exports 
to the Netherlands developed from 4 per cent in 1967 to 10 per cent in 1973 
regard ing  Lebanese exports to the EEC. These exports im proved in 
relation to total Lebanese exports (from 0.4 per cent to 0.7 per cent). 
However, total exports of the Benelux countries together are still of no 
serious significance in the pattern of trade relations between the EEC and 
Lebanon.
Thus, Lebanese exports varied as to the EEC and individual states. 
Lebanese exports to the former did not increase in substance (as regards the 
percentage of total Lebanese exports) but did increase in value. As to 
individual states, Lebanese exports declined relative to the grow th of 
Lebanese total exports to the former group, that is France, Germany and 
Italy. The impact of the second group, that is the Benelux, though it 
expanded in both value and percentage, was marginal. This diverse result 
as to m utual benefits could not be clarified unless one looks at the 
Lebanese balance of trade.
C-BALANCE OF TRADE
It has been clearly shown that, although trade relations expanded 
regularly over the years, both in terms of imports and exports, they were 
neither consolidated nor harmonised. Regarding im ports to Lebanon, 
there was a significant and substantial development for all member states 
of the EEC, though relatively at different levels as regards different 
individual member states of the EEC. However, as far as Lebanese exports 
are concerned, despite the expansion of these exports to the EEC territories, 
they declined in relation to the imports from the same markets as well as 
relative to the grow th of total Lebanese exports. It w as, m oreover, 
noticeable tha t im ports from Lebanon into the Benelux countries 
developed substantially. However, their trade relations with the Lebanon 
as a whole was of no significance, if total Lebanese foreign trade is taken
118
into consideration. Thus, the trade relations betw een the EEC and 
Lebanon, following the Trade Agreement, resulted in a w ider (more than 
three times) trade deficit than before by the end of 1973. Comparing such a 
result with the overall Lebanese balance of trade, where its trade deficit did 
not expand more than twice, the developments show that trade relations 
during the given period of time ran contrary to the interests of Lebanon. 
M oreover, the extent of Lebanese exports to the EEC com pared w ith 
Lebanon's im ports from the EEC did  not correspond, to Lebanon’s 
disadvantage, to the percentage of total Lebanese exports in terms of its 
total imports. Lebanese exports to the EEC did not cover, at best, more 
than 9 per cent of the imports from the EEC in 1972, whereas they declined 
in the following year to less than 7 per cent. In comparison w ith total 
Lebanese exports, they developed from 25 per cent in 1967 until they 
reached their peak in 1973, covering 41 per cent of total Lebanese imports.
One m ay argue that the Trade Agreement between the EEC and 
Lebanon did not cover only trade issues (MEN clause), bu t also technical 
cooperation. Consequently, Lebanese imports from the EEC m ay have 
concentrated on capital equipm ent necessary for the im plem entation of 
the technical cooperation necessary for the improvement of total Lebanese 
exports independently from exports to the EEC. If this holds true, then 
one wonders why Lebanon engaged in a Trade Agreement w ith the EEC. 
It has been argued in an earlier chapter that technical cooperation falls 
w ith in  the jurisdiction of the m em ber states. As such, technical 
cooperation provisions were in force between the most im portant trade 
partners of Lebanon among the m ember states of the EEC (France, 
Germany and Italy), by virtue of the terms of earlier relevant agreements 
prior to the Trade Agreement. This w ould suggest that the Trade 
Agreement failed to achieve any progress in the already existing relations 
between Lebanon and the EEC, except in the coordination of technical 
cooperation . However, the Trade Agreement w ith the EEC aim ed not 
only to coordinate technical cooperation, b u t also to harm onise ,
119
consolidate and expand trade relations between both parties. Therefore, 
increasing Lebanese exports to the EEC market was at the heart of the aims 
of the Trade Agreement and, was, consequently, the axis of consolidation 
and expansion of trade relations between the EEC and Lebanon. Since 
Lebanese exports to the EEC market did not increase, but on the contrary, 
they substantially decreased, it could then be suggested that trade relations 
betw een Lebanon and the EEC following the conclusion of the Trade 
Agreement fell short of meeting the objectives of the Trade Agreement, 
and led to results unfavourable to Lebanese interests.
Ill-THE AGREEMENT OF 1972 BETWEEN THE EEC AND 
LEBANON.
A-GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE AGREEMENT.
D uring the negotiations of the Trade and Technical Cooperation 
Agreement, Lebanon presented its views and ambitions relating to its 
relations w ith the member states in general, and the EEC in particular. 
The negotiations concerning the first m em orandum  reached a stalemate, 
and consequently, Lebanon rescinded its original proposal, w aiting for 
further opportunities to negotiate and conclude a preferential trade 
agreement for receiving trade concessions from the EEC.
Prior to the developments in the legal order of international trade, 
Israel scored a precedent by applying to the EEC for a preferential trade 
agreement. The Israeli application was prom pted by its strongest supporter 
in the EEC, The Netherlands, which blackmailed (chantaged) the EEC by 
exercising a veto against any envisaged agreement unless a form ula was 
agreed upon with a view to granting Israel special preferential treatm ent.1 
The Israeli application for preferential trade arrangem ents was opposed 
strongly by the French hostile attitude towards Israel at that time on the 
grounds of its aggression against the Arab countries in 1967. Consequently
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the EEC became divided on its external policy into a pro and anti group 
w ith respect to Israel's application.2 Further pressure was exerted by 
Germany in favour of Israel, leading France to bring forward a set of quid 
pro quo deals arguing that the EEC should m aintain political balance 
between Israel and the Arab countries with a view to express its readiness 
to negotiate similar preferential agreements with them.3 Consequently, 
the French "diplomacy" was requested by the Council to "inspire the Arab 
countries to apply  for commercial agreements". Eventually, France 
managed to persuade only Lebanon and Egypt to apply for a commercial 
agreement prom ising a positive attitude from the EEC towards Lebanon 
for granting a more favourable preferential treatm ent this time. Against 
this backdrop, Lebanon assumed that the legal and political barriers, which 
left Lebanon bereft of all hopes of receiving preferential trade treatment, 
could be tackled.4
In a com m unication on the first of October 1969, the Lebanese 
mission to the EEC was instructed by its government to explore w ith the 
EEC Council and  Com m ission m ethods by w hich the Lebanese 
government's desire for the possibility of concluding a preferential trade 
agreem ent with the EEC5 could be fulfilled. The Commission welcomed 
the Lebanese request and held exploratory talks on the 5th and 6th of 
February 1970 with the head of the Lebanese mission to the EEC. The two 
delegations exam ined the Lebanese request, resulting in establishing 
guidelines for subsequent negotiations.6 They reported the fruits of their 
talks to their authorities.7 The Council of the EEC, in May 1970, having 
received the Commission's report on the 14th of April 1970, instructed the 
Perm anent Representatives Committee (Coreper) to examine the report 
and  d raft a m andate for the opening of form al negotiations w ith  
Lebanon.8 On the 22nd of July 1970, the Council directed the Commission 
to launch formal negotiations with the Lebanese government through its 
representatives. In its instructions, the Council drew up the framework of 
the negotiations aim ed at concluding a partia l preferen tial trade
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agreem ent, providing for the elimination of customs duties as regards 
industrial products, and tariff cuts concerning certain agricultural products 
of particular interest to Lebanon.9
On the basis of the Council's instructions, the first phase of the 
formal negotiations was launched in Brussels on the 30th of September 
and the 2nd of October 1970. The second round of negotiations was held 
from the 13th to the 15th of October 1970. A further session was held 
during 1971, while the final session wound up on the 11th of December 
1972. Initial agreem ent was then reached on all the points under 
d iscussion.10 During the first round, the two delegations negotiated the 
EEC's offer p u t forw ard by the Commission. In the second phase of 
negotiations, the Lebanese delegation commented on the EEC proposal 
and p u t forw ard their governm ent's offer in retu rn  for EEC tariff 
concessions. At the end of the negotiations, a com m unique' was issued 
expressing both delegations' "hope for a favourable conclusion to the 
negotiations". The draft agreement was initialed on the 11th of December 
1972 and later a reciprocal preferential trade Agreement between the EEC 
and Lebanon was signed in Brussels on the 18th of December 1972.11 
Following the first enlargem ent of the EEC, the new m em ber states 
adhered to the Agreement by concluding an additional protocol which was 
signed in Brussels on the 6th of November 1973. Both the Agreement and 
the Protocol were scheduled to enter into force at the beginning of 1974.12
B-THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT
i-INTERNAL OR COMMUNITY LEVEL
The Treaty of Rome enumerates in various articles the areas where 
the EEC is em pow ered to conclude agreements w ith th ird  parties. In 
addition, the ECJ evolved this power to include areas which are not
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covered expressly by the Treaty, through implicit deduction from the 
whole fram ework of the objectives of the EEC Treaty.13 Am ongst the 
express areas is the common commercial policy (CCP), as the m ost 
im portant and detailed aspect of the external relations of the European 
Com m unities.14 It has been assumed to include "all measures intended to 
regulate economic relations with the outside world".15 The CCP is based 
on uniform principles, particularly as regards "the conclusion of tariff and 
trade agreements". In fact, tariff and trade agreements are expressly dealt 
with by Article 113 EEC. The ECJ interpreted this article widely to cover 
the attainm ent of the objectives set out in the CCP provisions.16 
Therefore, Art 113 is the principal provision of the CCP for it "aims to 
regulate commercial policy measures after the transitional period".17
Art 113 EEC sets out the procedures which ought to be followed in 
conducting tariff and trade agreements. It requires the Commission to 
"make recom mendations to the Council" [Art 113 (3)] and to negotiate 
agreements w ith third parties, following authorisation from the Council. 
As such, the negotiations should be "within the' fram ew ork of such 
directives as the Council may issue to the Commission" [Art 113 (3) Para 
2]. In addition, such negotiations should be conducted in "consultation 
w ith a special committee" which is to assist the Commission. However, 
in practice, the m ain task of the special committee is to safeguard the 
interests of the EEC member states during such negotiations.
Art 113 finally stipulates that the Council has to adopt the agreement 
by qualified majority.[ Art 113 (4) ]. It is obvious that such agreements 
become directly b inding upon the Com m unity institu tions and  the 
member states.18 Therefore when the EEC is empowered to act in the area 
of express powers, within the context of the CCP, such powers become 
exclusive,19 and the member states m ust abide by article 5 EEC.20
Accordingly, the Council concluded the Agreement between the EEC 
and Lebanon exclusively and cited Art 113 EEC in its prom ulgation to the 
Agreement as the legal basis of its action.21
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ii-THE INTERNATIONAL OR EXTERNAL LEVEL
In fact, tariff and trade agreements referred to in Art 113 EEC could be 
preferential or non-preferential agreements. However, the EEC is not only 
bound  by its constitu tional docum ents, b u t also by in ternational 
com m itm ents to w hich it adheres. Tariff and  trad e  liberalisation 
m easures are subject to trea tm ent under GATT ru les and  are 
consequently , a m atter of Com m unity concern. GATT calls for 
substantive tariff reductions (The Preamble and Art 28 Bis). However, 
such tariff concessions which are based on equality of treatm ent and 
implied reciprocity between different contracting parties provide a legal 
basis for any contracting party  to seek advantages from  such tariff 
reduction by virtue of the MFN clause. The MFN clause involves 
d ifferen t derogations w hich sanction certain  dep artu res  from  its 
application. International trade law experienced different developments 
due to the needs of international society. As such, Part IV GATT was 
added to the General Agreement and, later, a Generalised System of 
Preferences was introduced into the sphere of world trade law. One could, 
therefore, ask w hat is the legal basis of the Agreement of 1972 between 
Lebanon and the EEC as regards international law? To pu t the question 
differently: was the preferential trade arrangement offered to Lebanon due 
to legal developm ents in international trade norm s, or w ere these 
developments not taken into consideration during the conclusion of the 
Agreem ent? Did the parties to the Trade A greem ent of 1972 seek 
exemptions from the application of MFN clause under GATT derogation 
norm s?
Given the fact that international developments in w orld trade law 
have been elaborately discussed by an extensive literature, there is no need 
to discuss them here. The emphasis will in the present context focus on a 
brief recapitulation of legal undertakings by the EEC as to Part IV GATT
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and the GSP, and assess their legal implications for EEC’s external trade 
relations with Lebanon.
a-THE AGREEMENT AND PART IV GATT
D uring the early sixties, the problem  of developm ent w as hotly 
debated. A t its 21st session, the ministers of GATT realised that ’’trade 
negotiations efforts should be made to reduce barriers to exports of less 
developing countries" on a non-reciprocal basis.22 In the following year, a 
special session resulted in the adoption of a chapter entitled "Trade and 
Development" which was incorporated into the General Agreem ent on 
Tariffs and Trade and formed its Part IV, and came into force in 1966.23
By virtue of the new chapter, the Contracting Parties recognised the 
problem of development of developing countries , and agreed upon "the 
need for a rapid and sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less 
developed countries [XXXVI (2)]. Moreover, other principles were set out 
to treat the problem of development. The Contracting Parties pledged to 
provide the "largest possible measures, more favourable and acceptable 
conditions of access to w orld markets" to the prim ary products of the 
developing countries [XXXVI (4)]. In addition, the developed countries 
undertook to give "to the fullest extent possible" effect to different 
m easures which liberalise and expand exports of current or potential 
interest to developing countries.24 However, one could ask w hether or 
not these undertakings contradict Art 1 GATT. Or could Part IV be 
regarded a mere self- waiver which leads to the non-applicability of the 
MFN clause?
Since its incorporation, Part IV of GATT has received different and 
even controversial interpretations from different legal writers as regards 
its departure from the MFN clause. Moreover, the legal effectiveness of 
Part IV has been am biguous and indeed m inim ised by the cautious 
w ording of its articles. In addition, the absence of a clear am endm ent of
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Article 1 GATT left the legally binding nature of p a rt IV upon the 
Contracting Parties to the GATT unresolved.
There are indeed many views on this issue. One view  considered 
that any advantages which spring from Part IV GATT should  not be 
extended to other developed Contracting Parties, otherwise, "it w ould 
make no sense and it would violate all the principles of Part IV, should 
these advantages also be applied to other industrialised countries which 
would thereby benefit from a treatment devised to prom ote progress and 
developm ent".25
This argum ent seems to find evidence in Part IV itself. Art XXXVI (8) 
GATT provides for non-reciprocity for commitments m ade by developed 
countries to developing countries.26 The view of Gross-Espiell could have 
been implicitly deduced from the raison d 'e tre  of part IV GATT, which 
form s a cornerstone of legal obligation. The reason  beh ind  the 
introduction of Part IV is to provide a legal instrum ent w ithin the GATT 
to trea t the problem  of developm ent w ithin  developing countries. 
Therefore, to extend such advantages arising from part IV GATT to other 
categories of states would violate the spirit and raison d 'e tre  of part IV of 
the General Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade. This approach -that of 
adopting  a purposive or teleological in terpretation  of in ternational 
treaties- is not unknow n in international law . Such a purposive 
interpretation is a reflection of the practice of both the ICJ and ECJ.27
However, although Art XXXVI (8) provides for non-reciprocity from 
the developing countries for commitments m ade by developed countries, 
this Article does not cover any express w aiver from MFN. In other 
w ords, the Article stipulates for non-reciprocity as regards developing 
countries, and ignores the problem of extending such advantages to other 
developed Contracting Parties. Moreover, Art XXXVII GATT supports this 
argum ent w hen it refers to certain exceptions which evidently halt the 
legal effectiveness of the new chapter. A m ongst these com pelling 
exceptions are legal reasons which may include the international legal
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com m itm ents of developed countries tow ards the MFN clause. 
Consequently, the developed countries may argue, as was the case with the 
EEC and Lebanon, that they cannot offer tariff concessions to their 
developing trade partners for developm en t. purposes in  developing 
countries for fear, not of violating international law this time, bu t that 
other developed countries m ay invoke their rights to be given the 
treatm ent similar to that given to developing countries.28 Furthermore, 
from the outset, the developed countries had the intention of m aking 
inroads in the implementation of part IV GATT. Their passive attitude 
dem onstrated itself in two cases. Firstly, through rejecting different 
proposals pu t forward by different developing countries for the purpose of 
am ending A rt 1 GATT.29 Secondly through their refusal to support or 
abstain from voting for measures in favour of developing countries in 
UNCTAD I.30 This attitude was confirmed by the Declaration on a De 
Facto Implementation, which was signed by those countries who desired 
to im plem ent Part IV GATT. The Declaration was confined to the 
’’existing constitutional and legal possibilities”31 which reflected the 
intention of the developed countries to impede any progress as regards the 
legal effectiveness of Part IV GATT. Therefore, the language of Art IV, the 
num erous exceptions attached thereto such as ’’compelling legal reasons"; 
the prem editated intention of the developed contracting parties to GATT 
and the denial of the non-extension nature of preferential treatm ent 
offered to developing countries, leave no room for assertion that part IV 
of GATT is legally effective. In fact it added nothing to the "existing legal 
relationship between developed and developing countries".32 As such, 
part IV GATT provides only for non-reciprocity between developed and 
developing countries. However, the non-reciprocal nature of the article 
was demised by the "compelling legal reasons" which served as vehicle for 
legal ineffectiveness of Part IV GATT.33 Therefore, Part IV only set forth 
principles and objectives rather than legal obligations.34 However, from a 
political perspective one can assume that Part IV was used by  the
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dom inating developed countries as a political instrum ent to absorb the 
anger of the developing countries. According to this argument, Part IV of 
GATT, which is legally non binding upon the developed countries, could 
not provide a legal basis for the Agreement between the EEC and Lebanon 
to include tariff reductions as far as international trade law is concerned.
b-THE AGREEMENT AND THE GSP
The refusal of developed countries to amend Art 1 GATT to render
Part IV GATT legally effective resulted in the latter falling short of
meeting the developing needs of the international society. Consequently,
the developing  countries p u t forw ard their p roposals in  another
international forum. The U.N called for the first Conference on Trade and
Developm ent (hereinafter UNCTAD) in 1964. It resulted in filling the
legal lacunae which were left by Part IV GATT. It set out the principle of
non-reciprocal preferential treatm ent by developed countries, provided
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that preferences accorded to developing countries should not be extended 
to other developed countries.35 However, the passive attitude of the 
participating developed countries toward the conclusion of the principle 
brought about a lack of legal efficacy.36 Nonetheless, a special committee 
was established to further the principle of non-reciprocal non-extended 
preferences. Consequently, UNCTAD n  was held in New Delhi in 1968. It 
adopted  a unanim ous resolution which approved the sam e principle 
which the developed countries themselves refused to accept in the earlier 
UNCTAD.37 In addition, resolution 21 (II) sets forth the objectives of such 
general preferences and enumerates the means for the achievement of the 
principles and objectives enunciated in the resolution. Yet the legal 
implications of the resolution, so far as the MFN clause w ithin GATT is 
concerned, and, consequently, for the rights of the Contracting parties to 
GATT to receive similar treatment as regards any tariff reduction, had to 
w ait for the "Agreed Conclusions"38 and a derogation from the MFN
128
clause.
The "Agreed Conclusions" confirmed and formulated the principles 
and objectives of Resolution 21(11) into norm ative form. The former 
provides for non-reciprocal and non-discrim inatory preferences to be 
accorded to the developing countries. It further provides that "no country 
intends to invoke its rights to MFN treatment with a view to obtaining, in 
w hole or in part, the preferential treatm ent granted  to developing 
countries in accordance w ith  the conference Resolution 21(H)".39 
M oreover, tw o more interesting points are included in the Agreed 
Conclusions. Firstly, such preferences are conditional upon the necessary 
w aiver or waivers in respect of existing international obligations, in 
particu la r, un d er GATT".40 Secondly, tha t the countries offering 
preferences w ould "seek as rapidly as possible the necessary legislative or 
other sanctions to im plem ent the preferential arrangem ents".41 T his 
means that these preferences are to be accorded by each preference giving 
country  on an indiv idual basis. This po in t seems to overcom e, 
substantially, the verbal non-binding nature of the general system  of 
preferences.
As far the first point is concerned, among different proposals, the 
developed countries initially sought a general waiver procedure to be 
utilized for the insertion of preferences into the GATT system 42 Later, 
however at the end of the Tokyo Round, a decision was adopted, by 
consensus, approving a permanent departure from the MFN clause.43
As regards the second point, despite the fact tha t the grant of 
preferences does not constitute a binding commitment, the intention of 
the developed countries was tacitly understood to mean that the Agreed 
Conclusions w ere to be im plem ented.44 As such, this in ternational 
developm ent had its implications on EEC external trade relations. The 
EEC was the first to respond to these events. In June 1971, the EEC, upon a 
proposal of the Commission, adopted the necessary legislation for the 
im plem entation of the "Agreed Conclusions" for a General System of
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P references.45 The EEC General System of Preferences involved full 
exemption from customs duties for all industrial products in addition to 
partial exemption for certain processed agricultural products.46
The EEC General System of Preferences raises a question as to w hat 
extent the Agreement between the EEC and Lebanon was based on the EEC 
General System of Preferences accorded developing countries. In other 
w ords, could the Agreement be deemed to be part of the EEC General 
System of Preferences accorded developing countries?
Any thorough analysis of the Agreem ent betw een the EEC and 
Lebanon47 would reveal that the contracting parties aimed to expand their 
trade into each others markets. As such, they accorded each other partial 
reciprocal tariff concessions in accordance with a specific list annexed to 
the Agreement. By contrast, the General System of Preferences aimed, in 
addition  to expanding the trade  of the developing countries in to  
developed markets, to prom ote industrialisation, and to accelerate their 
rates of economic grow th [Resolution 21 (II)]. M oreover, the EEC 
preferences accorded developing countries offered full exem ption from 
customs duties concerning industrial products (apart from  sensitive 
products) and partial tariff cuts as regards agricultural products.48 Above 
all, the unilateral nature of the Generalised System of Preferences does not 
entail an agreem ent betw een the countries offering and  receiving 
preferences. It is clearly evident that the Agreement falls far short of the 
advantages which spring from the EEC General System of Preferences 
accorded the developing countries despite the fact that the Agreem ent 
stipulates for further developments. Nonetheless, the GSP could provide 
two implications. The first is of a legal nature. The GSP which recognises 
the principle of non-reciprocal non extended (to developed countries) 
nature  of tariff preferences to developing countries, w ould ease the 
opposition in offering similar treatm ent under non-concrete conformity 
w ith Article XXIV GATT. The second im plication is of an economic 
nature: the m ore preferential treatm ent offered by the EEC to other
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countries, the less effective and less feasible such preferences w ould 
become. Therefore, the GSP did not provide reference to the preferential 
trade arrangements between Lebanon and the EEC. One may thus wonder, 
on w hat legal basis the two parties accorded .each other partial tariff 
reductions.
C-THE AGREEMENT AND ARTICLE XXIV GATT
According to GATT norms, any Contracting Party to the General 
Agreement which engages in a trade agreement involving bilateral tariff 
concessions, has either to seek special waiver or the agreement should be 
compatible with the recognised departures enunciated in GATT.
The EEC presented the Agreement to GATT in order to have the 
compatibility of its provision with GATT rules examined.49 By doing so, 
the EEC was meeting its obligations under Article XXIV:7(a) GATT.50 The 
EEC claimed that the Agreement with Lebanon should be considered an 
interim agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area.
Indeed, Article XXIV: 8 (b) GATT allows its Contracting Parties to 
form a free trade area or an interim agreement leading to the formation of 
a free trade area. It considers such a formation as a derogation from the 
application of the MEN clause. For this purpose, GATT defines a free 
trade area as a "group of two or more customs territories in which the 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are elim inated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products 
originating in such territories". Moreover, an interim  agreement leading 
to the form ation of such a free trade area "shall include a p lan and 
schedule for the formation of such a free trade area within a reasonable 
length of time".51
As a m atter of content, the Agreement between Lebanon and the EEC 
affords barely the opportunity to eliminate "many of the obstacles to 
tra d e " .52 It merely offers partial tariff cuts on a defined num ber of
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products. This was construed by both Lebanon and the EEC to be a 
prelim inary step towards the formation of a free trade area. However, 
Article XXIV: 5 (c) GATT refers to a clear plan and schedule by which the 
envisaged free trade area could be genuinely achieved whereas the future 
of the A greem ent was connected only to wishes for a "progressive 
elimination of obstacles to the main body of trade"53 which may be subject 
to a longer time than the duration of the Agreement itself. Subsequently, 
such a wish could hardly be met. Moreover, the contracting parties to the 
Agreem ent failed to express either in the Preamble or in its detailed 
provisions that Lebanon and the EEC aim to form a free trade area. They 
only relied on the political good will of each other, notw ithstanding the 
failure of their political links to be translated into norm ative means in 
previous attempts. Moreover, it is evident that the parties had  widely 
differing-levels of economic development, and any reciprocal tariffs cuts, 
let alone full elimination of customs duties between themselves, w ould 
lead to severe injury to the nascent economy of the less developed 
country. However, one m ay argue that the Agreem ent m aintains the 
rights of either of the contracting parties to adopt defined safeguard 
m easures w hen it faces such difficulties. Be that as it may, the less 
developed country w ould find itself resorting perm enantly to safeguard 
measures which contradict the requirements of the formation of a free 
trade area entailing "the elimination of substantially all trade barriers" 
between the contracting parties "within a reasonable period of time".54 
Therefore, a sceptical inference could be draw n as to w hether such a 
practice within these circumstances may lead to the eventual formation of 
a free trade area.55 Therefore, the compatibility between the requirements 
of GATT and the Trade Agreement between Lebanon and the EEC could be 
established in principle. However, in stricto sensu, the Trade Agreement 
violated Article XXTV on two points: the objectives of Agreement did not 
refer expressly to the intention of the parties to form a free trade area, and 
there is an absence of a clear and defined "plan and schedule for the
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form ation of such a free trade area within a reasonable length of time" 
(Art XXIV: 5 {c}). The absence of the basis of the interim agreement, plan 
and schedule and reasonable length of time raises question about the 
discipline of the contracting parties to form a free trade area, in particular, 
the developed contracting party as opposed to the developing contracting 
party. In view  of these conditions, the W orking Party exam ining the 
compatibility of the Agreement w ith the provisions of GATT failed to 
support the claim of the contracting parties to the Trade Agreement that 
their A greem ent constitu ted an interim  agreem ent leading  to the 
formation of a free trade area.56
The foregoing discussion reveals that the Trade Agreement between 
Lebanon and the EEC, notwithstanding its compatibility with the rules and 
competence of the EEC as regards the norms of the Treaty of Rome, lacks a 
concrete legal external basis. However, one may argue that the Agreement 
could be based on the teleological argument of part IV of GATT.
Part IV of GATT provides the principles of providing preferential 
treatm ent to developing countries for development purposes. It has been 
argued earlier that the Part IV GATT has no legal effectiveness so as to 
b ring  obligations on the developed countries to offer p referential 
treatm ent to developing countries. Nonetheless, there is noth ing  to 
prevent developed countries from offering such treatment. However, the 
basic principle of Part IV GATT is the nature of non-reciprocity which 
contradicts the reciprocal undertakings of Lebanon and the EEC in the 
Trade Agreement.
C-THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE AGREEMENT
The trade provisions of the Agreement were intended to supersede 
all trade agreem ents or provisions which w ere concluded betw een 
Lebanon and  any of the M ember States of the EEC w hich w ere
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incompatible with, were identical to, or were covered by the provisions of 
the Agreement.57 However, there were other fields of cooperation which 
had not been dealt w ith in the Agreement and which were in operation 
between Lebanon and the Member States of the EEC which rem ained in 
force. The Agreement was for a duration of five years. It could, however, 
be denounced by either contracting party  provided that six months notice 
was given. Moreover, the door was left open for further improvements, 
bu t not earlier than 18 months before the date of its expiry.
The Agreement opens with a preamble which specifies the general 
principles and, to a certain extent, the political will of the contracting 
parties. It is then divided into two titles: Trade and General Provisions. 
The trade part is headed by the objective of their trade cooperation, and 
followed by procedural arrangements and details for the partial removal of 
trade barriers. In addition, certain safeguard m easures were included to 
ensure adequate protection for either party 's vital interests. The second 
part provides for the establishment of common institutions between both 
parties in order to ensure proper implementation of the Agreement.
i-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The Trade Agreement opens w ith a pream ble stating the aims and 
objectives which the contracting parties sought to achieve therefrom. The 
contracting parties "realised" that the harm onious developm ent of trade 
between themselves was of vital importance, and consequently concluded 
the Agreement ultimately to consolidate and expand their economic and 
trade relations. Thus, Lebanon and the EEC sought the elim ination of 
many of their trade barriers. However, as a preliminary step, reduction of 
tariff rates should take place first, with the intention of suppressing tariffs 
further, in accordance with GATT provisions. In addition, Lebanon and 
the EEC took cognizance of the EEC intention towards the fulfillment of its 
duties and obligations towards the M editerranean basin by means of an
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overall Mediterranean policy. Finally the contracting parties assumed that 
expansion of trade in their relations through the removal of obstacles of 
trade would contribute to the development of international trade. Unlike 
the first Agreement, the Trade Agreement of 1972 recognised for the first 
time the intention of the contracting parties to rem ove trade barriers, 
albeit on a partial and reciprocal basis. However, the pream ble of the 
Agreem ent did not recognise the level of the economic developm ent of 
Lebanon as a prelude to contribute to its endeavour to promote the process 
of economic development. This leaves the less developed contracting 
party (Lebanon) on an unjustified identical footing as in the case with the 
m ost developed countries. Therefore, one w ould w onder w hether the 
Trade Agreement is meant, in principle, to serve as a transitional phase 
towards more favourable treatment.
ii-TRADE ARRANGEMENTS
Regarding trade arrangements, the Agreement provides for reciprocal 
tariff cuts covering both industrial and agricultural products. In addition, 
liberalisa tion  of certain  quan tita tive  restric tions w as taken  in to  
consideration.
The EEC was committed to offer to products originating in Lebanon 
different levels of reductions on tariff rates already in operation under the 
common customs tariff against third countries. Products originating in 
Lebanon have to be directly im ported into the EEC territo ries in 
conformity w ith the provisions of the relevant protocol on originating 
products. In fact, according to the Agreement, Lebanese products were 
divided into different classifications. Consequently, trade concessions, as 
regards different products, were subject to different forms of treatm ent. 
Accordingly, customs duties on industrial products, other than those listed 
in Annex II of the EEC Treaty and lists A, B and C of the Agreement, were 
reduced between 35 per cent to 55 per cent of the common customs tariff.58
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Moreover, tariff rates on some fruit products of particular interest to 
Lebanon were reduced to about 40 per cent of the CCT. However, products 
like citrus were confined to special rules which eventually m inim ised 
their com parative advantages.59 In addition, other vegetable products 
were subject to a special reduction of rates ranging between 30 per cent and 
50 per cent, according to a specific timetable of importation. Furthermore, 
the EEC fixed definite duties on products falling w ithin the heading 
num ber 07.04 CCT. However, although the provisions of Annex I laid 
down the arrangements for a reduction of tariff rates, it failed to mention 
clearly any removal of quantitative restrictions to trade. It provided only 
for annual quotas of 70 metric tons concerning products falling under 
heading num ber 55.09 CCT. Some other products are subject to special 
treatm ent such as olive oil other than refined olive oil falling within sub 
heading 15.07 CCT. However, since products originating in Lebanon 
receive tariff cuts, these products may not be treated more favourably than 
the way the member states treat each other in similar fields.
Lebanon, in return  for receiving trade concessions from the EEC, 
offered products originating in the latter and falling within lists I, II and III 
of the Agreem ent, a 70 per cent reduction on customs duties upon 
im portation into Lebanon. Similarly, charges having equivalent effect to 
duties were reduced to the same level. This reduction applied on duties 
which were in operation in Lebanon against th ird  countries. It was 
suggested that this cut take effect from the 1st of January 1974.60 
Moreover, such a percentage of tariff cuts was unchangeable regardless of 
any potential changes which m ay take place concerning the duties 
themselves. Furthermore, products which were included in list I and in 
of the Agreement, in addition to other products originating in the EEC and 
im ported into Lebanon, should be and rem ain liberalised as regards 
quantitative restrictions. To this end, if any of those products which were 
included in lists I and HI were subject to restrictions, Lebanon should lift 
any such restriction after taking cognizance of its economic development.
136
On the other hand, the contracting parties to the Agreement were to 
m ain tain  adequate m easures to ensure p roper fu lfillm ent of the 
obligations which arose from the Agreement. In addition, they should 
refra in  from  adopting  any m easures w hich m ight endanger the 
functioning of the Agreement.
The MFN clause was embodied in the trade arrangement. However, 
despite the fact that the Agreem ent stipulates that duties levied on 
im ports from either contracting party  should not exceed those duties 
app lied  on products of the m ost favoured th ird  country, it o n l y  
committed Lebanon to treat the EEC products not less favourably than 
other m ost favoured nation. The incorporation of w ord '‘treatment" in 
Article 3 invokes a general application to all issues relating to importation 
other than duties. Nonetheless, the most favoured nation clause was 
accompanied by general exceptions. As such, the most favoured nation 
clause w ould not effect special treatm ent offered to frontier zone trade, 
customs unions, free trade areas and regional economic integration. 
H ow ever, these exceptions operated w ithout prejudice to the trade 
arrangements, particularly the rules of origin.
iii-SAFEGUARD MEASURES
M utual trade concessions were embodied in  the Agreem ent by the 
contracting parties to serve the declared general principles set out in the 
pream ble of the Agreement, i.e to facilitate and expand trade between 
Lebanon and the EEC. However any abuse, by either party , of these 
concessions m ight cause a threat to the economy of the other party. 
Therefore, both parties concomitantly sought to protect their domestic 
markets as much as possible from any potential damage to their economy. 
To this end, despite the principle of good faith, the incorporation of 
safeguard measures was essential to ensure the proper functioning of the 
Agreement.
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The A greem ent prohibited any internal practice in any of the 
contracting parties which m ay intend to discrim inate betw een the 
im ported product and those of national origin. However, the Agreement 
does not preclude restrictions or even prohibitions of imports or exports 
justified by the public interest. Other safeguard measures against dum ping 
practices w ere p rov ided  in the Agreem ent. A ccording to these 
provisions, the right of either party is reserved to adopt appropriate 
m easures against such practices provided that prior consultation in the 
Joint Committee is held and the measures taken are in accordance with 
Art VI GATT. The Agreement preserved further safeguard measures to be 
taken against any disturbances which m ight occur in a sector of the 
economy of either contracting party, or in any region of the territories 
where the Agreem ent was applied and against any prejudice to the 
external financial stability of either contracting party. In this event, the 
concerned party may take appropriate protective measures, provided that 
the Joint Committee was notified once such measures were adopted. 
H ow ever, in selecting such protective or safeguard m easures, the 
concerned party should take into consideration that the m easures chosen 
should cause the least disturbance to the operation of the Agreement.
iv-RULES OF ORIGIN
The determination of the rules of origin is a decisive factor whenever 
preferences to trade are offered from one party to another. The principal 
purpose of setting up certain rules of origin is to prevent a third country 
from seeking advantages from trade concessions designed to serve the 
contracting parties to a specific agreement. However, this may discourage 
cooperation between different countries other than those adhering to the 
agreem ent. As such, the Agreement is accompanied by a protocol 
designing specific rules of origin to define products originating in either of 
the contracting parties
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The protocol defines products as originating in either of the 
contracting parties if they are wholly obtained in either of the contracting 
parties. Moreover as to com pounded products, where m aterials other 
than materials from the contracting parties are used, they m ust undergo 
sufficient working processes to be recognised as originating products, 
provided that they are classified under a different tariff heading.
Finally, the protocol sets out specific provisions on the organisation 
of methods of administrative cooperation.
v-INSTITUTIONAL CONTENT
The Joint Committee referred to in the earlier discussion was set up 
by the contracting parties to supervise the proper implementation of the 
Agreement. To this end, it was empowered to take binding decisions in 
accordance w ith the Agreem ent and make recommendations. It was 
authorised to set ou t its rules of procedures and to act by m utual 
agreement. The Joint Committee consisted of representatives of Lebanon 
and the EEC, represented by the Commission. Its chairmanship was to be 
taken alternately by each of the contracting parties and it was to be 
convened once a year or at an extraordinary session at the request of either 
of the contracting parties, in accordance w ith its rules of procedures. 
Finally, the Joint Committee is empowered to set up different working 
parties to help it in performing its tasks.
V-THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIRST  
ENLARGEMENT ON THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EEC 
AND LEBANON
In the preceding chapter, the implications of the first enlargement on 
Lebanon as regards the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement were 
discussed. It was of vital importance, as a prelude, to examine the trade
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relations between the new member states of the EEC and Lebanon prior to 
their accession to the Trade Agreement. However, as the accession of the 
new member states to the EEC, and, consequently, their accession to the 
Trade Agreem ent and the Agreement of 1972 occurred during the same 
period of time, there is no need to tread the same path of analysing the 
trade relations betw een Lebanon and the acceding European states. 
H ow ever, it is w orth  m entioning that the im plications of the first 
enlargement on the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement between 
the EEC and Lebanon was marginal.
Once a European country joins the EEC, it becomes bound by acts 
adopted by the institutions of the EEC.61 As such, the acceding country 
should become bound by the Agreement concluded between the EEC and 
Lebanon since the Agreem ent constitutes an act of the Com m unity. 
Additionally , the accession to the Agreement concluded w ith Lebanon is 
subject to the EEC Treaty and the Act of Accession, which particularly 
regulates the transitional relations between the new mem ber states and 
the EEC on one the hand, and between the new member states and third 
countries on the other.
Article 108 of the Act of Accession of 1972 stipulates that, from the 
date of accession, the new member states shall apply the provisions of the 
agreem ents concluded w ith th ird  countries in general, and  in the 
Mediterranean region in particular, before the entry into force of the Act of 
Accession. To this end, a handful of protocols should be concluded 
between the EEC and the third countries concerned, taking cognizance of 
the necessary transitional measures.
The EEC and Lebanon exclusively concluded in 1973 a Protocol laying 
dow n provisions regulating trade relations between Lebanon and the 
acceding countries.62 Legally, the Protocol was based on Article 113 of the 
Treaty of Rome dealing with issues falling within the area of the common 
commercial policy. This was similar to the approach undertaken by the 
EEC as regards the original Agreement. Consequently, the new member
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states were left with no right to undertake, individually or collectively, 
any obligations as to this matter.
The purpose of the Protocol was to "determine by m utual agreement 
the transitional m easures and the adaptation, to the Agreement". It 
consisted of three titles and a final act as well as the annexed declarations. 
The Protocol adopted measures by which trade concessions concerning 
tariff cuts granted to Lebanon by the EEC were to receive similar treatment 
by the new member states, though subject to transitional measures. The 
reduction in customs duties m ade to Lebanon were on those duties 
applied by the acceding countries against third parties. Furthermore, the 
tariff cuts should not be more than the new  member states m ade to the 
original member states of the EEC as a requisite to compliance w ith the 
EEC common customs tariff. However, as a temporary measure, the U K 
imposed a tariff quota on total Lebanese imports of 100 and 125 tons in 
1973 and 1974 respectively, concerning products listed in Annex I to the 
Protocol relating to the Agreem ent betw een the EEC and  Lebanon 
consequent on the accession of UK, Ireland and Denmark.63 Moreover, 
the tariff quotas allocated to Lebanon concerning other woven fabric of 
cotton increased from 70 tons to 100 tons. The increase in the quota was 
distributed evenly between the new member states.
In return, Lebanon's trade concessions offered to the EEC as a result of 
those made by the latter to the former, were extended to the new member 
states. However, such tariff cuts were in accordance w ith a special 
schedule set out for this purpose and was to be completed by 1975.
VI-CONCLUSIONS
The second phase of trade relations between the EEC and Lebanon 
was crowned by partial reciprocal trade preferences (tariff cuts) claimed to 
be leading to the establishment of a free trade area. Indeed, international 
developments in the sphere of world trade law, mainly the introduction
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of the generalised system of preferences, which led to the adoption by the 
EEC of a special generalised system of preferences paved the way to offer 
non-reciprocal trade  concessions from  the developed countries to 
developing countries. By contrast, the EEC offered Lebanon a reciprocal 
partial trade  preferential agreem ent. From a legal perspective, the 
"in terim  agreem ent" was concluded w ithout p rovid ing  it w ith  the 
necessary elements which support its conformity with international trade 
norms (Article XXIV:5 (c) GATT).
It is clear that the Trade Agreem ent fell short of achieving the 
advantages of the development in international trade norms, in particular 
the advantages arising from the notion of non-reciprocal preferences 
betw een developed and developing contracting parties. The notion of 
non-reciprocity was first introduced via part IV GATT. However, the lack 
of commitments as regards developed countries towards the notion of 
non-reciprocity led to ineffectiveness concerning the legal nature of Part 
IV GATT. This lack of commitment was manifested in the refusal of the 
developed countries to undertake measures countering the MFN clause 
to support the effectiveness of Part IV GATT. By the same token, the EEC 
had show n its lack of enthusiasm  for offering Lebanon preferential 
treatm ent in 1965. How ever, the GSP provided the needed  legal 
instrum ent to fill the legal lacunae in Part IV GATT by reaffirm ing the 
notion of non-reciprocity as supported by the resignation of the developed 
countries to invoke the MFN clause should any developed country offer 
preferential treatm ent to a developing country. Moreover, the notion of 
non-reciprocal and non-extendible nature of trade preferences was 
introduced in an endeavour to recognise the problem of developm ent in 
developing countries. As a consequence, this notion identified  or 
perceived in principle that the gap in the level of economic developm ent 
in trade relations between developed and developing countries entitles 
the less developed party to receive non-reciprocal preferential treatm ent. 
The existing w ide gap in the level of economic developm ent betw een
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Lebanon and the EEC, should therefore, entitle Lebanon to receive non­
reciprocal preferential treatment. Denying that, taking the huge trade 
deficit between Lebanon and the EEC, in addition to the gap in the level of 
economic developm ent, into consideration, w ould  lead only to the 
dominance of the most developed partner and add more burdens on the 
Lebanese market. This would leave the Lebanese m arket vulnerable to 
EEC exports to Lebanon, in particular as regards nascent industries.
On the other hand, if either of the contracting parties (Lebanon or the 
EEC) considers or conceives that reciprocal trade preferences would satisfy 
their m utual interest best, then this rasies questions as to the reasons 
behind the failure to conclude sim ilar reciprocal preferential trade 
agreements in the earlier stage (the Trade and Technical and Cooperation 
Agreement of 1965) on the same international legal grounds as w ould be 
valid for a "quasi" interim agreement leading to the formation of a free 
trade area. During the negotiations of the Trade and Technical and 
Cooperation Agreem ent the EEC claimed to adhere to the norm s of 
international trade law to provide no preferential treatm ent to Lebanon. 
In the Trade Agreement of 1972, the international trade norm s did  not 
preven t the EEC from offering non-reciprocal trade preferences to 
Lebanon. Nonetheless, the EEC chose a different method; an interim  
agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area, in spite of the fact 
that the proposed international legal basis for the A greem ent was 
insufficient. Accordingly, taking the EEC practice into consideration, one 
could come to the conclusion that the EEC conceals itself behind the rules 
of international trade norms when these rules suit its interests, and does 
not take the same rules into account if advantages arising from them  are 
in the best interest of its trading partners. This practice can hardly  be 
conceived of as consolidating economic and trade relations betw een 
Lebanon and the EEC as the pream ble of the Agreement argues and 
intends.
Moreover, the circumstances which surrounded the negotiations of
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the Agreement, in particular the dispute between the member states of the 
EEC as to whether Israel should be granted preferential treatment, point to 
the fact that Lebanon was not an object of particular interest for the EEC. 
The arrangem ent with Lebanon was proposed by France as a part of quid 
pro quo in an endeavour to counter the "imbalance*1 of EEC external 
relations in the region of the Middle East. Therefore, possibly the raison 
d 'e tre  of the Agreement was not to achieve a more balanced contractual 
trade relationship betw een the EEC and Lebanon, bu t to prepare the 
ground and thereafter to allow the EEC to conclude a preferential trade 
arrangem ent w ith Israel. As such, one could look sceptically to the 
seriousness of the EEC relationship policy w ith Lebanon, particularly as 
the Agreement did not come into force.
The Agreement never came into operation as it "did not obtain the 
necessary ratifications".64 The denial of the ratification of the Agreement 
was never explained by either of the contracting parties and was not 
explainable by reference to any available document. Therefore, there are 
only two possible explanations for this. Either Lebanon or the EEC refused 
to ratify the Agreement. Lebanon could refuse to ratify the Agreement if 
she felt that the Agreement would operate only to the advantage of the 
EEC. A lthough there is no available data  from the Lebanese side 
confirm ing w hether Lebanon did  or d id  not ratify  the A greem ent, 
Lebanon, defended the Agreem ent before the w orking party  which 
exam ined the com patibility of the Agreem ent with GATT provisions, 
using argum ents similar to that of the EEC. This means that we can 
assume Lebanon was in favour of the Agreement. The other assum ption 
is that the EEC did not ratify the Agreement. Strictly speaking, legally the 
Agreement falls within the exclusive power of the EEC. As such, the EEC 
solely should conclude the Agreement and its acts w ould be directly 
binding on the member states. In fact, the EEC Council concluded and 
adopted and confirmed the Agreement on behalf of the Com m unity.65
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Therefore one may safely assume that there should or would be no legal 
barriers toward the entry into force of the Agreement.
The foregoing discussion could conclude w ith a view  that the 
contractual trade relationship did not, once again, take into consideration 
the historical, cultural, political links and the geographical proximity not 
pointing to any form of special relationship between Lebanon and the EEC. 
It is, moreover, clear that the Agreement did not digest the advantages 
arising from  the developm ent of the rules of in ternational trade. 
Consequently, one m ay safely assum e that there w as no genuine 
developm ent in the second phase of the contractual trade relationship 
between the EEC and Lebanon. Furthermore, being an agreement offering 
reciprocal tariff preferences, it w ould involve more disadvantages than 
advantages for Lebanon. In this way, the Agreement does not contribute 
to the economic developm ent of Lebanon through the expansion of 
Lebanese exports to the EEC markets. Above all, the Agreem ent never 
came into operation.
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SCO®PUBES p®(HB
NON-RECIPROCAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE: PREFERENCES
PHASE SINCE 1977.
I- INTRODUCTION
The first phase of the relations betw een the EEC and Lebanon 
witnessed the adoption of a non-preferential trade arrangem ent. In the 
second phase, an attem pt was m ade to develop these relations further 
towards an interim free trade area, as an attem pt to eradicate the dramatic 
deficit in Lebanese trade with the EEC, through promoting better access for 
Lebanon's exports to the EEC. However, the Agreement of 1972 never 
came into effect as it did not obtain the necessary ratifications. The earlier 
Trade A greem ent rem ained in operation through subsequent annual 
renew al until it was replaced by non-reciprocal trade  preferential 
arrangements in 1977.
Parallel to this, international society continued to witness a rapid  
development as regards international trade law towards reorganising the 
interests of the developing countries. It culminated in the emergence of a 
so to speak New International Economic Order. Needless to say, the 
emergence of the quasi New International Economic Order necessitated a 
profound developm ent in the norms and the rules of the international 
economic legal order.
Developm ents in the legal international economic order m ade it 
incum bent upon the developed countries, and subsequently the EEC, to 
fu rther add itional com m itm ents tow ards p rom oting  so lu tions to 
international economic problems. The developed countries w ere to 
contribute to the establishment of a new model for relations between the 
developed and developing countries compatible with the aspirations of 
the world community towards a more just and more balanced economic
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order.
In response to these international obligations, the EEC adopted a new 
cooperation and developm ent policy on a w orldw ide scale. This new 
policy encompasses a global M editerranean approach, by which the EEC 
m oved from an incoherent to a more determined and consistent policy 
tow ards the M editerranean basin. The M editerranean policy aim ed to 
provide free access to exports of the relevant countries, to enable them to 
offset their trade balance and to contribute to bringing about conditions for 
successful economic development in these countries. W ithin the context 
of the M editerranean  policy, the EEC and Lebanon concluded a 
Cooperation Agreement in 1977 alongside other M ashreq and Maghreb 
countries.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the legal framework of the 
Cooperation Agreement concluded between the EEC and Lebanon within 
the context of the EEC’s global M editerranean policy and in the light of 
EEC and  in ternational trade  norm s. H ow ever, before such  an 
examination can be made, attention m ust be draw n to the evolution of 
trade flows between the EEC and Lebanon since their last non-ratified 
Agreem ent.
II-EVOLUTION OF TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EEC 
AND LEBANON (1974-1978).
The non-preferential phase of trade relations between Lebanon and 
the EEC witnessed a series of continuous deficits in trade unfavourable to 
the in terests of Lebanon. Despite the im provem ent in Lebanon's 
productive capacity and subsequent increase in its exports, the share of 
Lebanese exports in the EEC m arket d id  not show any substantial 
improvement. Later, the two parties concluded a reciprocal preferential 
trade agreem ent by which Lebanon could find better access to the EEC 
market. However, since the Agreement of 1972 did not go into effect ,
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Lebanon's trade w ith the EEC rem ained to be regulated by the m ost 
favoured nation treatm ent clause.
Moreover, since the second half of 1975 , Lebanon experienced a civil 
w ar which caused considerable damage to its economic strategies in 
general, and to its economic infrastructure in particular. This damage 
contributed severely to the deterioration of its productive capacity, 
disabled its exports policy and hit its foreign trade. The economic 
consequences of the civil war were clearly manifested in the year 1976 as 
far as its trade flows is concerned. The following year, however, Lebanon 
recovered steadily from its economic and trade difficulties.
A gainst this legal and environm ental background, one w ould 
w onder whether Lebanon- EEC trade relations in general, and Lebanon’s 
exports to the EEC in particular showed any improvement.
A-IMPORTS
It is a well know n fact that, in 1974, Lebanon experienced an 
economic boom when Lebanese trade reached its peak. As such, Lebanese 
total imports doubled in one year amounting to $ 2.5 bn in 1974. D espite 
the civil war, Lebanese total imports did not fall dramatically. A part from 
1976, these imports slightly decreased over the years, totalling over $ 2.2 bn 
in 1978. EEC supplies to Lebanon improved rapidly, doubling in 1974, and 
were worth slightly below 42 per cent of the total Lebanese imports. This 
share decreased gradually over the years in proportion to the decrease in 
Lebanese total imports, until it reached 37 per cent of the Lebanese m arket 
in 1978.
The performance of EEC exports to Lebanon raises a further question 
as to w hether the member states witnessed a relative decrease in their 
exports to Lebanon, and whether there was any diversion of trade between 
Lebanon and different member states. This will be examined through the 
table below.
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Figure 4.1
Lebanese im pports froom the member states of the EEC (1974-1978)
Value in m US $ (C.I.F)-
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
BEL-LUX 63.6 55.2 9.9 62.5 62.7
DNMRK 21.2 12.7 5.6 9.1 11.6
FRANCE 242.3 179.5 56.4 186.6 204.2
GRMNY 228.8 178 38.2 127 135.3
IRELAND 1.4 1.7 0.3 1.8 2.4
ITALY 252 204.4 35.7 218.8 255.3
NTHRLND 61.6 43.2 14 49.4 52.2
U.K 156.6 173 20.1 93.9 123.5
EEC (9) 1027.5 847.7 180.2 749.1 847.2
TOTAL 2455.1 2252 899 1925.4 2245.2
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Yearbook (1980)
The above table shows that the dom inant group, including the U.K 
after its accession, continued to occupy a major share in the Lebanese 
market. However, Italy replaced Germany as the principal supplier to 
Lebanon among the member states of the EEC. Contrary to the general 
trends of Lebanese total imports and subsequent EEC share in the Lebanese 
m arket, Italian exports to Lebanon showed a continuous im provem ent 
since the conclusion of the Trade Agreement. They counted for 24 per 
cent of total EEC imports to Lebanon in 1974. Later, they increased steadily 
over the years until they were worth over 30 per cent of the EEC share in 
1978. The Italian share in the Lebanese markets equivalent to 10 per cent
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of total Lebanese imports in 1974, was enhanced and claimed over 11 per 
cent in 1978.
The significance of French exports to Lebanon was second to Italian 
supplies to Lebanon. Following their initial increase to 9.8 per cent of total 
Lebanese imports in 1974, French exports to Lebanon declined to 9 per cent 
where they remained constantly until 1978. However, its share amongst 
the EEC countries declined since the earlier phase, from 29 per cent in 1973 
to 24 per cent in 1978 of total Lebanese imports from the EEC.
Germany, earlier the major supplier to Lebanon, as far as the member 
states of the EEC are concerned, experienced a shift in its position in 
favour of Italy. G erm an exports to Lebanon did  no t show  any 
improvement after 1973. On the contrary, they showed a gradual decrease 
over the years from 11 per cent of total Lebanese imports in 1973 to 9.8 per 
cent and 9 per cent in 1974 and 1978 respectively. Likewise, its share of EEC 
supplies to Lebanon showed substantial deterioration. German exports to 
Lebanon declined dramatically from 32 per cent in 1973 to 22 per cent and 
15 per cent in 1974 and 1978 respectively, of the EEC share in the Lebanese 
m arket.
The gradual decline in EEC exports to Lebanon continued to effect 
British exports to Lebanon. The latter's imports from the U.K experienced 
a decline similar to that from Germany, decreasing steadily from 7.5 per 
cent in 1973 to 6.3 in 1974, and continued to show a further decrease until 
they reached 5.5 per cent of total Lebanese imports in 1978. Such a decrease 
in Lebanon’s imports from the U.K affected the British position as regards 
EEC share in the Lebanese market. As such, they decreased over years 
from 15 per cent in 1974 to 14 per cent in 1978 of total Lebanese imports 
from the EEC.
The Benelux countries, occupying a m arginal segm ent in  the 
Lebanese market, preserved their position. They, alongside Denmark, had 
always a marginal place in Lebanese trade, though at times their trade with 
Lebanon experienced some expansion. This group, together, d id  not
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occupy more than 12 per cent of the EEC share in the Lebanese m arket in 
1974. As a percentage, this share increased slightly, particularly as regards 
the Benelux countries, to 14.8 per cent in 1978. However, Denmark's share 
declined from 2 per cent in 1974 to 1.3 in 1978. This expansion of the 
group in the share was at the expense of Germany and the U.K.
N onetheless, exports from Benelux countries to Lebanon nearly 
doubled in value in 1974. Lebanon's imports from Benelux countries , as a 
group, represented 4 per cent of total Lebanese imports . It increased in 
1974 to 5 per cent of total Lebanese imports. These imports were at the 
same level in the Lebanese market in 1978 when they amounted to 5.1 per 
cent. However, Denmark's share in Lebanon's total im ports rem ained, 
similar to the Irish share, negligible. In 1978, this share am ounted to less 
than 0.05 per cent.
B-EXPORTS
Alongside the increase in its imports, Lebanon's exports im proved 
dram atically, w hen they nearly trebled in 1974 com pared w ith  the 
previous year, w ith a value of $ 1.5 bn. However, in the following two 
years, and owing to special circumstances, Lebanese exports deteriorated 
sharply to nearly a third of this original value. After 1976, Lebanese 
exports started to recover steadily from their difficulties. They developed 
from $ 500 m in 1976 to over $800m in 1978. Lebanese exports to the EEC 
m arket doubled in 1974 when they reached a value w orth  $ 248 m. 
However they declined sharply in the following years until in 1978 they 
accounted for only $ 44 m. It is worth m entioning that the particular 
increase in Lebanese exports to the EEC in 1974 was mainly attributable to a 
sharp increase in Lebanese exports to France. As such, the Lebanese share 
in the EEC m arket as a proportion of Lebanese total exports am ounted to 
17 per cent in 1974, declining to 5 per cent in 1978. The table below 
illustrates these points.
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Figure 4.2
Lebanese exports to the member states of the EEC (1974-1978) 
Value in m US $ (F.O.B)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1971
BEL-LUX 7.1 3.3 2.2 3.1 2.8
DNMRK 4 2.5 2 1 1.1
FRANCE 132.6 19.8 2.6 5.4 5.2
GRMNY 20.6 18.6 9.7 8.3 8.5
IRELAND 2 2 3 _ 3
ITALY 37.8 10.2 4.1 4.9 7.3
NTHRLND 4.1 2.9 17.6 7.6 2.2
U.K 61.2 17.6 10.4 13.3 14
EEC (9) 248.8 76.9* 51.6 43.6 41.4
TOTAL 1454.6 1162 555.4 741 814
Source: International M onetary Fund, Direction of Trade Yearbook
(1980).
The above table indicates that Lebanese exports to the EEC could be 
summarised in two words : incoherence and collapse.
In  1974, Lebanese exports to France increased sharp ly  and  
unexpectedly, contributing to an increase in Lebanon's share in the EEC 
markets. They accounted for 17 per cent of total Lebanese exports in that 
year including Lebanon's share in the French m arket w here they 
amounted to more than 50 per cent of EEC imports from Lebanon. This 
increase, though relatively marginal, corresponded to the huge expansion
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in Lebanon's trade in 1974. However, in the wake of events in Lebanon, 
Lebanese exports to the EEC nearly collapsed in both volume and value. 
The deterioration of Lebanon's exports to the EEC was reflected in 
Lebanon's exports to every market of the member states with 1973 or 1974 
taken as a reference year.
Since Lebanon's exports to the EEC increased unexpectedly (with no 
simple explanation for the increase) the year 1974 should not be taken as a 
b e n c h m a rk  in analyzing the trends of Lebanese exports to the EEC, 
because results would be otherwise. It would be instead wise to take 1973 
for reference because it is in line with the general trends of Lebanon's 
exports to the EEC.
The U.K remained the principal target for Lebanon's exports among 
the EEC member states, but U.K imports from Lebanon declined sharply 
from over 4 per cent of total Lebanese exports in 1973 to less than 2 per 
cent in 1978. German imports from Lebanon decreased as well from 1.4 
per cent in 1973 to 1 per cent for the same period. Similarly, Lebanon's 
exports to Italy and France fell from 1.7 to 0.89 per cent as regards France 
and from 1.4 to 0.63 per cent as regards Italy between 1973 and 1978 
respectively.
Lebanon's exports to the Benelux countries, Denmark, and Ireland 
also deteriorated. They did not account altogether for more than 1 per cent 
of total Lebanese exports in 1978. As individual markets , Lebanese exports 
in both value and volume were negligible as com pared w ith  total 
Lebanese exports. The substantial deterioration in Lebanese exports to the 
EEC as com pared to total Lebanese exports gives rise to the question 
whether such a decline brought about a diversion in exports betw een 
Lebanon and individual member states.
As to Lebanese exports in relation to individual member states and 
their share in the EEC, a question may emerge concerning which year 
should be as a reference point. Unlike the im portance of Lebanon's
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exports to the member states as compared to Lebanese total exports, 1973 
could not be used as reference because the new member states joined the 
EEC that year. Moreover, Lebanese exports to the EEC in 1974 included an 
odd figure relating to Lebanese exports to France, m aking difficult an 
analysis of the importance of other member states to Lebanese exporters. 
Therefore, if any of these years were taken as a reference point, it would 
not be easy to know the real trends of trade. Instead an attem pt should be 
m ade to provide, with a combination of figures of both years, as clear a 
picture as possible.
If 1974 were taken as a reference, then the above table would show 
that French imports from Lebanon collapsed sharply from 53 per cent of 
total EEC imports from Lebanon in 1974 to 11.7 per cent in 1978. A similar 
decrease may be noted if 1973 is taken as a reference, though the decrease is 
one per cent only. Consequently, the collapse of Lebanese exports to 
France in 1978 resulted in diversion in the destination of Lebanese exports 
between the member states of the EEC, leading to an increase in Lebanese 
exports within the EEC share to all other member states at the expense of 
the share of Lebanese exports to France.
How ever, if 1973 is taken as a reference year, then despite the 
confusion w hich m ay surround the real value of the exports to the 
acceding countries , Lebanese exports to individual m em ber states as 
com pared to EEC imports from Lebanon show a similar diversion in 
exports, though in lesser proportions.
Lebanese exports to the U.K, Germany, Italy, and France used to 
absorb the major share of EEC imports from Lebanon. However, in 1973 
these imports decreased sharply from 43 to 32 per cen t, 24 to 19 per c e n t , 
26 to 16 per cent and from 12.5 to 11.7 per cent respectively between 1973 
and 1978. The decline in Lebanese exports to these countries im proved the 
shares of the other member states of the EEC. However, w hatever 
im provements took place in Lebanese exports to the Benelux countries, 
Denmark, and Ireland, exports to them remained marginal.
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C-BALANCE OF TRADE
It is thus evident that trade relations between Lebanon and the EEC 
witnessed a further deterioration. The Lebanese balance of trade with the 
EEC showed a big deficit which increased gradually from 1974 onwards. 
Despite the improvement in Lebanese exports to the EEC in that year, the 
deficit in trade  betw een Lebanon and the EEC was $778m in 1974, 
contributing to 98 per cent of the total Lebanese trade deficit in the same 
year. Lebanese foreign trade suffered in the years following 1974, the 
deficit w ith the EEC remaining the principal burden affecting Lebanese 
foreign trade. As the table below shows, the deficit in trade with the EEC 
counted for 70 per cent in 1975 and 56 per cent in 1978 of the total deficit in 
Lebanese foreign trade. This improvement in the deficit in trade w ith the 
EEC was not due to the enhancing Lebanon's exports to the EEC. It was, in 
fact, due to the deterioration of Lebanese total exports.
Figure 4.3
Balancce of trade between the EEC and Lebanon 
Value in m US $
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
IMPORTS 1027.5 847.7 180.2 749.1 847.2
EXPORTS 248.8 76.9* 51.6 43.6 41.4
DEFICIT 778.7 770.8 728.6 705.5 805.8
TOTAL DEFICIT 790.5 1090 343.6 1184.4 1431.3
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Yearbook 
(1980).
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Further evidence relating to the trade deficit m ay be found by 
examining the ratio between exports to the EEC and imports from it to 
Lebanon. A comparison of this result with the ratio of total Lebanese 
exports to total Lebanese imports would reveal the size of the damage 
which Lebanon's trade relations with the EEC m eant for Lebanese foreign 
trade. The earlier table shows that, Lebanese exports to the EEC covered in 
1974, 24 per cent of Lebanese imports from the latter, whereas Lebanon's 
total exports covered over 61 per cent of Lebanese total imports in the 
same year. Thereafter, the contribution of Lebanon’s exports to the EEC in 
its trade balance with the latter decreased steadily and sharply over the 
years until it d id not cover more than 5 per cent in 1978 in comparison 
with the total which was 36 per cent.
Therefore, it may be concluded that Lebanese trade relations w ith the 
EEC continued to suffer a huge deficit both when Lebanon witnessed an 
economic boom as well as when it experienced economic difficulties.
It was, therefore, clear that for the Agreement to mean any help for 
Lebanon there was need to replace the Trade Agreement w ith another 
agreem ent to provide Lebanon w ith a better treaty  fram ew ork for 
substantial opportunities to expand the share of Lebanese exports to the 
EEC market.
Ill-The Cooperation Agreement (1977).
A-General background
The emergence of the so to speak New International Economic O rder 
on the one hand, w hich imposes on the Com m unity in ternational 
commitments tow ards the developing countries, and the stress for the 
need for a m ore coherent and constructive policy tow ards the 
Mediterranean basin on the other, put the Mediterranean global policy on
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the agenda of the European Parliament. The latter, on the 9th of February 
1971, discussed relations betw een the EEC and the M editerranean 
countries. The Parliam ent stressed the need for a harm onious 
relationship betw een the EEC and the M editerranean countries. It 
emphasised, in particular, the ’’prime necessity of going beyond the purely 
commercial aspects of the question (relations w ith the M editerranean 
countries) and of the contribution to the economic developm ent of the 
region" taking into account the special characteristics and  level of 
economic developm ent of each country.1 In its resolution, the European 
Parliam ent insisted on the necessity for the EEC "to adopt a policy of 
developm ent by m ore appropriate means than commercial m easure 
alone". To this end, the European Parliament asked the Foreign Ministers 
of the m em ber states "to continue the efforts directed tow ard  the 
defin itions of a comm on policy vis a vis the countries of the 
M editerranean basis".2
Although the resolution of the European Parliam ent is not legally 
binding either on the EEC or on its member states, it has nonetheless a 
vital political significance towards the preparation of the M editerranean 
policy. In a series of preparatory sessions for the EC Paris sum m it held 
from 6 Novem ber 1971 until 12 December 1972, the foreign m inisters of 
the m em ber states of the EEC, directed by the European Parliam ent 
resolution, discussed the topics for the Summit's agenda. Am ong the 
principal topics was "foreign relations and the comm unity" and  its 
responsibilities in the world.3
A communique" was issued as regards EEC's external relations. It 
stressed the need for the m ember states to act together w ithin  the 
Com munity "to cope with growing world responsibilities incum bent on 
Europe". Moreover, as a response to the expectations of all the developing 
countries, the Com munique" "attached essential im portance to the 
fu lfillm en t of the EEC com m itm ents to the coun tries of the 
M editerranean basin w ith  which agreem ents have been or w ill be
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concluded, w hich should be the subject of an overall and balanced 
approach".4
This Com m unique' carries a weighty political and legal significance. 
Firstly, from a political perspective, it demonstrates the political will of the 
member states to provide the EEC with a wide mandate in the cooperation 
and development fields. The authoritative organ of the EEC to take action 
(conclude agreements) at the external level is the Council, deciding by a 
qualified majority (Art 113 EEC) or unanimous approval (Art 238 EEC). In 
the latter case, all member states may use a veto. The political will of the 
member states gives the EEC a green light, provided that such action is 
deemed necessary, to act in an area where no power is vested in it. Such 
action should be based, however on Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Thus, the political intention of the member states is a prerequisite as a step 
to push aside the legal barriers which may impede the EEC at an earlier 
stage from acting on the issue of cooperation and development at both the 
regional and world levels.5
The political effectiveness of the Com m unique' was translated into 
EEC norm s by the Council at its session in June 1972. The Council 
reexam ined a proposal for an overall approach to solve the problem s 
facing EEC relations w ith the M editerranean countries.6 The proposal 
suggested the gradual achievement of a free trade area in industrial and 
sem i-m anufactured goods over a transitional period  of five years 
embracing all M editerranean countries, similar to the agreem ent which 
was then under negotiation with Portugal.7 The principles of the proposal 
were approved at the Council's session of October 1972. In addition, the 
Com mission of the EEC lent its help and subm itted on 27 and 29 
Novem ber 1972 a num ber of recom mendations to the Council8 which 
adopted a common position on a global Mediterranean policy, though two 
member states had different views towards the degree of reciprocity.9 The 
United Kingdom and Germany echoed the traditional strong opposition of 
the United States to special preferential arrangements between the EEC
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and non-European M editerranean countries, particularly  w hen these 
countries were to be granted free access to EEC markets in terms of non­
reciprocal preferential treatm ent.10 Against this background, it was 
suggested by the EEC Commission that fresh negotiations be launched 
between Lebanon and the EEC for the conclusion of a new agreem ent in 
conform ity w ith the principles of the "Paris Summit" and the global 
M editerranean policy, alongside its alignment with the N ew  International 
Economic Order. Such negotiations were to involve close technical and 
economic cooperation as a Lebanese goal in its relations with the EEC.11
In January 1975, the Commission of the EEC, influenced by the 
overall M editerranean approach which emerged after the Paris summit, 
and in conformity w ith Article 228 EEC, proposed to the Council that 
negotiations be opened with the Mashreq countries, including Lebanon, 
seeking agreements similar to those concluded in the same year w ith the 
M aghreb countries.12 The Council authorized the Commission at its 
session on 9-10 December 1975 to open the negotiations w ith  these 
countries, w ith a view to concluding a trade and economic cooperation 
agreem ent.13 However, while the EEC, represented by the Commission, 
was launching the negotiations w ith most of the M ashreq countries, 
Lebanon was unfortunately, dragged from January 1976 into a severe and 
devastating civil w ar which made the negotiations between both parties 
impossible.14
It was not until the end of 1976, when the Lebanese civil w ar was 
somewhat "frozen", that the Lebanese Government took the initiative by 
sending its Minister for Social Affairs to pay a visit to the Commission of 
the EEC. He told his hosts of his government's desire to open negotiations 
with the EEC as soon as possible, with a view to concluding an overall 
cooperation agreem ent similar to those of other M ashreq and Maghreb 
countries. The Commission in return confirmed its desire and readiness 
to hold negotiations with Lebanon.15
At an earlier stage, the Council at its session of 20 September 1976 had
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issued to the Commission a supplem entary directive on financial and 
economic cooperation to enable it to hold further negotiations w ith 
Lebanon.16
Prelim inary discussions took place on 19 January 1977 betw een 
represen tatives of both parties for the p reparation  of the form al 
negotiations to take place on 15 and 16 February 1977.17 The formal 
negotiations needed merely one session to be completed, and the text of 
the Agreement was initialled in Brussels on 16 February 1977.18 However, 
at the end of the negotiations, the Lebanese delegation expressed its 
disappointm ent at the outcome stating that the agreement had fallen short 
of meeting Lebanese needs and desires, are in particular, the urgent needs 
arising in the wake of the devastation caused by the civil w ar.19 While 
from a legal perspective, the Lebanese official statement has no legal effect 
or im plications it indicates, the imbalance of negotiating positions 
between the Lebanese and the EEC. In fact, the negotiations were short 
and lasted only one session in comparison to earlier negotiations between 
Lebanon and the EEC on the one hand, and between the EEC and other 
M editerranean countries on the other. In addition, the Cooperation 
Agreement is identical to all the other cooperation agreements concluded 
between the EEC and the Mashreq countries, and as such contradicts the 
EEC claim of taking into consideration the special characteristics and the 
level of economic development of each country. The practice as regards 
the negotiations, gives the impression that the Agreement is a "contrat 
d"adhesion". This would indicate that the Lebanese delegation attended 
the negotiations to sign the Cooperation Agreem ent rather than  to 
negotiate trade, technical, economic and financial arrangements by which 
the Cooperation Agreement could best respond to Lebanon’s needs for 
future economic development. The Council approved the agreem ent as 
initialled by the Commission on 8 March 1977. Later, the EEC and its 
M em ber sta tes acting jointly, and Lebanon form ally signed  the
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Cooperation Agreem ent together with all the annexed docum ents, in 
Brussels on the 3 May 1977.
The participation of the EEC member states in the conclusion of the 
Cooperation Agreement meant that the latter had to effect ratification in a 
manner consistent w ith their individual domestic procedures in order to 
bring the Agreement into fo rc e d  Such a process of parallel ratifications 
takes a long time and may delay the operation of the preferences which 
arise from the Agreement. Such delay then contradicts the desire of the 
EEC to seek im m ediate implementation of the trade provisions of the 
Cooperation Agreement. Therefore, the EEC Council, (similar to the case 
of all other agreements with Mashreq and Maghreb countries), on 3rd 
March 1977, authorised the Commission to negotiate with Lebanon for an 
in terim  agreem ent seeking the early im plem entation of the trade  
m easures of the C ooperation A greem ent.21 The in tended Interim  
Agreement was concluded and entered into force immediately, on the first 
of July 1977,22 for a duration of one year if the Cooperation Agreement was 
not ratified by all the parties at an earlier date.23
As the Cooperation Agreem ent did not enter into force a t the 
suggested date, the Council on 22nd May 1978, authorised the Commission 
to open negotiations with Lebanon to extend the Interim Agreement. The 
need for the extension arose from the fact that the procedures for 
ratification of the Cooperation Agreement by the respective national 
Parliaments could not be completed soon enough for the Cooperation 
Agreement to come into effect on the intended day 24 On 26 June, the 
Council extended until December 1978 the Interim Agreem ent pending 
entry into force of the Cooperation Agreem ent25
The Interim Agreement was justified by the desire to accelerate the 
im plem entation as early as possible of trade preferences, exclusively, 
concerning certain goods m entioned in the cooperation Agreem ent. 
However, as the Interim Agreement was of a provisional nature, several 
Articles, including Articles 25, 39, 44, 46 of the Cooperation Agreem ent
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were not induded  in the Interim Agreement.
As the Interim  Agreem ent was commercial in its nature, it was 
juridically speaking, based on Article 113 EEC which expressly confers 
upon  the EEC the pow er to conclude exclusively tariff and trade 
agreements. It was negotiated by the Commission, as authorised by the 
Council. The Council Regulation referred  to the  Com m ission's 
recommendation in the reasoning cited in the said regulation.26 Thus, the 
EEC exclusively concluded the Interim Agreement and cited Art 113 as a 
legal basis for such a conclusion.
By concluding the Interim  Agreem ent, and later approving the 
Cooperation Agreem ent between Lebanon and the EEC, the European 
Parliament, in its consent to the Agreement, considered that the global 
M editerranean policy had been rounded off towards the southern and 
eastern M editerranean regions.
B-THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT
The EEC possesses a host of relations w ith third countries covering 
areas and activities falling within its competence. Amongst such areas 
w ithin the competence of the EEC is the common commercial policy 
considered to be the main pillar of EEC external relations. When the EEC 
acts within this field, it is bound by its treaty-making powers, in particular 
by Articles 111, 113 EEC. However, beyond this scope, as the EEC also acts 
varyingly at an international level, by concluding agreements w ith third 
countries a n d /o r  international organisations, the EEC together w ith its 
member states becomes bound by commitments adhered to so to speak 
collectively, in particular, towards different international organisations 
and conferences. The best exam ple of such an EEC in ternational 
com m itm ent is the General Agreem ent on Tariffs and  T rade and 
UNCTAD. Therefore, when the EEC concludes an envisaged agreem ent 
with third countries, it is not only confined to its internal competences (its
1 6 6
treaty m aking power), bu t also by its external international aspects. An 
agreem ent undertaken by the EEC should not contradict or violate 
international law  or international practice. In other words, the EEC m ust 
respect international law, especially when it itself is a de facto contracting 
party  to a particular agreement, as in the case w ith GATT as far as the 
EEC's commercial policy is concerned. One could ask w hether the 
Cooperation Agreement between Lebanon and the EEC is in accord w ith 
EEC com m itm ents at both the internal and external levels. In other 
w ords, on w hat legal basis does the EEC justify the C ooperation 
Agreement as far as both its treaty making competence and international 
trade norms are concerned.
i-INTERNAL OR COMMUNITY LEVEL
The treaty making power of the EEC is governed by the rules27 of the 
Community's constitutional documents and its recognised practice.28 The 
Treaty of Rome defines the areas where the EEC is capable of concluding 
agreem ents w ith th ird  countries, and the nature of such agreem ents. 
Where such agreements are provided for in the Treaty, the EEC possesses 
an exclusive power to conclude that agreement.29
The C ooperation Agreem ent, w hich falls w ith in  the area  of 
commercial policy of the EEC, within the context of Chapter Ten of the 
Treaty of Rome, was concluded, however, on the basis of the m ixed 
procedure, that is to say, concluded jointly by the EEC and its m em ber 
states. This gives rise to the question w hether resort to the m ixed 
agreem ent form ula m ay bring into question the EEC treaty  m aking 
com petence to conclude the Cooperation Agreem ent exclusively; or 
w hether the action of the EEC and its member states (mixed agreem ent 
approach) was based on a recognised legal practice to conclude such an 
agreem ent jointly.
In fact, the Treaty of Rome provides no provisions for the m ixed
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agreem ent procedure. Nevertheless, this m ethod has been frequently 
used by the EEC and its member states whenever deemed necessary, with 
implicit or otherwise approval by the ECJ.30
Resort to the mixed agreement approach has been justified on both 
external and internal grounds. The external reasons legally justifying the 
adoption  of m ixed agreem ents have been exam ined in an earlier 
chapter.31 There is no need to deal with the same issue, particularly when 
no reason, as far as the case with Lebanon is concerned, was found to 
support the conclusion of a mixed agreement.
Internally, however, the conclusion of a mixed agreem ent is legally 
required whenever the subject m atter of an agreement involves certain 
arrangements or specific provisions which exceed the exclusive explicit or 
implicit powers of the EEC.
Similar to the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1965, 
the Cooperation Agreement clearly goes beyond both the express and the 
implied powers of the EEC. It includes, besides trade measures, economic 
and technical cooperation, and financial arrangements.
The Treaty of Rome expressly empowers the EEC to conclude trade 
and tariff agreements in accordance with Article 113 EEC, bu t financial, 
economic and technical issues are not covered by any provision of the EEC 
Treaty, as far as EEC external relations is concerned. As a precedent, the 
ECJ did  not object to agreements involving financial m atters, concluded 
jointly by the EEC and its member states, provided that the member states 
take the burden of the financial measures.32 However, in the case of the 
Cooperation Agreement, the financial measures were to be com m itted 
from either the European Investment Bank's own resources or from the 
EEC's own budgetary resources.33 Therefore, the member states could not 
have joined the Cooperation Agreement on financial grounds.
On the other hand, the treaty making competence of the EEC does not 
allow the EEC, either expressly or implicitly, to conclude agreements with 
a th ird  country  encom passing economic or technical cooperation.
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W henever an agreem ent has involved the economic and  technical 
cooperation fields, the EEC has used exclusively Article 235 EEC as a legal 
basis for the conclusion of a given agreement.34 The use of Article 235 EEC 
may be taken as a dear indication of the lack of the EEC competence to act 
in such areas. Moreover, the member states of the EEC usually make clear 
through specific provisions that the involvement in such an arrangem ent 
does not prejudice their hitherto existing competence in a given field. The 
Cooperation Agreement with Lebanon accompanied the birth  (1975) of the 
EEC Mediterranean global policy which emerged from the Paris summit.
At the Paris summit, a political statement was issued calling for ever 
closer cooperation between the EEC and the M editerranean countries, 
based on an overall and balanced approach. Despite the political 
significance of that statement,35 it did not have legal implications for the 
EEC treaty m aking competences, since it d id not m odify the Treaty of 
Rome to provide the EEC with treaty-making competences to conclude 
agreements w ith third countries covering economic and technical issues. 
In other words, economic and technical fields have rem ained w ithin the 
jurisdiction of the member states. Legally, however, the Council is 
em pow ered to act on these issues w henever such action is deem ed 
necessary to attain one of the objectives of the EEC Treaty, despite a lack of 
express powers.36 Moreover, given the political will of the member states 
to develop an ever closer cooperation with the M editerranean countries, 
the Council, especially as it represents the will of the member states, may 
reflect such a will by translating it into legal standards, such as by 
concluding the Cooperation Agreement exclusively on the basis of Article 
235 EEC and thereby possibly pre-em pting independen t action by 
individual m ember states. However, the significance of the political 
presence of the member states at the international scene may lead them to 
avert the conclusion of such an agreement exclusively by the EEC, that is, 
on the basis of Article 235 EEC, by joining the conclusion of the given 
agreem ents involving matters beyond EEC treaty-m aking competence.
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The Cooperation Agreem ent was concluded in a m ixed form, also 
involving Article 238 EEC as a basis.37 This gives rise to the question 
w hether Article 238 EEC is not sufficient to provide the necessary legal 
basis for concluding the Cooperation Agreement exclusively by the EEC.
Article 238 EEC provides only for association agreements rather than 
cooperation agreements. Nevertheless, some writers on European law  see 
no difference between association agreements and cooperation agreements 
w hen they recognise similarities between both kinds of agreem ents.38 
However, the two types of agreements may not necessarily be similar 
either in their purposes or subject-matter.
A rt 238 EEC empowers the EEC expressly to conclude "agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, 
common action and special procedures". The Article adds that such 
agreements should be concluded by the Council acting unanim ously after 
receiving the assent of the European Parliament. W here any such 
agreement calls for an amendment to the Treaty, such am endm ent would 
then be in accordance with Art 236 EEC. Thus Art 238 EEC concentrates on 
four points:
1-The establishm ent of an association agreem ent providing for 
reciprocal rights and obligations;
2-Conclusion of the "association" agreement by the Council, by 
unanim ous approval.
3- Compulsory approval by the European Parliament.
4- The possibility that an "association" agreement m ay go beyond the 
EEC treaty making-competences, however, w ith due regard to 
Article 236 EEC.
Association agreements are regarded as being prelim inary to future 
membership in the Communities as was the case with Greece and is the 
case w ith  Turkey. It may be said to be a transitional substitu te for 
m em bership. Such is the case w ith EFTA countries.39 M oreover, 
association agreements have been used for other purposes such as to
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retain firm links and ties between the relevant EEC m ember states and 
their form er colonies territories. The m ain feature of association 
agreements under Art 238 EEC is the fact, that they are concluded on an 
equal footing involving reciprocal rights and obligations.
The Cooperation Agreement with Lebanon, similar to all cooperation 
agreem ents w ith the M ashreq and Maghreb countries, aims neither to 
pave the  w ay for m em bership nor p rov ide for substitu tion  for 
m em bership. The Cooperation Agreem ent aims to strengthen existing 
relationships and to promote the economic and trade cooperation of both 
parties. M oreover, the Cooperation A greem ent p rovides for non­
reciprocal tariff preferences in the interest of Lebanon, looking forward to 
a later stage involving the possible form ation of a free trade area. 
Therefore, the purposes and the features of the association agreements 
may be different than those of cooperation agreements. Consequently, the 
Cooperation Agreement with Lebanon cannot be said to be an association 
Agreem ent.
Throughout its practice, the EEC has concluded, a handful of 
cooperation agreements w ith th ird  countries. The agreem ents may be 
categorised into two groups: agreements concluded under the umbrella of 
the Com munity's M editerranean policy and those concluded w ith non- 
M editerranean third countries.
The C ooperation A greem ent betw een the EEC and  Lebanon 
represents the first category of cooperation agreements. The most recent 
cooperation  agreem ents concluded betw een the EEC and  non- 
M editerranean th ird  countries are the cooperation agreem ents w ith 
Yemen40 and Hungary41 in 1985 and 1988 respectively. Both agreements 
were concluded by the EEC exclusively, with Articles 113 and 235 of the 
Rome Treaty being cited as their legal bases. In both agreements express 
provisions can be found referring to the fact that certain m easures 
involved in the agreements are beyond EEC treaty making-competence. 
N onetheless, it was concluded by the EEC exclusively. The tw o
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agreem ents encompass trade, economic and technical cooperation but 
exclude financial cooperation. Therefore, would the inclusion of financial 
cooperation in the Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements require resort 
to Article 238 EEC as a legal basis and, consequently, require the form of a 
mixed agreem ent, as compared w ith the cooperation agreem ents w ith 
non-Mediterranean countries, based on Articles 113 and 235 EEC?
Article 238 EEC does not expressly provide for financial cooperation. 
It em pow ers the EEC to conclude association agreem ents involving 
common action and special procedures. Moreover, not all association 
agreements concluded between the EEC and different categories of third 
countries have involved financial cooperation. This underp ins the 
interpretation that the terms "common action" and "special procedures" 
do not, explicitly, cover financial issues. Nonetheless, assum ing that 
financial cooperation is implicitly covered by Article 238 EEC, the EEC has 
also exclusively concluded a handful of separate financial protocols with 
third countries.
Article 235 EEC empowers the EEC to take action on all necessary 
m atters to attain the objectives of the Rome Treaty, despite its lack of 
express power to do so in specific fields. This provides the EEC with more 
concrete pow er to conclude agreements covering financial provisions, as 
long as the EEC takes the burden of the financial issues. This gives rise to 
the question of w hether Articles 113 and 235 EEC w ould be legally 
sufficient to perm it the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreem ent by the 
EEC exclusively.
The Cooperation Agreement with Lebanon goes in fact beyond the 
EEC treaty making-competences. Its conclusion, based on Article 238 EEC 
required the parallel participation of the EEC member states. Otherwise, 
the resort to an amendm ent of EEC treaty making-competences w ould 
have been inevitable. However, such an amendment of the EEC treaty 
making-competences under Article 236 EEC has to be proposed by either
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the Commission or one of the member states. Moreover, following the 
European Parliam ent's approval of such a p roposal, a conference 
addressing such amendments w ould have to be convened and reach a 
conclusion by common accord. The entry into .force of the amendments 
could then be possibly delayed for such a long time as to underm ine the 
advantages sought from the implementation of the am endm ents, since 
such amendments would not have any legal effect until they are ratified 
by all m em ber states in accordance w ith  their ow n national legal 
procedures. Therefore, following these steps to provide the EEC w ith an 
expansion in its treaty making-competences to cover other areas not 
provided for in the treaty, is extremely cumbersome.
Furtherm ore, the assent of the European Parliam ent under Article 
238 EEC is obligatory. However, under Article 235 EEC, though the 
consultation of the European Parliament is required, it is often to question 
whether disapproval by the European Parliament would not be an obstacle 
to the conclusion of the Agreement. The European Parliament approved 
the Cooperation Agreement w ith Lebanon. The European Parliam ent 
delivered an opinion of consent to the Council.42 In its opinion, the 
European Parliament applauded the Agreement with Lebanon and drew  
attention to the close economic and cultural links between the European 
countries and Lebanon. By recom m ending the A greem ent, the 
Parliament considered that the overall approach to the relations w ith the 
M editerranean countries had been rounded off in accordance w ith the 
findings of the Paris Summit Conference of 19th October 1972 43
The unanim ous approval of the Cooperation A greem ent by the 
Council, under Article 238 EEC, expressed the political will of the member 
states to adopt the agreement. Such a political will m ay be assumed to be 
necessary under Article 235 EEC which requires unanim ous approval by 
the Council for the concluded Agreement. Therefore, the conclusion of 
the Cooperation Agreement between Lebanon and the EEC, covering also 
financial cooperation, based on Article 113 and 235 EEC would not require
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the participation of the member states, nor an am endm ent of the EEC 
treaty making-powers and, consequently, would provide a sufficient legal 
basis for a conclusion by the EEC exclusively.
ii-EXTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The EEC was established by an international treaty between sovereign 
states. It thereby became a subject of international law and consequently 
became bound by its rules and principles. Therefore, w hen it acts 
externally, though within its treaty making-competence, it has to do so 
w ithout prejudice to international legal rules and principles. Otherwise, 
any violation or breach of these rules, or principles, as well as EEC's 
international engagements, would entail an obligation to make reparation 
in accordance w ith the contents of the treaties to which the EEC is a 
contracting party, and the international rules on dispute settlement.44 As 
such, the conformity of the Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and 
Lebanon with international rules and practice is considered necessary. In 
other words, the Cooperation Agreement should not contradict or violate 
the international obligations of its contracting parties.
H ow ever, the Cooperation Agreem ent relates predom inantly  to 
trade. Thus it should be in alignment with the principles and norm s of 
UNCTAD and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade.
1-THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND THE GSP
The enorm ous substantive documents of UNCTAD activities have 
been translated into international commitments by developed countries to 
developing countries. A General Scheme of Preferences emerged and was 
soon adopted  w ith respect to different individual developed customs 
territories. The EEC was the first to adopt in 1970 its own scheme of 
preferences and renewed it in 1980,45 followed by later modifications and
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liberalisation as a prelude to further renewal in the 1990s.46
However, trade preferences offered to developing countries would at 
first look to be inconsistent w ith the principle of non-discrim ination in 
trade which was embodied in GATT (MFN). Therefore, the need has 
arisen for a form ula that w ould m ake the G eneralised System of 
Preferences com patible w ith  Article 1(1) GATT. O therw ise, the 
G eneralised System of Preferences, unanim ously  adop ted  by the 
UNCTAD, w ould rem ain legally ineffective, and  any offer of tariff 
preferences to any developing countries w ithout proper waiver from the 
MFN clause w ould consequently involve a violation of that Article. 
Am ong different proposals,47 the contracting parties to the General 
Agreement adopted a fixed term waiver for a ten year period, by which the 
developed contracting parties to GATT agreed to grant non-reciprocal, 
non-extendible preferential treatm ent to the developing countries.48 
Following the Tokyo Round, the Enabling Clause emerged, providing a 
perm anent legal recognition of trade preferences under GATT. The 
Enabling Clause met a "fundamental concern of developing countries by 
legitim izing (the Generalised System of Preferences permanently) at the 
international level as one of their long standing aspirations".49
The preferences for development referred to in the Enabling Clause 
are to be accorded not on grounds of political, cu ltural o r even 
geographical ties, bu t on grounds of the differences that exist in levels of 
economic development.50 In fact, Para 2(a) of the Enabling Clause specifies 
that the preferences accorded to developing countries should be in 
accordance w ith the Generalised System of Preferences providing for the 
e stab lishm en t of "generalised non-reciprocal non -d isc rim in a to ry  
preferences beneficial to the developing countries".51 The GSP was 
conditioned so as "not to constitute a binding commitment", that is to say, 
it does not impose a legal obligation upon the developed contracting 
parties.52 Consequently, should they not meet their obligations under the 
GSP, they w ould not be liable to provide rem edies or compensation.
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Therefore, the contracting parties may w ithdraw their preferences in part 
or in whole.53 However, if a developed contracting party chooses to adopt 
a scheme of tariff preferences, it should meet the characteristics specified 
ad hoc in the Decision of June 1971 as well as in the Agreed Conclusions. 
The main characteristic of the GSP is that a country offering preferences 
should not discriminate between developing countries i.e. there should be 
one scheme for all developing countries. Therefore, tariff preferences 
stipulated  in the context of the Lome" Conventions, as well as the 
cooperation agreements between the EEC and M editerranean countries, 
designed for different purposes, are excluded from these waivers. In the 
light of the latter case, such preferences should be considered under the 
GATT provisions for joint action.
The EEC, in turn, adopted different policies of preferences tow ards 
different categories of states and regions. The GSP, which sprang from the 
persistent dem and of the developing countries for special treatm ent in 
international trade, was designed for developing countries not engaged in 
trade w ith the EEC through either bilateral or m ultilateral agreements. 
The EEC's GSP applies to manufactured and semi m anufactured goods for 
developing countries, and no particular treaty or agreem ent between the 
EEC and any beneficiary developing country is needed, for making use of 
that GSP. The M editerranean countries, on the other hand, for different 
reaso n s , inter alia, geograph ica l p rox im ity  to the  E u ro p ean  
Com munities,54 were approached specifically by the global M editerranean 
policy, encompassing in addition to trade preferences, financial, technical 
and economic cooperation.
The global M editerranean policy is based on a p luralist style of 
relations, such as customs unions, free trade areas and non-reciprocal 
trade agreements. The main feature of the cooperation agreements which 
were designed for the Mashreq and Maghreb countries is that they involve 
non-reciprocal trade preferences offered by the EEC to these countries.
Therefore, since the Cooperation Agreement is not covered by the
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EEC's GSP and, consequently, the Enabling Clause cannot be invoked for 
departure from the principle of non-discrimination in world trade, would 
it fall w ithin the GATT provisions for a joint action for the departure 
from Article 1 (1) GATT ?
2-THE AGREEMENT AND GATT: PROVISIONS FOR WAIVER 
FROM MFN CLAUSE
The major obstacle to the prom otion of world trade involving the 
develop ing  countries w as the universal application  of the non- 
discrim inatory principle of trade enshrined in GATT Article 1. This 
obstacle was m oderated through progressive improvement in GATT rules 
and its application, by em bodying in the General A greem ent vital 
derogations, waivers and discriminatory rules.
From the outset, the GATT recognised departures from the MFN 
clause for historical reasons.55 Additional derogations may be applicable 
through special waiver to be recommended for exceptional reasons in 
accordance w ith the provisions of Article XXV GATT. Furthermore, the 
introduction of Part IV GATT marked a significant legal step towards the 
recognition of the concept of non-reciprocity w ithin the GATT sphere. 
Finally, general exceptions are possible under Article XXIV GATT 
perm itting the creation of customs unions and free trade areas, or the 
conclusion of interim  agreements leading to the form ation of either a 
customs union or a free trade area.
(A)-HISTORICAL REASONS
As far as historical reasons for a departure from the application of the 
MFN clause are concerned, there were no provisions for preferential 
treatm ent between the EEC and Lebanon in force at the time the GATT 
came into effect. Thus Lebanon's EEC trade relations have not been
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subject to tariff preferences for historical reasons.56
(B)-TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER GATT PROVISIONS
In principle, the notion of non-reciprocity, translated into trade rules 
in Part IV GATT, considers that export earnings "play a vital part in the 
economic developm ent of the developing countries", provided that their 
exports find "more favourable and acceptable conditions of access to world 
markets". Accordingly, a developed country m ay offer non-reciprocal 
tariff concessions to a developing country for the purpose of prom oting 
the la tte r 's  trade  and contributing  to the econom ic an d  social 
advancement of the developing country.57
The purposes and the objectives of the Cooperation Agreement with 
Lebanon reflected those principles em bodied in part IV GATT. The 
objectives of the Cooperation Agreem ent are to "establish a broad 
cooperation  in o rder to contribute to the econom ic and  social 
developm ent of Lebanon".58 Moreover, as far as trade cooperation is 
concerned, it aimed to promote trade between the contracting parties for a 
better balance in their trade with a view to accelerating the rate of growth 
of the export trade of Lebanon and improving conditions of access of its 
products to the EEC's market.59
H ow ever, p a rt IV GATT does not constitute a w aiver from  the 
application of the MFN clause . In other words, it does not preclude other 
developed contracting parties from invoking their rights under that 
clause. Moreover, the fixed term waiver and the Enabling Clause have 
been specifically designed to meet the requirement of non discrimination 
of tariff preferences offered to all developing countries agreed upon and 
prescribed by the GSP under the auspices of UNCTAD.
If the Decision of June 1971 and the Enabling Clause are read  in 
conjunction with part IV GATT, provided that such preferences are based 
on non-discrim ination betw een all developing countries, and  w ere
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designed to close the gap between the level of development of developed 
and developing countries, they m ay provide a legal basis for non 
extendible preferences between developed and developing countries.
Therefore, since the Cooperation Agreement offers preferences which 
discriminate between developing countries, and are designed to meet the 
EEC's own, mainly political, purposes , they would have to find a legal 
basis under different GATT provisions. Is it possible to justify the 
Cooperation Agreement under Article XXIV GATT?.
(C)-ARTICLE XXIV GATT
Article XXIV GATT appears on first impression to set forth precise 
rules for regional arrangem ents which perm it a departure from  the 
application of the MFN clause. It recognises that the provisions of the 
General Agreement "shall not p reven t/as between the territories of the 
Contracting Parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free trade 
area, or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation 
of a customs union or of a free trade area",60 However, the formation of a 
free trade area , to qualify for a waiver from the application of the MFN 
clause, should be in accordance with the precise rules set forth in that 
Article. Accordingly, in order to qualify under Article XXIV GATT as a 
free trade area, a regional grouping, or an interim agreement leading to 
the formation of a free trade area, would have to satisfy certain elements 
and characteristics.
1-The purpose of the formation a free trade area should be to facilitate 
trade between the constituent territories.61
2- The duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce would be 
eliminated, substantially on all the trade between the constituent 
territories on products originating in such territories.62
3- Any interim  agreement leading to the formation of a free trade
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area "shall indude a plan and schedule for the formation of such a 
free trade area within a reasonable length of time".63
The Cooperation Agreement between Lebanon and the EEC aimed to 
strengthen trade relations. To this end, the parties established a wide 
range of cooperation w ith a view to m aking a contribution to the 
econom ic developm ent of Lebanon.64 The A greem ent asserts the 
intention of prom oting trade in conform ity w ith the in ternational 
obligations of the contracting parties. Promoting of trade to ensure a better 
balance of trade, and improving the conditions of access of Lebanon’s 
goods to the EEC market, would facilitate trade between the contracting 
parties. To equip these objectives with a certain degree of certainty, the 
Cooperation Agreement was concluded for an indefinite duration.
W ith the Cooperation Agreem ent coming into effect, the EEC 
undertook to eliminate all customs duties and charges having equivalent 
effect to customs duties, besides eliminating all other restrictive measures 
of commerce substantially w ith respect to all trade w ith Lebanon.65 
However, Lebanon did not undertake any obligations corresponding to 
those undertaken by the EEC. Therefore, the nature of Lebanon’s 
commitments may be said to be contrary to Article XXIV: 8 (b) GATT, 
which entails that all contracting parties to a free trade area agreement 
should suppress, substantially, all duties and restrictions to trade. The 
EEC, however, has argued that, since Lebanon is a developing country, it is 
to be treated as initially exempted from reciprocal commitments; the EEC 
underpins its argument by making reference to Article XXXVI: 8 GATT.66 
In fact Lebanon, neither during the first stage, nor at any definite stage, has 
been committed to undertake measures corresponding to those of the EEC. 
On the contrary, Lebanon has been privileged to m aintain or even 
increase its customs duties or other restrictive measures to trade if such 
measures have been deemed necessary for its economic developm ent.67 
This leads to the conclusion that, since the gap of development between 
the EEC and Lebanon is wide and even, becomes w ider, over time,
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Lebanon may maintain its rights under the Cooperation Agreement to use 
exceptional measures to ensure a better balance in its trade, growth in its 
economic developm ent and a better balance of payments. Therewith, 
Lebanon would not be able to fulfil the conditions for the establishment of 
a free trade area which entails, inter alia, the elim ination of all tariff 
barriers between its customs territories. Thus, would the Cooperation 
Agreement, since it does not meet the conditions for the formation of a 
free trade area, hold as an interim agreement leading to the formation of a 
free trade area?
To be considered as an interim agreement leading to the formation of 
a free trade area, a regional arrangem ent should include a plan and 
schedule for such formation within a reasonable length of time. Such a 
plan and schedule would be examined and m onitored by an ad hoc 
established working party. Should such a plan prove not be likely to 
promote progress towards the formation of a free trade area, or should the 
schedule not be limited to a reasonable length of time, the contracting 
parties to such arrangements would be, provided they are contracting 
parties to GATT, under an obligation either to modify their agreement or 
not to put it into force.68
The Cooperation Agreement does not expressly provide for a plan or 
a schedule for the formation of a free trade area, nor does it itself expressly 
provide that the Agreement is an interim  agreem ent leading to the 
formation of a free trade area. When the Cooperation Agreem ent was 
presented for scrutiny under GATT, the EEC considered that, inter alia, 
these aspects m ay not avert the conclusion of the C ooperation 
A greem en t.69 Moreover, the Cooperation Agreement refers to review 
sessions w ith  Lebanon, to be held every five years, for seeking 
opportunities towards the removal of obstacles to trade.70 Do these review 
clauses constitute a necessary plan or substitute the necessary plan and 
schedule to be within a reasonable length of time?71
There is no interpretation of "reasonable length of time", either in
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the practice of the General Agreement, or in the views of the EEC.72 There 
are many regional integration agreements which do not include "a plan 
and schedule for the form ation of such a free trade area w ithin  a 
reasonable length of time" as prescribed in the relevant article.73 When 
these agreements were examined, the GATT showed tolerance towards the 
legal question, and sought a political approach to the conclusion of these 
agreements. This laxity in a legal approach has led the contracting parties 
to pay little regard to the legal issue regarding the formation of a free trade 
area.
Therefore, one may rightly back the view of the GATT working party, 
which considers that the objectives of the Cooperation Agreement reflect 
those of Part IV and Article XXIV GATT. However, the Agreement does 
not fully comply with the rules applicable to the establishment of a free 
trade area, or w ith any other individual article. Consequently, the 
Cooperation Agreem ent stands somewhere between the GSP and an 
interim agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area. It is rather 
a preferential trade agreement.
C-THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT.
The Cooperation Agreement was concluded between the EEC and its 
member states on the one hand and Lebanon on the other in 1977.74 It 
replaced the earlier Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1965 
and all previous trade arrangements, for an unlimited duration. The body 
of the Cooperation Agreement is headed by a preamble. It is then divided 
into titles, each headed by one of the covered fields of cooperation. In the 
pream ble, the contracting parties refer to their political ideology, their 
aims and objectives, in accordance with a model normally used for every 
cooperation agreement concluded between the EEC and all Mashreq and 
Maghreb countries. The preamble is thus identical to all other preambles 
incorporated in the cooperation agreements w ithin the context of the
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M editerranean policy, with similar political, historical and even cultural 
reasons being given as reasons underlying EEC relations with Lebanon.
The preamble provides the basis on which specific objectives may be 
achieved and cooperation may take place. The ultimate aims contain the 
elements that then develop in each considered field of cooperation. In the 
preamble, the level of cooperation is expressed; an order of priorities is 
thus adopted by providing a framework through which expectations may 
be generated and fulfilled. The Preamble may be said to be effective since 
it forms an integral part of the agreement. As such, it m ay be resorted to 
for guidance in the absence of express details in any field of cooperation, it 
m ay o rien t the contracting parties and underp in  the teleological 
interpretation of the relevant provisions.
i-AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The preamble has four paragraphs, setting out broadly and in concise 
and plain  language the general objectives of the contracting parties. 
Com pared w ith  the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreem ent, the 
objectives of the Cooperation Agreement reflect certain developm ents 
which took place in relations between the EEC and Lebanon consequent to 
developments in economic and trade law at the international level and 
their effect on EEC policies towards the developing countries in general 
and the Mediterranean countries in particular.
In the Cooperation Agreement, the contracting parties stressed their 
m utual desire to m aintain and strengthen their friendly relations in 
accordance with the principles of the U.N charter. The latter expressed 
w ith respect to its general purposes, the desire "to develop friendly 
relations among nations", beside its attem pts to achieve "international 
cooperation  in so lving in ternational prob lem s of an econom ic 
character".75 It is noticeable that the United Nations Charter devotes one 
chapter to international economic and social problem s, reflecting an
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international em phasis on prom oting economic developm ent between 
nations.76 The chapter provides the foundation for some legal obligations 
for U N  member states to act77 and cooperate with a view to achieving and 
prom oting "higher progress and developm ent to prom ote solutions of 
international economic problems".78
From the United Nations forum an adequate response to the problem 
of developm ent in developing countries has emerged through UNCTAD 
activities. The latter has been a strong advocate for the adoption of more 
preferential treatm ent towards developing countries. In this respect, the 
EEC has been since the Paris Summit in 1972, a major actor on the 
in ternational trade  scene, and as such it accepts its in ternational 
responsibilities
In the Cooperation Agreement these new developments have been 
taken into consideration within the framework and development of EEC 
external relations policies. The Cooperation Agreem ent is m eant to 
contribute therew ith to the establishment of a "new model for relations 
between developed and developing states, compatible with the aspirations 
of the international community toward a more just and m ore balanced 
economic order"79 which is so to speak the New International Economic 
Order.80
C orresponding to these developm ents, the contracting parties 
intended to establish a wide range of cooperation between them selves 
w ith a view to contributing to the economic and social developm ent of 
Lebanon. To this end, they declared their resolve to prom ote economic 
and trade cooperation taking into consideration the level of developm ent 
of each party. The basic objectives of the contracting parties are repeated in 
detail. The Cooperation Agreement enumerates the means to m eet them 
in the field of economic, technical, financial and trade cooperation. The 
achievement of the given objectives is not, however, isolated from  the 
efforts to be m ade by the Lebanese authorities as regards Lebanon’s own 
developm ent policy. The Agreement works as a complem ent to such
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envisaged efforts. To this end the objectives and the priorities of the 
developm ent plans of Lebanon involve the im portance of prom oting 
regional cooperation between Lebanon and other states (the Members of 
Arab League).
In the field of technical cooperation, the EEC and its member states 
have defined their objectives in more specific and diversified term s, 
aimed at prom oting the participation of the EEC in the effort m ade by 
Lebanon to develop its production and economic in frastructure  in 
industrial and agricultural fields. Lebanon is to welcome and encourage 
participation of the EEC in implementing such development programmes. 
Moreover, the objectives of technical cooperation cover fields of science, 
technology and the protection of the environm ent. The contracting 
parties seek to prom ote the participation of the EEC opera to r in 
programmes for exploring, enhancing and processing Lebanon's resources.
In the economic field, Art 4 of the Cooperation Agreement sets a few 
specific objectives which the contracting parties shall make efforts to 
prom ote. For the first time, the marketing and prom otion of Lebanese 
products exported directly to the EEC m arket has attracted particular 
attention.
The contracting parties undertook to prom ote cooperation in  the 
fisheries sector, to encourage private investm ent in Lebanon and to 
exchange in fo rm ation  on econom ic and  financial developm ents 
connected to areas related to in the Cooperation Agreement. O ther 
m easures defined in the Agreem ent aim ed at boosting Lebanon's 
industria l production  through the acquisition of patents and  other 
industrial property rights. The Cooperation Agreement left the door open 
for further areas of cooperation to be taken into consideration during the 
implem entation of the Agreement.
A standard problem for most of the developing countries in meeting 
the challenge of economic develoment is the lack of technology and 
financial resources for the acquisition of technology. Financial
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cooperation is in this respect necessary as much as technical and economic 
cooperation itself and complementary to it. As such, the financial sector 
received in the Agreement the same attention as economic and technical 
cooperation. The Cooperation Agreement stipulates, in its financial 
protocol, the participation by the Com munity in financing m easures 
w hich w ou ld  contribute to Lebanon's econom ic developm en t in 
accordance with the framework of the financial and technical cooperation 
protocol.
Trade was the most im portant issue in the relations betw een both 
parties. Its purpose and objectives have been considered throughout the 
Agreement. The contracting parties aimed at harmonising and prom oting 
trade betw een themselves, taking into consideration their respective 
levels of development. They intended to ensure a "better balance in 
trade" w ith a view to developing the growth of Lebanon's trade. The 
prom otion of Lebanon's trade was thus treated as a cornerstone in the 
process of Lebanon's economic development, for raising the standard of 
living. The Cooperation Agreement thus offers non-redprocal free access 
to all industrial products to the EEC, in addition to a wide m argin in tariff 
cuts concerning agricultural products.
ii-FIELDS OF COOPERATION
The aims and objectives of in the pream ble of the Cooperation 
Agreem ent were "in principle" met through an attem pt at cooperation 
between the EEC and Lebanon covering economic, technical, financial and 
trade sectors. Common institutions and working parties were set up  to 
provide proper administrative support for the Cooperation Agreement. 
H ow ever, as the Cooperation Agreement offers m ore non-reciprocal 
favourable treatm ent to Lebanon, an EEC (traditional) fear of an abuse of 
such preferential treatm ent or disruption therefrom  in EEC m arkets,
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m otivated the EEC to m aintain safeguard m easures to ensure safe 
consequences in the operation of the Cooperation Agreement.
1-ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION.
Third w orld countries usually suffer from  a lack of advanced 
technology; this lack hinders their process of economic development. 
Lebanon is one of the "technologically" poor countries, and its technical 
cooperation with the EEC is more than vital for Lebanon to develop its 
economy progressively.
The first EEC-Lebanon technical cooperation took place in 1965. 
H ow ever, th rough  the Cooperation A greem ent of 1977, technical 
cooperation between them took the form of EEC participation in efforts 
m ade by Lebanon. Such participation sought to develop Lebanese 
production, productivity and improvement of its economic infrastructure 
w ith  em phasis on industria liza tion  and  also m o d ern iza tio n  in 
ag ricu ltu re . EEC partic ipation  covered, u n d er the  C ooperation  
Agreement, the following areas of cooperation:
(A)-MARKETING.
M arketing technique and know -how  m ay m ake an im portan t 
contribution to economic growth and development at both the macro and 
micro levels of a country.81 The Cooperation Agreem ent deals w ith 
m arketing, though in general terms. It provides for m arketing and 
prom oting sales of products originating in Lebanon and exported to the 
EEC. The Cooperation Agreement does not express m ore than that on 
marketing, but the contracting parties may decide on further cooperation 
in that respect. The Cooperation Council is empowered to make binding 
decisions and m ay elaborate further on cooperation in m arketing, in 
particular w ith respect to international m arketing research. As far as
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exports of Lebanese products are concerned, marketing research involves 
statistical information about the European market, an understanding of 
the m arket environment, studies of needs in markets and a methodology 
for an optimal expansion on penetrating foreign .markets.
(B)-INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION.
The contracting parties undertook to prom ote their industria l 
cooperation w ith a view to boosting Lebanese industrial production 
through EEC participation in the implementation of Lebanese industrial 
development programmes. For the same purpose, the contracting parties 
undertook to organise and develop contacts between Lebanese and EEC 
industrial policy-makers, presumably through conferences or seminars or 
other arrangem ents. The acquisition of patents and other industrial 
property  of help in boosting Lebanon's industrial production is to be 
facilitated on favourable terms, particularly by mean of financing such 
acquisition, in conformity with the conditions set out in the financial 
P ro toco l.82 The financial aspects of such acquisitions in the form of a 
transfer of patents or industrial property rights are, while being a private 
matter, controlled by market forces and may need governmental assistance 
and guidance.
(C)-ECONOMIC COOPERATION
C oncerning the economic sector, the contracting parties shall 
"encourage private investments which are of m utual interest to both 
parties to operate in Lebanon and the EEC";83 and they shall prom ote the 
exchange of inform ation regarding economic developm ent and  the 
financial situation of each contracting party, to the extent necessary for the 
proper functioning of the Cooperation Agreement. The exchange of 
inform ation is of vital im portance to Lebanon, w ith  reference to
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undertaking research and secure an access to their results, exchange of 
skills and expertise. Research, development and requirem ents related 
thereto are very costly for a small country like Lebanon. In marketing and 
prom otion, for example, exchange of information may take the form of 
exam ining the chances of penetrating the EEC m arket by Lebanese 
exporters as a prerequisite  to securing successful attem pts tow ards 
deploying an outward looking policy.
The EEC undertook to cooperate technically as a prelim inary or 
complementary step for prom oting capital projects draw n up by Lebanon. 
The prelim inary form of cooperation m ay involve research on the 
feasibility of any proposed capital project, necessary com plem entary 
cooperation and expertise required for supervising or operating research 
projects. Lebanese staff involved in the scheme of cooperation are to be 
trained through scholarships offered either by the EEC or by individual 
member states.
The contracting parties have undertaken to facilitate the proper 
functioning of technical cooperation, ranging from possible special 
privileges offered in a particular case to m odifying regulations which 
contradict cooperation.
A com parison betw een the Trade Agreem ent of 1965 and  the 
Cooperation Agreement of 1977 shows clearly that progress has been made 
in the field of technical cooperation regarding cooperation objectives, 
levels of cooperation, range or area of cooperation. H ow ever, the 
economic question cannot be answered clearly as to the extent to  which 
the evolution of technical and economic cooperation betw een Lebanon 
and the EEC has been com m ensurate to the developm ents needs of 
Lebanon.
(D)-MISCELLANEOUS
The Cooperation Agreem ent stipulates that the contracting parties
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shall prom ote cooperation in the fisheries sector, science, technology, and 
protection of the environment. It sets forth the guidelines and framework 
for economic and technical cooperation.84 The details and procedures are 
left to the Cooperation Council, which may also deal w ith other areas of 
cooperation and periodically define guidelines therefore as well as 
form ulate practical steps or methods for the actual establishm ent and 
implementation of cooperation.
As regards cooperation on scientific and technological m atters and 
the protection of the environment, the EEC has expressed its readiness to 
examine on a case by case basis "whether and on what terms Lebanon may 
have access to the results of the programmes which m ight be undertaken 
either jointly by the member states of the EEC or by any of the Member 
states in collaboration with other countries.85
2-TRADE COOPERATION.
As already indicated earlier, the Cooperation Agreement is a part of 
the EEC M editerranean policy developed parallel to developm ents in 
international trade regulation. Under the terms of this policy, a pluralist 
style of relations was adopted with a view to bringing about conditions for 
better access of products, particularly industrial products, of special interest 
to the M editerranean countries, to the EEC markets. The EEC has offered 
preferential tariffs irrespective of reciprocity to its M editerranean trade 
partners. In its relations with Lebanon, the EEC has organized its trade 
preferences on a non-reciprocal basis. Lebanon has in return undertaken 
to offer the EEC most favoured nation treatment.
(A)-EEC'S PREFERENCES AS COMMITMENTS.
EEC non-reciprocal trade preferences extended to Lebanon encompass 
industrial and agricultural goods . For industrial goods, complete
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suppression of customs duties is provided , beside lifting any restrictions 
affecting the movement of Lebanese industrial products to EEC markets. 
Customs duties applied to agricultural products are reduced relatively. 
Traditional exceptions to the preferential treatm ent are valid as regards 
m ilitary and other industrial products justified on grounds of public 
interest.
a)-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS.
W hen the EEC and Lebanon set out the objectives of their trade 
cooperation, they aimed to promote trade between themselves "with a 
view to increasing the rate of growth of Lebanon's trade and improving 
the conditions of access for its products to the EEC markets". Accordingly, 
the EEC undertook to no longer apply customs duties and charges having 
equivalent effects on industrial products originating in Lebanon and 
im ported directly into the territories of the EEC.86 How ever, while 
eliminating customs duties, other protectionist elements m ay continue to 
exist in the form of various measures.
Tariff preferences enjoyed by Lebanon are not applicable to all 
industrial products. Corresponding exceptions exist, of which the first is 
now  of historic interest. The other exception of a perm anent nature, 
concerns trade with repercussions on the functioning of the common 
market. In addition, products which are considered dangerous or of vital 
importance to the public interest or public security, beside military goods, 
are excluded from  the application of the rules of the Cooperation 
Agreement.
As for the historical exceptions, they had been adopted consequent to 
the transitional period applicable to the countries acceding to the EEC. 
The national tariff system of Ireland, rather than the common external 
tariff of the EEC, was applied for some products such as m otor vehicles 
exported to that country;87 Similarly, preferences concerning other groups
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of products specified in Article 13 of the Cooperation Agreement, were 
subject to an annual ceiling until 1979. Beyond that ceiling, ordinary tariff 
duties applicable to th ird  countries became applicable for products 
originating in Lebanon. These measure were of a tem porary nature hence 
their historic importance.88
W ith regard to the other kind of exceptions, they took cognizance of 
the functioning of the common market. The EEC recently, altered its 
classification of industrial products into sensitive and non-sensitive 
products only. Sensitive products, comprising products listed in Annex II 
of the EEC Treaty, beside other products listed in Annex A of the 
Cooperation Agreement, do not enjoy tariff exemption. In the case of the
U K, as customs duties consist of protective and fiscal elements, the U.K
»
may replace its fiscal duties by internal taxes.89 Furthermore, processed 
agricultural products enum erated in Annex B of the C ooperation 
Agreem ent m ay enjoy tariff concession only, in conjunction w ith "the 
fixed component of those charges levied on imports of these products into 
the Community".90
Products of public interest are exempted from the application of the 
rules of the C ooperation Agreem ent. As such, the C ooperation 
Agreement does not preclude prohibitions, or restrictions on trade w ith 
products justifiable on grounds of public interest. H ow ever, such 
exceptions are to be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, not disguising 
restrictions on trade between the contracting parties. Accordingly, exports, 
imports or goods justified on ground of public morality, policy or security; 
protection of health; life of hum ans, anim als and plants; national 
treasures of artistic, historical or archaeological value do no t enjoy 
preferences which are provided for in the Cooperation Agreement by the 
EEC to Lebanon. Similarly, the protection of industrial and commercial 
p roperty  or rules relating to gold and silver follow the sam e line.91 
Furthermore, either of the contracting parties m ay adopt any necessary 
m easures to ban the disclosure of information running against security
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interests, especially when such measures are essential to national security 
in tim e of w ar or international tension. Accordingly, such m easures 
w ould include trade in arms, ammunition or war material or research in 
development of products indispensable for defence.92
Im proving conditions of access of Lebanese products into the EEC 
m arket entails however, in addition to the removal of all custom duties 
and charges having equivalent effect, also the elim ination of all other 
restrictions w hich m ay constitute an obstacle to trade  betw een the 
contracting parties. In this respect, the EEC abolished , on the entry into 
force of trade measures, all quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on industrial products falling 
within the jurisdiction of the EEC Treaty, save products listed in Annex II 
of the EEC Treaty exempted from such treatment.93
b)- AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
Agricultural products in the EEC, are governed by the controversial 
common agricultural policy. Before the last enlargement, the EEC enjoyed 
autarchy, or even surpluses, in different areas of agricultural products.94 
Desirous not to disturb the EEC common agricultural policy, the EEC 
resorts to various protective measures. Agricultural products im ported to 
the EEC are not treated like industrial products, but the EEC was not self- 
sufficient, or d id  not produce, many agricultural products, particularly 
those w ith special interest to and characteristic of the M editerranean 
climate. Such agricultural products originating in Lebanon and im ported 
into the EEC enjoy various tariff cuts varying from product to product 
depending on the date of importation.
Concerning customs duties on agricultural products , Article 16 of the 
Cooperation Agreement provides a list of products which are subject to 
tariff reductions. The tariff cuts vary from 40 per cent to 80 per cent of the 
rate  applicable to th ird  countries under the common external tariff.
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M oreover, agricultural products other than those provided in the said 
Article, enjoy specific and individual treatment. For example, tariff cuts 
are applicable on some products like onions, in accordance w ith a specific 
im port calendar. Other products enjoy tariff cuts, provided that, after 
customs clearance and deduction of im port charges other than custom 
duties applicable to imports from third countries, their price is not less 
than a set reference price.95 Some other agricultural products e.g garlic 
falling under CCT heading 07.04 are governed by a fixed rate of duties. A 
product like unrefined olive oil m ay be treated carefully so as not to 
disturb EEC, particularly, Italian production. Art 18 of the Cooperation 
Agreement, with four paragraphs, is devoted to olive oil.96 Until the first 
of January 1987, now a date of history, the North European new member 
states which had acceded the EEC, were authorised to apply their own 
duties on defined agricultural products, provided that such duties were 
not lower (could be longer) than those already set out in Annex C of the 
C oopera tion  A greem en t.97 The controversy on the EEC com m on 
agricultural policy and the proliferation of the preferential agreem ents 
encompassing agricultural products, concluded between the EEC and third 
countries, has made the CAP subject to modifications. Accordingly, the 
EEC m aintained its right to modify the agricultural provisions of the 
Cooperation Agreement, however, when doing so the EEC shall take into 
consideration advantages arising from the Cooperation Agreem ent as 
regards Lebanon’s imports.98
As regards quantitative restrictions, the Cooperation Agreement does 
not make direct reference to them in the provisions relating to trade 
cooperation. However, as the joint declarations, the protocols and the 
Annexes to the Cooperation Agreement, form an integral p a rt of the 
A g re e m e n t,99 the contracting parties have agreed that agricultural 
products originating in Lebanon and im ported directly into the EEC, 
subject to the restrictions provided in the provisions of the Agreement,
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th a t is quotas and im port calendar, shall be free from  any other 
quantitative restrictions, or any measures having equivalent effect.100 In 
addition, both parties have declared their readiness to develop their trade 
concerning agricultural products other than- those dealt w ith  in the 
Cooperation Agreement, in accordance with CAP provisions. However, it 
looks at first sight as it agricultural products are treated more favourably 
w ith respect to the interests of the preferences-receiving country, that is 
Lebanon. A thorough analysis, particularly by economists, reveals that 
quotas and im port calendars minimise the possibility of obtaining the 
optimal benefit of these tariff cuts. In fact, the calendar for tariff reductions 
does not correspond with Lebanon's export seasons.101
(B)- LEBANESE PRIVILEGES.
Unlike association agreements which are, in principle, based  on 
reciprocal rights and duties, trade agreements between the EEC and the 
developing countries following recent international developm ents in 
international trade regulation, are not subject to reciprocity betw een the 
contracting parties.102 A developing country like Lebanon, in its relations 
w ith a developed customs territory such as the EEC, is privileged w ith 
rights to increase its existing customs duties or any charges having 
equivalent effect or to introduce new customs duties, in addition to any 
o ther charges having  equivalent effects. Sim ilarly, quan tita tive  
restrictions and m easures having equivalent m ay be in troduced  or 
increased in Lebanon's trade arrangements with the EEC. Such measures 
may be applied on products either imported from the EEC into Lebanon, 
or exported from Lebanon to the EEC, provided that industrialization and 
developm ent in Lebanon requires so.103 Once any of these m easures is 
adopted by Lebanon, the EEC should be notified of such a m easure and 
treated as a single market without any discrimination between its member 
states. Particularly/if quantitative restrictions were adopted in the form of
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quotas or currency allocation to a given product in accordance w ith 
Lebanese legislation, the Cooperation Council should be consulted at the 
request of the EEC or any of its member states.
(C)-LEBANON'S COMMITMENTS.
Irrespective of the notion of non-reciprocity in trade relations, first 
introduced by UNCTAD and codified in Part IV GATT, and despite the 
codification of the notion of non-reciprocity, the contracting parties to 
GATT have not ruled out the possibility that the developing contracting 
parties m ay enter into trade negotiations aimed at a reduction in tariffs 
rates in accordance w ith the MFN clause. In this respect, the level of 
economic developm ent of the developing country may be an indicator 
affecting the possibility of its contribution to such trade negotiations. 
Given the huge gap between the level of economic development between 
the contracting parties to the Cooperation Agreement, i.e the EEC and 
Lebanon, it would be pointless and contradictory to the spirit and the letter 
of recent developm ents in international trade regulations if Lebanon 
reciprocated with trade preferences or even tariff cuts to the EEC. Such 
action w ould be inconsistent with its level of economic development and 
trade needs. This does not preclude Lebanon from offering proposals to 
the EEC in return for receiving trade preferences. Lebanon offered to treat 
the EEC as a single entity, no less favourably than a most favoured nation. 
In addition, it declared itself bound by certain measures aimed to ensure 
the proper achievement of the objectives of the Cooperation Agreement. 
It has pledged to pursue a non-discrimination policy between different 
m em ber states of the EEC or different firms or nationals of the EEC. 
Furthermore, in order to guarantee proper implementation, in particular 
of the trade  provisions of the C ooperation A greem ent, Lebanon 
undertook to adopt any general or specific (legal) measures necessary to 
ensure the fulfillment of its obligations undertaken by the Agreement.
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Lebanon w ould be otherwise liable and the EEC w ould apply safeguard 
m easures affecting the preferences offered by the EEC.104 Lebanese 
comm itm ents tow ards the EEC raise a pertinent question as to their 
compatibility w ith Lebanon's national, regional and international legal 
engagements, which are considered below.
a)-THE MFN CLAUSE
Lebanon ceased to apply GATT provisions since its w ithdraw al as a 
contracting party in 1951, but embodied most of the GATT's rules in its 
trade agreements with nearly all of its trade partners. In particular, the 
m ost favoured nation treatment was the most im portant provision to be 
incorporated in all its trade agreements. H ow ever, w hen Lebanon 
reciprocates MFN treatm ent with its trade partners, it does so w ithout 
prejudice to the process of its economic development or its fundam ental 
economic interests. A few exceptions to the application of MFN treatm ent 
are always attached thereto resulting in a different form of application of 
the MFN clause between different countries according to their level of 
economic development. The GATT itself provides for some exceptions 
from the application of the MFN clause. Article 1 (2) GATT authorises 
concessions m ade on historical grounds to be waived from  the MFN 
clause. Article XXIV GATT exempts two types of "regionalism" from the 
application of the MFN clause. Firstly, Article XXIV:3 GATT does not 
p revent "advantages accorded by any contracting party  to adjacent 
countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic". The other type concerns the 
formation of a customs union, a free trade area and an interim  agreement 
leading to the formation of either a customs union or a free trade area. In 
the case of Lebanon, bound by the charter of the Arab League, such 
regional arrangem ent is construed to encom pass regional econom ic 
in tegration entailing reciprocal tariffs and concessions betw een the 
member states of the Arab League. Such traditional exceptions to MFN
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obligations are taken into consideration in the Cooperation Agreement.105
When reciprocal concessions and advantages in tariffs are exchanged 
within the framework of GATT, they are m ade on a non-discriminatory 
basis.
Following the insertion of Part IV in the GATT, the introduction of 
the GSP and the adoption of the Enabling Clause, the GATT has come to 
apply a pluralist system of trade regulations.106 In an action aimed at 
balancing the disadvantages of the position of the developing countries , 
the developed countries renounced their rights of reciprocity vis-a-vis the 
develop ing  coun tries .107 The principle of reciprocity has rem ained 
applicable only between developed countries. Article XXXVII par 4 GATT 
"exhorts" developing contracting parties to enter in to  preferential 
a rran g em en ts .108 However, this provision has been contested by the 
developed contracting parties so as not to override the advantages arising 
from Article 1(1) GATT.109 The problem of extending advantages arising 
from Article 37 GATT to other Contracting Parties (whether developed or 
developing countries) may block the operation of that Article. Relating to 
GATT, a decision has been adopted authorising the developing contracting 
parties to accord each other "preferential treatm ent as provided in the 
p ro toco l110 w ith respect to products originating in other parties to the 
protocol, w ithout being required to extend the same treatm ent to like 
products w hen im ported  from  other developed countries11.111 The 
Enabling Clause came to reaffirm this position in its Article 2 (c) which 
stipulates preferential arrangem ents am ongst developing countries as 
being non-extendible to other developed contracting countries.112 
Therefore, m easures which Lebanon may adopt for the benefit of the 
developing countries are w aived from the application of the MFN 
o b lig a tio n s .113 Hence, the m ost favoured nation treatm ent which is 
accorded by Lebanon to the EEC applies m erely to advantages and 
concessions made by Lebanon to other developed countries.
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b)-NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICY.
The principle of non-discrimination, fundam ental in trade relations 
between states, is associated with the concept of reciprocity as a pillar of the 
MFN clause embodied in GATT. Despite the renunciation of the concept 
of reciprocity between the developed and the developing countries, the 
notion of non-discrimination has remained applicable. It safeguards the 
contracting parties' interests against m isuse of these concessions or 
waivers when these are offered in trade by one party to another within as 
well as outside the GATT framework, such as the GSP which provides for 
non-discrimination between developing countries when they are accorded 
such preferential treatment by a developed country.
Lebanon, in its trade relations with the EEC, is pledged to uphold this 
principle in order to provide equal opportunities and fair competition to 
EEC firms when they export their products to Lebanon. The Cooperation 
Agreement confers upon Lebanon, as a developing country, the right to 
introduce or even increase its duties or quantitative restrictions or charges 
having equivalent effect to duties or quantitative restrictions against 
imports from the EEC. However, having offered the EEC MFN treatment, 
Lebanon cannot apply such rights against EEC products unless it applies 
the same measures to all similar products imported from other developed 
countries. Similarly, once products originating in the EEC are im ported 
into Lebanon, they are to be treated, particularly as regards internal taxes, 
on an identical basis to any other like product, be it indigenous or 
im ported from a third country.
Lebanon has agreed not to differentiate between the member states of 
the EEC, their institutions or nationals. However, in 1951, Lebanon, under 
the auspices of the Arab League, banned trade (and suspended other 
relations) with all firms or individuals with investments or connections 
w ith Israel. It seems that there is a prima facie contradiction betw een
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Lebanon's comm itm ents vis-a-vis the EEC and its regional pledges 
undertaken through the Arab League, particularly when the Cooperation 
Agreem ent comm itted Lebanon to undertake "any general or specific 
(legal) measures required to fulfill its obligations under the Agreement", 
failing which it would be itself subject to safeguard measures.114 Lebanon 
tried to construe these obligations so as not to constitute a derogation from 
its laws and regulations in force so far as they remain necessary for the 
protection of its essential security.115 In other words, it refers implicitly to 
the boycott regulations of goods and firms in connection with Israel so that 
E uropean firms w ould have fair com petition and w ould  no t face 
discrimination on political grounds as long as they were bound by these 
rules. The EEC dissociated itself from accepting such an interpretation 
expressly. In an answer to the Lebanese Government's letter, it only took 
"note" of the Lebanese declaration. Further, it expected the "principles set 
out in the Agreement, including the non-discrimination principle, to be 
p u t into full application", and particularly considered that the "application 
of the principle of non-discrim ination should ensure the correct and 
sm ooth application of the Agreem ent".116 Against this backdrop, a 
question would arise as to whether the execution of the rules of boycott of 
inter alia European firms with business connection w ith Israel w ould be 
deemed to rim  counter to the principle of non-discrimination against the 
EEC's firms or nationals.
To show that the Lebanese interpretation is not contrary to the 
principle of non-discrimination would entail, firstly, the elucidation of the 
point of Arab legitimacy of an Arab boycott policy against Israel and all 
foreign firms doing business with Israel as a country in a state of w ar with 
the Arab countries (including Lebanon) and continuing to be in a situation 
of hostility. Consequently, the Lebanese attitude towards European firms 
having connections with Israel should be approached from an angle of 
security interest grounds.
The practice of implementation of-economic m easures, including a
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boycott against foreign products and firms, has long been exercised by 
peoples of different states and by states themselves, individually  and 
collectively.117 It has been frequently used as an acceptable instrument for 
advancing foreign policy and the notion of security interest objectives of 
the boycotting states, or to influence the foreign or domestic policy of the 
boycotted states whether they are at peace or at war.118 The traditional 
perspective of international law viewed the situation as being one in 
which it is difficult "to contest the exercise by a state of a right that is a 
normal incidence of its sovereignty".119
Contem porary practice in international law has shown no change in 
the legitimacy of imposing such sanctions or boycott m easures against 
different states whether in peace or in war. However, since the legality of 
a boycott in international law is not a main topic in the present study, it 
will be here only noted that the legality of boycott in international practice 
is claimed by states and international organisations in their practice on the 
grounds of security interests.120
D espite the Declaration of the General Assem bly on "Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation Among States"121 which outlaw s the use of 
economic coercion against each other, the U.N Charter confers upon the 
Security Council the power to impose inter alia sanctions against states 
for actions deemed a threat to peace. In fact, the General Assembly and the 
Security Council have eloquently exercised this pow er on different 
occasions. A series of resolutions calling for economic measures including 
sanctions and  a boycott have been adopted , for exam ple, against 
R h o d e s ia l22 and South Africa.123 Most recently, a sim ilar series of 
resolutions were adopted against Iraq pursuant to Article 41 of the U.N 
Charter.124
The practice of boycott or sanctions in the international sphere is not 
confined to the General Assembly of the U.N or its Security Council. 
Other international groupings and organisations have trodden the same
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path. The USA, on an individual basis, and collectively w ith other 
W estern European countries, has been a pioneer in establishing such a 
practice outside the U.N. A detailed multilateral exports program m e was 
developed by fifteen W estern European countries w ith  a "perm anent 
organisation and agreed list continually updated  in accordance with 
criteria for adding, deleting, upgrading and dow ngrading  the items 
involved". The participant countries were not in a state of w ar and had 
no conflicts about occupied territories when the program m e was designed 
against certain states.125 The EEC has adopted a similar approach on 
different occasions, for example particularly against Argentina during the 
British-Argentine conflict in 1982.126
The right of a belligerent country or states to resort to economic 
m easures against its adversary and any third party  which supports an 
aggressor state and violates obligations of neutra lity  is m anifest in 
in ternational law. There is, how ever, a serious doub t w hether an 
international organisation may enjoy a broader right than  individual 
states to "penalise" a particular state or third party for constituting a threat 
to the collective security interest.
Some may argue that the Arab boycott against Israel and its friends 
and allies is categorised as economic warfare rather than sanctions.127 It is 
difficult nonetheless, to contest the legitimacy of adopting economic 
measures (boycott) against a state which is in a state of w ar w ith a single 
country or a group of countries, let alone occupying territories, particularly 
if a boycott is deemed to be a reprisal action.
In 1951 the Council of the Arab League adopted a resolution128 
imposing a total ban, as a primary boycott, on all Arab states and Arabs 
dealing w ith Israel on a commercial or personal basis. In addition as a 
secondary boycott, a ban was imposed on all foreign firms w ho had 
connections with Israel in the form of subsidiary companies, factories or 
p lants and thereto related activities constituting assistance to Israeli 
economic or m ilitary strength, because they w ere considered to be
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rendering Israel or respectively being a threat to Arab security interest.129 
The extent and the definition of the th rea t rem ained a m atter of 
discretionary pow er vested in the individual m ember state of the Arab 
League. The Arab programme for boycotting Israel was given a specialised 
organ. A system of blacklisting those firms which failed to comply with 
Arab term s of trade was designed. Affected firms were given three 
m onths warning to sever their links with Israel and accept the Arab terms 
of trade boycott.130 Different Arab states did not necessarily have identical 
blacklists covering the same firms.
The USA Adm inistration runs a boycott system designed against 
"formerly Communist countries" similar to the Arab boycott system.131 It 
has also adopted an anti-boycott legislation in an effort to neutralise the 
Arab boycott of Israel, in particular the secondary type of boycott. In 1977 
the U.S Export A dm inistration Am endm ent Act prohib ited  any U.S 
national from complying with a "boycott fostered or im posed by any 
foreign country against other countries friendly to the U.S" and not itself 
under boycott by the U.S.A.132 Canada showed a similar attitude and 
adopted anti-boycott m easures by means of w ithdraw ing governm ental 
financing assistance from companies complying w ith the Arab boycott 
program m e of Israel and its allies.133 However, unlike the above two 
positions, other W estern governments, including the m em ber states of 
the EEC, took no official move in cognizance of the Arab boycott program. 
Consequently, European firms were left with an option between a m arket 
w ith a population of more than one hundred fifty million of inhabitants 
and another m arket of only three million inhabitants.
In respect of Lebanon's pledge to adopt a non-discrimination policy 
vis-a-vis the EEC firms and nationals, while individual mem ber states of 
the Arab League were empowered to make their own blacklists, the 
application of a boycott policy by Lebanon was based on defined criteria, 
similar to those of other Arab countries, and extended to all foreign firms 
whose practice violated Lebanese domestic law therewith constituting a
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threat to Lebanon's security interests. The criterion for the boycott did not 
aim at particular European firms on national, religious or racial grounds.
In 1954, like all other Arab countries, Lebanon adopted laws unifying 
boycott m easures and procedures, and standardised penalties for any 
breach or violation of its trade laws. These rules, as Lebanese domestic 
law, were to be observed by all firms wishing to engage in business with 
Lebanon. If they violated the domestic laws of Lebanon, they would be 
banned from having any relations, including trade w ith Lebanon, its 
companies or nationals. In 1971, 1400 American firms not complying with 
Lebanese domestic laws were blacklisted by Lebanon.134
The EEC member states have not restrained their firms or nationals 
in order to observe Lebanese laws and regulations relating to the boycott of 
Israel. The Arab boycott system, on the one hand, and the enforcement of 
Lebanese law  on the other have m ade it difficult to contest the non- 
discriminatory nature of Lebanese policy. Lebanese rules on boycott do 
not collide w ith the non-discrimination policy since they apply to all 
undertakings w ithout discrim ination. Lebanese practice cannot be 
deem ed as being discrim inatory between European firms and others, 
because it applies against all firms or persons regardless of their race, 
nationality or religious status, whose actions are deem ed to violate 
Lebanese law and to constitute a threat to Lebanon's security interests.
(D)-SAFEGUARD MEASURES
The GATT advocates the principle of liberalisation of international 
trade. To underpin this notion, it calls for subsequent trade negotiations 
w ith a view to eliminating or reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Liberalisation of trade requires, however, the latter to operate fairly, 
otherwise different countries may be vulnerable to an adverse effect on 
their economy and the process of their economic development. W ith this 
po in t in m ind, GATT has been provided w ith  different safeguard
204
provisions to ensure the proper operation of the process of liberalisation 
of international trade;135 but, not all states are contracting parties to the 
GATT. This creates loopholes in ensuring fair trade betw een different 
states as subjects of international law involved in international trade. 
Countries which are not bound as contracting parties by the provisions of 
GATT, include in their trade agreements their ow n safeguard measures. 
These m ostly correspond to the GATT provisions in this field. The 
Cooperation Agreement between Lebanon and the EEC similarly included 
some safeguard m easures to protect the operation of the Cooperation 
Agreement from unfair trade between its contracting parties so as not to 
jeopard ise  the  econom ic situation  or the p rocess of econom ic 
development of either of the contracting parties.
a)-ANTI-DUMPING PRACTICE
The Cooperation Agreement provided for safeguard m easures against 
dum ping, bounties and subsidies practices,136 against serious difficulties in 
the balance of payments,137 and against disturbance or difficulties in the 
economic situation138 in either of the contracting parties. The inclusion of 
these safeguard measures raises the question of their legal basis, and 
whether they are of any practical significance.
Anti-dum ping measures are actions aimed at setting up  a m inim um  
im port price, or adding special duties or levies to the price of a product 
which is "introduced into commerce of either of the contracting parties at 
less than its norm al value in the imported country, in which it causes or 
threatens to cause injuries to an established domestic industry" in  the 
exported country.139 Article VI of GATT forms the um brella legislation 
for national anti-dum ping laws.140 It authorises its contracting parties to 
adopt such m easures as are necessary to protect their industries from 
dum ping practices generating economic injuries.141 In 1968, Article VI 
GATT was supplem ented with an interpretation code applicable on its
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implementation, following the Kennedy Round to bring the national laws 
prom ptly into uniform application of Article VI GATT.*42 The Kennedy 
Round's Anti-Dumping Code has been replaced by a new Code negotiated 
during the Tokyo Round in 1979.143 The new Code aimed to control the 
abusive application of national anti-dum ping laws to situations which 
allegedly seriously caused or threatened to cause injuries justifying the use 
of anti-dum ping measures.
The EEC anti-dumping approach vis-a-vis third countries is part of its 
common commercial policy. Article 113 EEC confers upon the EEC an 
express power to adopt measures, "to protect trade such as those taken in 
case of dum ping or subsidies" practiced by a third party. The EEC first 
adopted its own legislation against dum ping practices by third countries, 
based on the first GATT Anti-dumping Code, which came into force on 
the first of July 1968.144 It has been revised regularly. In accordance with 
the new GATT Code of 1979, the EEC adopted new rules replacing its 
earlier anti-dum ping rules, and brought EEC law  into conformity with 
GATT ru les.145 The 1979 rules have again been subject to a series of 
amendments and were last reshaped by EEC Regulation 2423/88 at present 
in force.146 The Regulation covers both agricultural and industrial 
p roducts147 and applies vis-a-vis third countries as contracting parties to 
GATT, or otherwise. It does not, as such, preclude the application of 
special rules laid down in the Cooperation Agreement between Lebanon 
and the EEC, especially concerning consultation procedures in  the 
Cooperation Council. The Cooperation Agreement provides for measures 
against dum ping practices "in accordance w ith the Agreem ent on the 
Im plementation of Art VI of GATT". However, these are to be adopted 
under specific conditions and procedures laid dow n in the Cooperation 
A greem ent.148 Consequently, before taking any anti-dum ping measures, 
the Cooperation Council has to be supplied  w ith  all the relevant 
inform ation for the examination of a relevant claim w ith a view  to 
seeking a satisfactory solution. If a m utual solution is not reached,
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consultations have to be initiated in the Cooperation Council prior to any 
measures being taken. Such measures "must not exceed the limits of what 
is strictly necessary to counteract the difficulties which have arisen".149 It 
is w orth noting that the draftsmen of the Cooperation Agreement referred 
to the fact that any measures likely to be taken m ust be in conformity with 
the Kennedy R ound’s Anti-Dum ping Code. Consequently, the EEC 
adopted a Regulation150 for the purpose of implementing the safeguard 
clauses provided for in the Cooperation Agreement.151 This Regulation 
confers upon  the Com m ission the pow er to take decisions, after 
examining the case either on its own initiative or at the request of any of 
its member states, whether the practice in question is compatible w ith the 
rules em bodied in the Cooperation Agreement. Should dum ping be 
shown to exist on the part of Lebanon, the necessary action w ould be 
introduced in accordance w ith the procedures laid dow n in Regulation 
459/68.
This w ould suggest that while the anti-dum ping m easures to be 
introduced by the EEC against Lebanon would have to be in accordance 
w ith EEC's ow n regulations and in conformity w ith GATT rules, the 
counter m easures introduced by Lebanon against the EEC or any of its 
m em ber states w ould be based on international rules relevant in this 
fie ld .152 This signifies that Lebanon does not have independent anti­
dum ping rules. However, since the Kennedy Round Code and the EEC 
Regulation of 1968 have been replaced by a subsequent Code and 
Regulations respectively, the anti-dumping measures to be introduced by 
Lebanon against the EEC or any of its member states w ould have to be 
based on the Tokyo Round Code, while EEC anti-dum ping m easures 
against Lebanon would have to be introduced in accordance w ith the EEC 
Regulation of 1988.
Countervailing duties are privileged under Article VI para (3) GATT 
to offset bounties and subsidies practices, provided that such practices 
cause injuries or threaten to cause injuries justifying the im position of
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such duties, regardless of whether such a product is being dum ped or 
n o t.153 However, in compliance w ith Article VI para (5) GATT, the 
injured contracting party cannot impose both duties (countervailing and 
anti-dum ping) at the same time and for the same situation. 154 Anti­
dum ping measures and countervailing duties resemble each other in their 
nature and features. They are always introduced together in one article or 
regulation in the GATT system or in EEC regulations. As such, they have 
undergone the same developments in GATT and EEC rules.155 Similarly, 
in the Cooperation Agreement, countervailing measures are included in 
the same provision as that on anti-dum ping, operate under sim ilar 
conditions and procedures.156
b)-DISTURBANCE OF THE ECONOMY
A second type of safeguard measures is designed for the purpose of 
adjustm ent to counter certain difficulties w hich em erge despite the 
norm al application of international rules on trade. The Cooperation 
Agreement is equipped with safeguard m easures to counter any serious 
disturbance in any sector of the economy of either of the contracting 
parties or to offset any "serious deterioration in the economic situation of 
a region" of the contracting parties. Unlike reference to anti-dum ping 
measures, the Cooperation Agreement does not refer to any international 
rules when dealing with the issue of safeguard m easures, despite the 
resemblance between safeguard provisions in the Cooperation Agreement 
and Article XIX GATT. Instead, Articles 32 and 33 of the Cooperation 
Agreement specify the grounds on which the rights to adopt safeguard 
measures can be invoked to counter the specified difficulties, beside the 
conditions which have to be taken into consideration. M oreover, the 
extent to which such safeguard measures may go, should not exceed the 
limit necessary to counteract the difficulties (principle of proportionality).
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Furthermore, prior to the adoption of specific measures, the Cooperation 
Council is to be provided with all the relevant information required for a 
thorough examination with a view to seeking an acceptable solution to 
the problem. Otherwise, failing to reach a satisfactory outcome, the parties 
m ay adopted  such m easures, provided they cause the least possible 
d isturbance to the functioning of the Cooperation Agreem ent. The 
Cooperation Council is to be furnished with details of such measures.
As regards the EEC, appropriate safeguard measures m ay be adopted 
by the EEC Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Com mission, in accordance w ith EEC common rules on im ports.157 
However, if such difficulties give rise to urgent action, the concerned party 
m ay adopt the appropriate action prom ptly w ithin the lim its strictly 
needed to remedy the situation.158
C)-BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
The third type of safeguard action which m ay be considered as an 
escape clause from the application of the rules of the C ooperation 
A greem ent is related to the balance of paym ents. The C ooperation 
Agreement provides for taking necessary safeguard measures to counter 
"serious difficulties or serious threats of difficulties" to the balance of 
paym ents w hich any of the contracting parties to the Cooperation 
Agreement m ay face. In this respect, the structure of GATT has been 
incorporated w ith a series of exceptions, so that m easures otherw ise 
prohibited by GATT, can be taken in defined situations of balance of 
paym ents difficulties.15^  However, the Cooperation Agreement does not 
refer to any international rules or procedures to be followed in  dealing 
with the balance of payments difficulties. The grounds and conditions to 
invoke related  escape clauses is left to be dealt w ith  w ith in  the 
discretionary pow er of the contracting parties. Obviously, once such a 
righ t is invoked, m easures w ould have to be adop ted  against all
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outsiders.160 The Cooperation Agreement has limited the condition of the 
use of safeguard measures in connection with the balance of payments to 
serious difficulties or serious threat of difficulties of balance of payments 
in Lebanon or any of the member states of the EEC, provided that the 
selected measures do not cause more than the least possible disturbance to 
the  fu n c tio n in g  of the  C ooperation  A greem ent (p rinc ip le  of 
proportionality). Moreover, other contracting parties to the Cooperation 
Agreem ent should be informed imm ediately of the adopted measures. 
The Cooperation Council is to subject such adopted measures to periodic 
consultations w ith a view to their abolition as soon as circumstances 
perm it.
The history of trade relations between Lebanon and the EEC does not 
record, unlike the case of the rules of origin, any claim brought in 
connection with anti-dum ping or countervailing measures against either 
of the contracting parties.161 While, Lebanon’s trade relations w ith the 
EEC have, since their inception, run  rather counter to the economic 
interests of Lebanon, Lebanon’s imports from the EEC have form ed the 
major part of its total imports. These im ports may threaten or cause a 
threat if they (dum ped or not dum ped) compete with nascent domestic 
industry, but, considering the fact that Lebanon is a developing country, it 
should not be forgotten that it is entitled under international rules, in 
addition to the rules of the Cooperation Agreement, to increase or adjust 
its customs duties or quantitative restrictions or even introduce new  
customs duties or quantitative restrictions against imports from the EEC. 
However, as imports may threaten or cause a threat only if they compete 
(particularly unfairly when due to the difference in the level of economic 
development), a threat may come not only from imports of EEC products 
b u t from  all ou tsiders, particu larly  from  developed  coun tries. 
Consequently, in conformity with its MFN treatm ent pledged to the EEC, 
such m easures w ould have to be extended by Lebanon against all 
developed countries. Therefore, if imports threaten the nascent domestic
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industry , and the threat comes from all outsiders, it w ould be, for 
Lebanon, easier to invoke its rights to increase existing or introduce new 
custom duties or quantitative restrictions provided for in the Cooperation 
A greem ent, rather than invoke its rights under safeguard measures. 
Hence, from Lebanon's angles, safeguard measures are good in principle, 
bu t lack any serious or practical significance.
Lebanon's exports to the EEC have always formed a marginal share of 
Lebanon's total exports. From an EEC perspective on EEC imports, this 
share of Lebanese exports to the EEC does not even form a marginal share 
and as such are also hardly perceptible. Consequently, in the light of a 
diversification of exports and imports, it is hard to see Lebanon’s exports 
to the EEC forming a threat or injury to the EEC domestic industries. 
Therefore, it may be suggested that the safeguard measures provided for in 
the Cooperation Agreement are of rather theoretical value aim ed at 
bringing the Cooperation Agreement into conformity w ith all EEC trade 
agreem ents w ith third countries. They lack any serious significance as 
regards obstacles to trade flows between Lebanon and the EEC. As long as 
Lebanon rem ains a developing country its exports are not capable of 
competing and threatening EEC domestic industries.
3-Rules of Origin
The determ ination of the origin of a product is a basic element in 
ensuring fair trade, particularly when preferential and more favourable 
treatm ent is involved in international trade. Such a determ ination 
should afford the country offering the preference adequate protection 
against th ird  country suppliers. Otherwise, trade relations betw een 
different countries will turn into anarchy as a result of a potential practice 
by a th ird  party, taking advantage of such preferences and infiltrating its 
products not entitled to preferential treatment into the preference offering 
market. The infiltrated goods would therewith circumvent the proper
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rates of duties and may cause a serious threat to a sector of the economy or 
to the economic situation of the preference offering country. The system 
adopted with respect to rules of origin should enhance the opportunity to 
the beneficiary country of enjoying the trade preferences and not disguise 
non-tariff barriers to trade which m ay devalue preferential treatm ent 
accorded to the preference receiving country.
The adoption of specific rules of origin reflects the economic policy of 
the party  im posing them. This discloses the reason for the lack of 
internationally agreed rules on certain basic principles for adopting 
common rules of origin. The GATT is silent on a definition of an 
originating product or on the adoption of the rules of origin. It deals only 
with the use of marks of origin for protecting the consumer in the country 
of consumption, and with the value or level of tariff concessions m ade by 
the contracting parties to GATT w ith respect to becoming significant 
protective non-tariff barriers.162 However, the GATT does not exclude its 
contracting parties from adopting their ow n rules of origin. On the 
contrary, it authorises them  to include their national p rovisions, 
concerning marks of origin, as an obligation to indicate the origin of the 
im ported product and to protect the authenticity of that origin.163 An 
attem pt has been made by the working group of the Special Committee of 
the UNCTAD and it has been able to arrive at certain agreed conclusions 
regarding rules of origin which the preference offering countries (as far as 
the GSP is concerned) may agree to take into consideration when adopting 
their own rules in this field.164
As far as the EEC is concerned, the definition of a p roduct as 
originating1 in a given country is of vital importance for applying its 
common custom tariffs, since the enforcement of the proper rates of duties 
and other quantitative restrictions or anti-dum ping m easures depend 
heavily on the origin of the product. The EEC has adopted its ow n concept 
of rules of origin as fundamental for the successful implementation of the 
com m on comm ercial policy.165 This concept applies vis-a-vis th ird
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countries, mutatis mutandis, to all relevant agreements concluded by the 
C o m m u n i ty .166 The Cooperation A greem ent is am ongst these 
agreements.
The Cooperation Agreem ent includes a Protocol concerning the 
definition of the concept of "originating product" and the m ethod of its 
administration, for the purpose of providing evidence as to the origin of 
products exported from Lebanon to the EEC. The Protocol is similar to 
other protocols in cooperation agreements concluded between the EEC and 
the M ashreq and Maghreb countries. The Protocol has been adopted in 
conformity with the EEC Council Regulation 802/68.167
According to the Protocol, a product is recognised as originating in 
any of the contracting parties if it is either wholly produced in one of them 
or has undergone "sufficient working or processing" operation from 
m aterials or components other than those wholly produced either in 
Lebanon or the EEC and used in the production.168 For the purpose of 
implementing this working or processing criterion, the concept "sufficient 
working or processing" would be considered as being fulfilled if the new 
product receives a new tariff heading in the Brussels Tariff Nom enclature 
other than that covering the processed or worked material. However, this 
m ethod is too blunt to produce the correct result in such a working or 
processing operation. Consequently, a sim ple w orking or processing 
operation featuring some products is considered inadequate enough to 
confer upon them the concept of originating product irrespective of the 
question w hether there has been a change of the tariff head ing  
classification in accordance w ith the Brussels Tariff N om enclature.169 
Nonetheless, certain working or processing operations w hich m ay not 
result in a change of tariff heading are recognised as "originating 
p roducts".170 Therefore a product resulting from com pound m aterials 
and undergoing working or processing operations m ust have its own 
purposes, properties and composition which it did not possess before the 
relevant processes or operations.171. Consequently, the value added
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criterion was taken into account to avoid any abuse in the rules of origin if 
the  non-orig inating  m aterial had  undergone certain  w orking or 
processing operations. Save the exceptions listed in Art 3 (3) of the 
Protocol, the value of the materials worked or processed should not exceed 
15 per cent of the total value of the goods obtained.172
The idea behind the determ ination of the rules of origin is to 
ascertain that only the beneficiary state would be able to enjoy such tariff 
concessions. The rules of origin system, therefore, should facilitate the 
achievements of this task, and accordingly also the objectives and the goals 
of the Cooperation Agreement.
The Cooperation Agreement aimed at prom oting trade between its 
contracting parties with a view to accelerating growth rates in trade with 
Lebanon and to improving the conditions of access of Lebanese products 
into EEC markets. This gives rise to the question as to w hat contribution 
these rules, as they are involved in trade between Lebanon and the EEC, 
can make in  achieving the objectives of the Cooperation Agreement. In 
other words, how far are these specific rules of origin useful in serving 
their purpose w ithout damaging or devaluing the preferences which are 
accorded to Lebanon?
The ru les of orig in  app lied  to Lebanon fea tu re  tw o m ain 
characteristics. A rigidity and complexity of the rules on the one hand, 
and the absence of cumulative treatm ent of materials used in Lebanese 
products on the other.
The EEC rules of origin are criticised as being generally very rigid 
irrespective of their application to Lebanon or to any other developing 
country as a beneficiary of the GSP. This has led the UNCTAD to adopt a 
reso lu tio n  calling  for the "sim plification , h a rm o n isa tio n  and  
improvement of the rules of origin" with respect to the GSP.173 It should 
be noted that the rules of origin applied against Lebanon are more severe. 
The w orking group of GATT, exam ining the com patibility  of the 
Cooperation Agreement with the provisions of GATT, criticised the EEC
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for adopting such a rigid system. The EEC justified these rules as the 
outcom e of a choice betw een "the desire to further the economic 
development of Lebanon and the need to avoid the customs tariff from 
being circumvented".174 Rules of origin are usually based, economically, 
on either process criteria or value added criteria. The former require a 
substantial transform ation in the non-originating m aterial used in the 
final product ready for consumption under a new tariff classification. The 
latter require that the percentage of the non-originating m aterial worked 
or processed m ust not exceed a given percentage of the value of the 
product ready for consumption.
The system applicable to Lebanon has adopted a combination of both 
groups of criteria. It first states that the non-originating material worked 
or processed m ust undergo sufficient operations combined w ith  the 
change in the tariff heading. To the further disadvantage of Lebanon, the 
Cooperation Council has required that the value of the w orked or 
processed m aterial should not exceed 15 per cent of the value of the 
produced goods obtained in Lebanon. This system would make it harder 
for Lebanon to enjoy such trade concessions to the fullest possible limit. 
The assum ption of the EEC could hold true if Lebanon possessed raw  
m aterials or natural resources to be processed in  its m anufacturing 
activities. However, given the fact that Lebanon is deprived of such raw  
materials, it cannot invest in m anufactured activities unless the m ost 
economical and rational raw materials are imported. Such im ports have 
to undergo substantial transformation to produce manufacturing goods in 
Lebanon. Therefore, the given system may deflect trade between Lebanon 
and its trade partners, favouring the interests of the EEC rather than 
furthering the economic development of Lebanon. As a result, trade 
relations between Lebanon and its trade partners other than the EEC may 
be harmed. Eventually, Lebanon may find no alternative than to im port 
materials needed for m anufacturing activities from the EEC for fear of 
using non-originating materials which break the rules of orig in  and
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consequently neutralises the accorded preferences.
The EEC has always claimed that the "extension of the rules of origin 
is aimed at encouraging regional integration through the adoption of the 
concept of a cumulative system of origin".175 Any potential regional 
cooperation, in a region that has a great interest to trade w ith the EEC 
more than within the region, will depend on the degree of embodying the 
concept of cum ulative origin in the system. In the absence of a 
cumulative origin system, the complete qualifying process will have to 
take place in the exporting country such as Lebanon claiming tariff 
p re fe re n c e s .176 Consequently, an exporting country like Lebanon 
receiving favourable treatm ent w ould not im port (or export) from its 
neighbouring countries, materials necessary to attract m anufacturing 
activities to enable it to produce goods with competitive features in the 
EEC market. This holds true for Lebanon as a country deprived of regional 
cooperation suitable to its economic development. The EEC rules of 
origin applied to Lebanon leave the only possibility that w orked or 
processed materials will have to be imported from the EEC only to satisfy 
the EEC system  of origin. O therw ise non-orig inating  m aterials 
undergoing working or processing operations, are as already mentioned 
not to exceed by more than 15 per cent the total value of the product.177
As far as potential regional cooperation for Lebanon is concerned, 
such cooperation is likely to be with the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan 
and Syria) which have with the EEC similar trade interests as Lebanon. 
These countries involved with the EEC in the same type of Cooperation 
Agreem ent that Lebanon has, are bound by identical rules of origin. 
C onsequently , non-qualifying goods m ay no t benefit from  trade  
preferences nor can they circumvent customs tariffs. In the absence of a 
cum ulative criterion, concerned countries m ay be discouraged from 
becoming involved in manufacturing activities between them in order to 
satisfy the EEC criteria for the rules of origin. As a resu lt, the
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m anufacturing activities of these countries, including Lebanon, m ay be 
directed towards the EEC as an ultimate beneficiary. Hence, these rules of 
origin may serve to promote EEC trade with Lebanon, but not w ith a view 
to im proving grow th of Lebanese exports to the EEC. These rules 
constitute, in addition, an obstacle to attem pts for prom oting regional 
cooperation as using m aterials from  regionally closer countries in 
m anufacturing operations may be a burden to Lebanon's exports to the 
EEC. This raises the question whether such a situation, with preferences 
offered to Lebanon by one hand, does not involve the factual w ithdraw al 
of preferences by the other. Therefore, the need for the liberalisation of 
the origin system  m ay exist, beside the adoption of a concept of 
cumulative origin system. Otherwise, Lebanon w ould continue to face 
trem endous difficulties in its m anufacturing activities.
D-INSTITUTIONAL CONTENTS
The Cooperation Agreement calls for the establishment of common 
institutions betw een Lebanon and the EEC. This is sim ilar to the 
situation relating to all agreements concluded by the EEC w ith  th ird  
countries. The common institutions act as a forum for consultation and 
discussion of cooperation betw een the contracting parties of the 
Cooperation Agreement, particularly when reviewing experiences gained 
from the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement. They are 
given the task of administrating the proper functioning of the Agreement. 
The common institutions consist of the Cooperation Council as the main 
institution, and other bodies or committees which may in turn establish to 
assist it in carrying out its duties.178
i-THE COOPERATION COUNCIL
The Cooperation Council was established for the purpose of attaining
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the objectives of the Cooperation Agreem ent, to ensure a sm ooth 
functioning of the Agreem ent and to prom ote political cooperation 
between the European and the Lebanese Parliaments. It is empowered to 
take binding decisions, formulate resolutions, make recommendations or 
deliver opinions in connection w ith the attainm ent of the common 
objectives of the Cooperation Agreement. In addition, it m ay hold 
consultations for the purpose of taking any appropriate m easures for 
prom oting political cooperation between the European and the Lebanese 
Parliam ents.179
The Cooperation Council consisting of representatives of the EEC, its 
member states and Lebanon, acts by m utual agreement between the EEC 
and Lebanese representatives who may be assisted by other officials. 
W henever financial issues are involved, particularly those of specific 
concern to the European Investment Bank, a representative of the EIB 
m ay attend a relevant m eeting.180 The members of the Cooperation 
Council may be represented by other delegates with full powers.181
The C ooperation Council meets once a year in private  or in 
extraordinary sessions whenever required by any concerned party. Such a 
meeting may be summoned by the president of the Cooperation Council 
who determines the date and the place of the meeting.181
The presidency of the Cooperation Council is held alternately, from 
the first of April to 30th of September by the Lebanese representative and 
from the first of October to 31th of March by a member of EEC Council.
The Cooperation Council has held, as a discussion platform, m any 
sessions to review  im provem ents in trade in im plem entation of the 
Cooperation Agreement. In addition, it serves the purpose of extending 
and developing cooperation to meet potential developm ents that may 
arise at the national, European and international level. As such, the 
Cooperation Council has held four review meetings in 1979, 1980, 1984 
and 1985. The meetings in 1974 and 1984 reviewed the results of 
cooperation whereas the other discussed the experience gained from the
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functioning of the Cooperation Agreem ent.183 Another new  review 
session has been agreed to be held in 1995 for appraising the level of the 
im provem ent of trade, and the future developm ent of relations in the 
light of the objectives of the Cooperation Agreement.
ii-THE COOPERATION COMMITTEE
The Cooperation Agreem ent has em pow ered the  C ooperation 
Council to set up any committee184 which may be needed to assist it in 
carrying out its duties. The Council accordingly established two bodies: a 
Cooperation Committee and a Customs Cooperation Committee. Later, a 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee was formed.
The C ooperation Com m ittee is responsible for assisting  the 
Cooperation Council "in the performance of its duties, preparing  its 
deliberations, studying any m atter which the Cooperation Council has 
entrusted to it to examine and for ensuring the required continuity of 
cooperation for the sake of the proper functioning of the Cooperation 
A greem ent".185 It is composed of representatives of the members of the 
Cooperation Council. The chairmanship of the Committee is held under 
the same conditions and procedures as those for the presidency of the 
Cooperation Council.
iii-THE CUSTOMS COOPERATION COMMITTEE
The Custom Cooperation Committee is responsible for the task of 
ensuring adm inistrative cooperation in the uniform  application of the 
customs provisions of the Cooperation Agreement, as well as any other 
customs tasks entrusted to it. It consists of customs experts of the member 
states of the EEC, officials of the Commission and Lebanon. It meets 
alternately under the chairm anship of a representative of the EEC 
Com m ission and Lebanon in accordance w ith  the sam e ru les of
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procedures as those of the Cooperation Council.
iv-THE TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE
The Additional Protocol, concluded between the EEC and Lebanon 
following the last enlargem ent, set up a further "Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Committee" im proving the operation of the institutional 
mechanism of the Cooperation Agreement.
The new Committee was given the task of facilitating the regular 
exchange of information on trade and production data and forecast, beside 
possibilities for cooperation in different areas covered by the Cooperation 
Agreement.186
The Trade and Economic Committee is subject to the Cooperation 
Council which determines its composition and rules of procedures. It is 
chaired alternately  by a representative of the Com m ission and  a 
representative of Lebanon.
IV-THE IMPACT OF THE EEC'S SOUTHWARD  
ENLARGEMENT ON LEBANON
Similar to the first enlargem ent, the accession of the Southern 
Mediterranean European countries, Greece, Portugal and Spain, to the EEC 
has had considerable negative as well as positive political, economic and 
legal consequences both internally and externally.187 Internally, the 
enlargement has entailed changes in the EEC treaty to accommodate the 
consequences of the new enlargement. The enlargement has required the 
acceding countries to adopt the necessary measures to transfer the exercise 
of pow ers to the EEC and to adopt its policies in the fields of its 
com petences.188 Externally, the enlargement affected the EEC relations 
w ith th ird  parties, and has had an im pact on relations betw een the 
acceding countries and countries parties to agreements falling w ithin the
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sphere of the Treaty of Rome. The new member states have had to accede 
to all EEC bilateral and multilateral agreements be it under GATT or other 
in ternational organisations, beside the adoption of the EEC general 
scheme of preferences. The new member states have been under an 
obligation to term inate the application of any b ila tera l, w hether 
preferential or non-preferential, trade agreement with its trade partners. 
The acceding countries have had  to w ith d raw  o r ad ju st their 
com m itm ents concerning other m ultilateral agreem ents falling w ithin 
EEC competences to bring them into line with the common policies of the 
Communities. Transitional or temporary exemptions have been in this 
respect perm itted  in agreem ent w ith defined criteria to enable the 
operation of certain arrangements of vital interest to the new  m em ber 
state.189
As far as Lebanon is concerned, the im pact of the  second 
enlargement, depends on the level of existing relations with the EEC on 
the one hand, and on its relations with the acceding states on the other. 
The legal im plications have resulted from either d iscontinuing  the 
application of trade agreements, if any, between the acceding countries and 
Lebanon, or the adoption by the new member states of the agreem ent 
concluded betw een the EEC and Lebanon -that is, the C ooperation 
Agreement between Lebanon and the EEC designed to prom ote Lebanon’s 
exports to the EEC. H ad such exports been threatened by the new  
enlargem ent, adequate measures between the EEC and Lebanon w ould 
have been taken to counter negative consequences and enable the parties 
to pu rsu e  the objectives of the C ooperation A greem ent after the 
enlargem ent of the EEC. Legal implications m ight arise consequent to a 
potential deterioration after accession, of trade flows between the EEC or 
its acceding countries and Lebanon. Has the second enlargem ent 
threatened Lebanese trade flows to the EEC or to its new member states?
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A-THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE IMPACT 
OF THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT ON LEBANESE TRADE 
RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON THE EEC AND ITS NEW 
MEMBER STATES.190
Unlike the first, the second enlargem ent generated m ajor fears 
among non-member M editerranean countries that preferential treatm ent 
accorded to them by the EEC could be eroded by the accession of their rival 
M editerranean countries' exports.191 The fears derived from the existence 
of high levels of similar production and subsequently exports from these 
countries to the EEC markets. This could lead to imperfect competition 
conditions in  trade  betw een the acceding states and  their rival 
M editerranean countries, lowering the capacity of the EEC m arkets to 
absorb their exports and eventually creating dire problems in their balance 
of trade and the process of their economic development.192
The impact of accession of new member states on trade flows between 
Lebanon and the EEC rested on the fact that the capacity of the m arket of 
the EEC to absorb Lebanese exports would be lowered in view of the 
resem blance in exports from  Lebanon and sale of corresponding  
competing products from the new member states on the EEC markets. 
Similarities in primary products exported to the EEC, between products of 
the acceding countries and Lebanon was measured as being 23.6 per cent, 
as regards Greece, 11.3 per cent as regards Portugal and 29.4 per cent as 
regards Spain. Therefore, Spanish and then Greek exports were more 
likely to cause a threat to Lebanese exports to the EEC in the light of a 
substantial similarity between their exports.193 The enlargement of the 
EEC entailed the suppression of barriers to trade applied earlier by the 
acceding countries to trade with the EEC. Similar barriers could face 
Lebanese exports to the new member states with serious consequences for 
Lebanon if the preferential treatment accorded to Lebanon had an earlier
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impact on the latter’s exports to the EEC, or if Lebanon's exports to the 
new member states were themselves substantially significant.
By the terms of the Cooperation Agreement, Lebanese exports to the 
EEC are classified into industrial and agricultural goods. Since the entry 
into force of the Interim  Agreement, industrial goods have enjoyed, in 
principle, perfect competition conditions with comparable exports of the 
acceding countries as all enjoy free access into the EEC markets. Therefore, 
it m ay be concluded that Lebanese exports of industrial goods m ay have 
secured their share in the EEC m arkets and w ould not be seriously 
threatened by the EEC southward enlargement; bu t agricultural products 
are subject to tariff cuts only and sometimes to specific quotas. Such 
p roducts  w ill thus be in im perfect com petition conditions w ith  
comparable exports from the acceding countries as the latter will enjoy, 
unlike Lebanon, free access to the EEC market. Consequently, the erosion 
of value of the preferential treatment is more likely to be against exports of 
agricultural products. It is clear, however, that trade in goods not 
produced by the acceding countries would be least affected.194
Lebanon's trade relations with the acceding countries varies between 
one county and another. However, a common feature in trade relations 
with them is that Lebanon’s trade balance suffers a big deficit. In a larger 
Community, the deficit is expected to be further accentuated. The five year 
period prior to the accession of each country shows that Lebanese imports 
from Greece were increasing gradually, nearly trebling between 1976 and
1980. However, as a percentage of EEC exports to Lebanon, this increase 
has been parallel to the increase in EEC exports to Lebanon, which nearly 
doubled for the same period of time. The share of Greek exports to 
Lebanon am ounted to 1.6 per cent of total Lebanese imports in 1976 and 
increased slightly in 1980 and was valued as being 1.8 per cent of Lebanese 
total imports.
Lebanese exports to Greece claimed a m odest share in the Greek
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market. In the years preceding Greek accession, Lebanese exports to Greece 
decreased sharply from nearly 9 per cent of the EEC total im ports from 
Lebanon in 1976 to 2.4 and 0.1 per cent in 1979 and 1980 respectively. 
These exports, decreasing dramatically, were equivalent only to 0.06 per 
cent of Lebanese total exports.
The corresponding figures to the EEC as a group show a similar 
decline from 10 per cent of total Lebanese exports in 1976 to less than 7 per 
cent in 1980. This conflicts with the general rate of growth of Lebanese 
exports which nearly doubled between 1976 and 1980.
Lebanon's trade relations w ith Portugal does not show  a better 
outcome, though it did not have the same opportunities as far as trade 
with Greece and Spain. Lebanon’s trade deficit with Portugal fell from $ 6 
m in 1981 to $ 2.4 m in 1986. This was not due to an increase of exports to 
Portugal, bu t to a decrease in Lebanon's imports from Portugal. Lebanon 
exported virtually nothing to Portugal during the five year period before 
its accession to the EEC. As far as supplies from the EEC to Lebanon and 
total Lebanese imports are concerned, the share of Lebanese im ports from 
Portugal had not been of any substantial significance.
Trade flows with Spain were more im portant to Lebanon than trade 
with the other two acceding countries. Lebanese imports from Spain have 
been gradually improving in value and volume, increasing from 4.8 per 
cent to 9.5 per cent of Lebanon's imports from the EEC in 1981 and 1985 
respectively. The corresponding percentage of Lebanon's total imports 
shows similar improvements, doubling from 2 to 4.6 per cent for the same 
period. The improvement of Lebanon’s imports from Spain has not been 
attributed to a traditional increase in imports onlv, but is due to a decrease
X '  J  •
of EEC exports to Lebanon by 34 per cent compared with than they were in
1981. EEC exports maintained a major share in Lebanon’s total imports 
equivalent to 48 per cent of Lebanese total imports in 1985. Lebanese total 
exports were declining over that period, being lower by 40 per cent in 1985 
than they were in 1981.
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In contrast to Lebanese imports from Spain, exports to Spain showed 
a gradual decrease during the same period of time, declining in value and 
share of EEC imports from Lebanon, from 2.2 per cent in 1981 to 1.3 per 
cent in 1985. Lebanese exports to the EEC had shown an increase from 6 
per cent in 1981 to 16.7 per cent in 1985 of total Lebanese exports. The 
share of Spanish imports as regards Lebanon’s total exports had doubled. 
The contradiction between the decrease in Lebanon’s exports to Spain and 
the increase in their share in total exports is explained by the fact that 
Lebanon's total exports declined nearly to half the level of exports in 1981.
The outcome was a huge deficit in Lebanon's balance of trade with 
these countries, contributing to a w ider gap in its trade relations w ith the 
EEC follow ing the enlargem ent. This has been particu larly  true  as 
Lebanese exports to the acceding countries and the EEC of nine member 
states were not sufficiently significant to eradicate Lebanon's trade deficit 
w ith them. This suggests that the preferential treatm ent accorded to 
Lebanon by the EEC with nine member states had no impact on promoting 
and providing better access to Lebanese exports to the EEC markets. 
W ould the accession of new member states lead to serious repercussions 
for Lebanon's exports to the EEC or to the new member states and would it 
contribute to a wider trade deficit?
Lebanese imports from Greece, following its accession to the EEC, 
decreased in value by 23 per cent in 1985 compared with the situation on 
the eve of enlargement in 1980. Lebanon’s total imports and particularly 
its im ports from the EEC had decreased by 42 per cent and 37 per cent 
respectively for the same period of time. Greek and EEC exports to 
Lebanon m aintained their share with little improvem ent in the Lebanese 
market as a whole.
Lebanon's imports from Spain decreased by nearly 40 per cent in 1989 
compared with the situation in 1986, despite an improvement in Lebanese 
total imports. The corresponding figures for Portuguese and EEC exports 
to Lebanon showed that they nearly rem ained constant. This indicates
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that Lebanese imports from Spain were falling as to their share in EEC 
trade flow, with twelve members to Lebanon. Portuguese, Spanish and 
overall EEC exports to the Lebanese market declined gradually after 1986.
Lebanese exports to Greece declined by 27 per cent between 1981 and 
1985. M oreover, the value of these exports was marginal. However, 
Lebanese total exports to the EEC of ten member states improved by 26 per 
cent during the same period of time, representing an increase of exports to 
the EEC by 11 per cent of total Lebanese exports. These exports declined in 
1985 by nearly half of their value in 1981.
C orresponding figures for Portuguese and Spanish im ports from 
Lebanon remained insufficient as far as Portugal is concerned, whereas as 
regards Spain, they increased only slightly in terms of value. However, 
Lebanese exports to the EEC markets improved rapidly and nearly doubled 
betw een 1986 and 1989. This improvement represented an increase of 
only 6 per cent of the share of Lebanese exports to the markets of the EEC 
of twelve member states, despite an increase in Lebanese total exports by 21 
per cent in 1989 compared with the 1986 figures.
Therefore, the assum ption that a sim ilarity of p rim ary  goods, 
exported to the EEC, from Lebanon on the one hand and Greece and Spain 
on the other, could threaten Lebanese exports by 23 per cent from Greece 
and 29 per cent from Spain respectively cannot be valid. Lebanese exports 
to the EEC of twelve member states, and to its traditional m arkets in the 
EEC in particular, im proved dram atically following the enlargem ent, 
despite a decline in Lebanese exports to the acceding countries.
This outcome raises a question as to the factors which contributed to 
an im provem ent in Lebanese exports to the EEC m arkets. Three 
explanations may be submitted:
Firstly, Lebanese manufactured goods exported to the EEC enjoy free 
access to the EEC markets on an equal footing with the acceding member 
state. This means that exports of relevant goods are less likely to be 
threatened by the enlargement. Agricultural products are supposed to be
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m ore vulnerable to a threat by the southw ard extension of the EEC. 
How ever, Lebanon orients its exports of agricultural goods to Arab 
markets, particularly in the Gulf countries, and the importance of the EEC 
as an alternative opportunity for Lebanon's exports is likely to emerge 
only if the traditional Arab markets are threatened for different reasons 
such as instability or security.195
Secondly, following the last round of civil w ar in  1986-1990, the 
Lebanese currency devalued sharply,196 giving Lebanese producers further 
comparative advantages to compete in the EEC market. In addition, the 
rules of origin and the application of the concept of "originating product" 
to Lebanese exports were widely abused by Lebanese producers. This led 
the Commission to threaten Lebanon, that unless Lebanon took the 
necessary measures to control such abuse, the EEC w ould prevent any 
access of Lebanese products to the EEC markets or at least w ithdraw  the 
tariff preferences accorded to Lebanon.197 Such abuse against very rigid 
rules of origin enabled Lebanese producers to com pete w ith  sim ilar 
products in the EEC market, consequently improving the Lebanese share 
of exports in the EEC markets.
Thirdly, as a precautionary step, the Lebanese government negotiated 
"in principle" with the EEC, on the impact of the second enlargem ent on 
Lebanese trade flows to EEC markets. Following a series of sessions 
starting on 28th of November 1983, the EEC and Lebanon, in a situation 
similar to that of all non-member M editerranean countries, were able to 
conclude on 9th of July 1987 a Protocol additional to the Cooperation 
Agreem ent, adapting the latter by taking into account the possible 
consequences of the enlargement. The Protocol entered into force on 1st 
of February 1988.198
Article 44 of the Cooperation Agreement provides for the possibility 
of reviewing any improvement in trade relations between Lebanon and 
the EEC as a result of the operation of the Agreement. The additional 
Protocol was intended to protect Lebanon's "traditional exports" to the
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EEC against any possible damage consequent on the accession of Spain and 
Portugal. It provided the opportunity  to phase ou t custom s duties 
applicable to certain non-liberalised EEC imports of Lebanese origin over 
the same transitional period applicable to Portugal and Spain, however, 
w ithout leading to a treatm ent of Lebanon more favourable than that 
applicable to the EEC of the twelve member states between themselves. 
An alteration  to the set quotas as applicable to d ried  legum inous 
vegetables w as effected. Furtherm ore, quotas could be established 
whenever the imports of newly liberalised products threatened to cause 
difficulties on the EEC markets. Most of these p roducts involved 
similarities between Lebanese and Spanish prim ary products. A further 
suppression of customs duties on primary products of special interest to 
Lebanon would have contributed to improve Lebanese exports to the EEC. 
To find if one of the above assumptions or all three are valid a thorough 
examination on a commodity by commodity basis by economists w ould be 
necessary. The flow of Lebanese exports to the EEC in the coming years 
should be monitored.
B-THE LEGAL IMPACT OF THE ENLARGEMENT ON THE 
FRAMEWORK OF EEC TRADE RELATIONS WITH 
LEBANON
Lebanon had not been involved in trade  agreem ents w ith  the 
M editerranean acceding countries. Lebanon and the acceding states had 
been m utually applying against the other, their own set of rules applicable 
to th ird  countries. Therefore, the second enlargem ent d id  not generate 
any negative legal implications on relations on historical grounds, 
between Lebanon and the new member states. However, as Lebanon had 
since 1965, a bilateral trade agreement w ith the EEC, and currently a 
Cooperation Agreement as a part of the EEC M editerranean policy, the 
accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain w ould create a new  legal
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framework for their trade relations with Lebanon.
The establishm ent of the new legal fram ework of trade relations 
betw een the acceding countries and Lebanon consequent to the EEC 
enlargem ents were not derived from any earlier links of the acceding 
countries with Lebanon, but from the requirements of EEC law (rules and 
procedures). The EEC Treaty stipulates that a new  m ember state shall 
adopt on membership all EEC agreements and discontinue the application 
of their own agreements conflicting w ith the competence of the EEC. 
Consequently, the EEC and its member states, including the acceding 
countries concluded with Lebanon on 12th of December 1980,199 and on 
the 9th of July 1987,200 in a mixed form, two Protocols to the Cooperation 
A greem ent, w hereby the acceding countries joined the Cooperation 
Agreement. The Protocols laid down the adjustments to the formalities 
and operation of the Cooperation Agreement, as well as the transitional 
measures to bring about conditions that enable the new member states to 
apply the Cooperation Agreement.
From a juridical point of view the Protocols are based on Article 238 
EEC. As such, they were negotiated and later proposed by the Commission 
to the Council,201 and the consent of the European Parliament was sought. 
However, the Protocols could not enter into operation unless approved by 
the EEC, all its m em ber states and Lebanon in accordance w ith  their 
relevant legislative and constitutional provisions and procedures. This 
means that the im plem entation of the Protocols m ay be delayed and 
consequently the new m ember states may not apply the Cooperation 
Agreement from the first day of membership.
In view of the time needed for the Protocols to be ratified, and in 
order to advance the im plem entation of the trade provisions of the 
Protocols, the EEC and Lebanon laid dow n (unilateral or bilateral) 
arrangements for trade between Lebanon and Greece on the one hand,202 
and Portugal and Spain and Lebanon on the other.203 The arrangem ent 
entered into force soon after their conclusion, seeking to advance the
229
implementation of the trade provisions of the Protocols.
i-TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH GREECE
The arrangem ents, m ostly identical to the transitional m easures of 
the Protocol of accession to the Cooperation Agreement, aim to provide to 
Greece with free access to products originating in Lebanon. As such, the 
transitional measures for the arrangements concerning Greece provide for 
a progressive dism antling of the customs duties and charges having 
equivalent effect applied by Greece against Lebanon prior to its accession. 
An interval or transitional period lasted until the end of 1985. Lebanon 
was not be treated by Greece less favourably than the member states of the 
EEC. This treatm ent w ould extend to cover provisional quantitative 
restrictions and imports including import licensing. However, the Greeks 
m ain ta ined  against Lebanon exem ptions to im pose p rov is iona l 
quan titative  restrictions and m easures having equ ivalen t effect to 
quantitative restrictions, lasting until the end of 1985. On the other hand, 
conditions for im ports deposits and cash in payments were dism antled 
over a period of three years ending by the first of January of 1984.
ii-TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH SPAIN
Trade arrangem ents betw een Lebanon and Portugal and  Spain 
provided for the gradual elim ination of customs duties and charges 
having equivalent effect to duties, beside applying tariff preferences204 
offered by the EEC to Lebanese exports, over an eight year period of time 
ending on the first of 1993. Moreover, the elimination of customs duties 
and charges having equivalent effect would operate according to a m ethod 
by which the acceding countries would liberalise their m arkets for EEC 
products. Lebanon expects to be treated by Spain no less favourably than
230
the N ine m ember states of the EEC. However, products originating in 
Lebanon and defined in Annex II, III, V of the Protocol m ay be subject to 
quotas for a transitional period of time, provided Spain applies against 
Lebanon, rules and adm inistrative practices similar to those applied 
against the EEC as constituted on 31 December 1985.
The Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla are considered to be integral 
parts of EEC territory. Hence, the same arrangements applied by Spain 
against im ports from Lebanon are to apply to them. However, these 
territories may grant more favourable treatment than that granted by the 
EEC to Lebanon to products referred to in Annex II of the EEC Treaty and 
originating in Lebanon.
iii-TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH PORTUGAL
A rrangem ents for Portugal provide for a suppression of customs 
duties on imports of products of Lebanese origin on the date of entry into 
force of the relevant EEC Regulation concerning trade arrangements, save 
some specific products which are subject to a progressive elimination of 
duties applicable against Lebanon on the first of January 1980, or 
application of duties defined in the relevant Annex.205
In add ition , charges having equivalent to du ties are  to be 
progressively eliminated, quantitative restrictions are to be liberalised by 
the end of 1992, save with respect to oranges until the end of 1995. 
Portugal retains the power to apply quantitative restrictions on imports of 
m otor vehicles in accordance with Protocol 18 of the Act of Accession. 
These restrictions are now of historical interest since they w ere only 
applied until the first of January 1988.
On the other hand, tariff preferences as regards products defined in 
Annex II of the EEC Treaty may be gradually granted to Lebanon over a 
period of time ending by the first of January 1996.205 Lebanon is to be 
treated no less favourably than the way Portugal treats (in these fields) pre-
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accession the nine member states of the EEC.
V-CONCLUSIONS
The collapse of Lebanese export trade with the EEC created the need to 
replace the Trade Agreement of 1965 by another agreem ent to enable 
Lebanese exports to have better access to the EEC m arkets. The 
Cooperation Agreem ent was concluded, from Lebanon's perspective, to 
provide such an opportunity by means of a non-reciprocal preferential 
trade arrangement.
The Cooperation Agreement provides for free access for industrial 
products and tariff cuts for agricultural products of goods originating in 
Lebanon and directly exported into the EEC m arket, w ith a view to 
guaranteeing a better trade balance for Lebanon. In return, Lebanon has 
offered to treat the EEC and its member states not less favourably than it 
treats other developed countries. The Cooperation Agreem ent includes 
safeguard measures to ensure better implementation and operation of the 
Agreement, Lebanon has expressly agreed while not repealing its laws 
specifically relating to its security interests (rules of boycott against Israel), 
to apply them on a non-discriminatory basis.
For the EEC, the Cooperation Agreement is part of its Mediterranean 
policy, as a new model of relations between developed and developing 
states, compatible w ith the aspirations of the international comm unity 
tow ards a more just and more balanced economic order (Para 4 of the 
preamble). The EEC M editerranean policy has recognised the special 
relationship between the EEC and the relevant countries in the region and 
has aimed at responding "even more than the past to the expectations of 
all the developing countries".207 As such the EEC attatches "essential 
im portance  to fulfill its com m itm ents to the  coun tries of the 
M editerranean  w ith  w hich agreem ents have been concluded".208 
However, it w ould be a blunder to consider that all the M editerranean
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countries, particularly  non-European M editerranean countries, have 
between themselves similar historic, political, cultural economic relations 
w ith the EEC. The EEC, in designing the M editerranean policy, has 
undertaken to take into consideration the different characteristics and 
levels of economic developm ent of the M editerranean  countries. 
Lebanon possesses the very core of the characteristics justifying the special 
relationship between the EEC and the M editerranean countries. The 
European Parliam ent has reaffirm ed th is argum ent in  a resolution 
providing its consent for the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement. 
The Parliam ent drew  attention of the EEC to the close economic and 
cu ltu ral links w hich exist betw een the E uropean countries and 
Lebanon.209
The EEC has responded to the special relations between the EEC and 
the M editerranean countries in general and in Lebanon in particular, by 
offering ever present preferential trade arrangem ents, and  complete 
suppression  of customs duties for products originating in Lebanon. 
However, the advantages arising from this policy offered by one hand has 
then neutralised by the other. This has been due to different reasons, inter 
alia, the rigidity of the rules of origin which, instead of facilitating the use 
of such accorded preferences, are disguised non-tariff barriers and 
eventually form a major obstacle to the promotion of Lebanese exports. It 
seems that whenever the EEC finds itself under no strict international 
legal obligations to provides facilities in trade for developing countries, it 
imposes very rigid rules against them. The developing countries are, in 
principle, entitled to expect a favourable treatm ent from the developed 
countries. W ithin this context, the EEC has adopted its rules of origin 
against M ashreq countries in general, and Lebanon in particu lar, 
exacerbating the conditions of access of Lebanese products to the EEC and 
devaluing or even neutralising the preferences accorded to Lebanon.
The negotiations leading the conclusion of the C ooperation  
Agreement needed one session only. This suggests that Lebanon did  not
2 3 3
have a chance to negotiate and present its special and urgent needs as 
different than those of other countries in the region. Therew ith the 
conclusion of the Agreement has resembled the conclusion of any "contrat 
d'adhesion". This is evidenced by the Lebanese statement which refers to 
the disappointm ent of Lebanon with the result of the negotiations. The 
great resemblance between the Cooperation Agreement between Lebanon 
and the EEC, on the one hand, and betw een the EEC and  other 
M editerranean countries on the other underpins it and refutes the EEC 
declaration  th a t the EEC has taken in to  account each coun try ’s 
characteristics and level of economic development. Therefore, although it 
seems that the EEC has developed its political will to respond to the needs 
of special rela tions betw een the EEC and the countries of the 
M editerranean area, this policy has not taken into consideration their 
special needs despite the fact that a country like Lebanon has most of the 
elements which would entitle her to receive more favourable treatm ent. 
Consequently, Lebanon's exports to the EEC has never recovered, let alone 
developed.
The conclusion of a preferential trade agreem ent w hich includes 
economic, financial and technical cooperation, questions the powers of the 
EEC to engage in such an agreem ent in these fields, beside the 
com patibility of such a practice w ith international trade  rules. The 
Cooperation Agreement expressly goes beyound the treaty m aking power 
of the EEC. It has been concluded in a mixed form based on Art 238 EEC, 
but the possibility to conclude the Cooperation Agreement exclusively by 
the EEC was not exhausted. It was the prevailing political will of the EEC 
member states that entailed their presence in the international sphere and 
consequently their participation in the conclusion of the Cooperation 
Agreement.
The Cooperation Agreement has w itnessed developm ents in the 
contractual re la tionsh ip  betw een the EEC and L ebanon and  its 
compatibility w ith developments in international trade rules. The notion
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of non-reciprocal preferen tial trade  arrangem ents em erged from 
UNCTAD I and was eventually form ulated into trade rules in Part IV 
GATT. This has led to the introduction of the GSP legitimised by the 
Enabling Clause. However, the Cooperation Agreement w ith Lebanon 
goes beyound the commitments of the EEC under the GSP. The objectives 
of the Cooperation Agreement respond to those of Part IV GATT in 
particular and the GATT itself in general. However, the latter does not 
provide a legal basis for the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement. 
Therefore, the Cooperation Agreement has to m eet the requirem ents of 
other w aivers from the application of the MFN clause. Similarly, 
technically speaking, the Cooperation Agreem ent was short of fully 
complying with Article XXTV GATT.
The Contracting Parties to GATT used to tolerate the application of 
the rules of Article XXIV as regards relations betw een developing 
countries, the EEC, in its M editerranean approach, set a precedent in 
international trade rules for relations between developed and developing 
countries. The laxity of the legal approach to the formation of a free trade 
area or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area, 
has led the contracting parties to GATT to pay little regard to the vital legal 
question. As such, this precedent in the practice of the EEC has been 
implicitly recognised by the contracting parties to GATT, despite some 
criticism . This p recedent m ay becom e a custom ary  s tan d ard , 
notwithstanding opposition by the USA.
A lthough the preferences accorded to Lebanon have show n no 
impact in promoting and providing better access for Lebanese exports to 
the EEC markets, the southward enlargement of the EEC has had little, if 
any, impact on its trade in general and Lebanon's exports to the EEC in 
particular. On the contrary, its exports have increased. However, the 
increase in Lebanese exports to the EEC, following its enlargement, has not 
been based on a healthy improvement in the conditions of these exports. 
The prim ary products in Lebanese trade, with high similarity to those of
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the acceding countries, are oriented to different markets. It is, in addition, 
suggested that the massive abuse of the rules of origin in Lebanon led to a 
rap id  increase in Lebanese exports to the EEC. The question remains 
unanswered as to what the share of Lebanese exports in the EEC markets 
w ould have been, had the civil w ar not destroyed Lebanese production 
capacity, consequently damaging Lebanese exports, or if Lebanese exporters 
had  not abused the rules of origin? The enlargem ent of the EEC has 
gradually  required the new  m em ber states to join the Cooperation 
Agreement and subsequently join the established legal framework.
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(SIWu'EB FO®E
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
ECSC AND LEBANON
I- INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that the European Coal and Steel Community did 
not attract w riters to deal w ith it, com paring it w ith the European 
Economic Community. The limitation of power bestowed upon the ECSC 
as regards particularly its international activities on the one hand, and the 
limitation of products covered by it on the other made the ECSC look like 
a less problem atic international organisation. The Treaty of Paris 
establishing a free trade area for coal and steel between its m ember states 
did not confer upon the ECSC powers to conclude commercial agreements 
with third countries. Despite the fact that the ECSC was established many 
years before the EEC, Lebanon had no relations with the ECSC owing to 
the fact that this organisation has no influence on products of special 
interest to Lebanon. However, following the Mediterranean policy all the 
Mediterranean countries concluded agreements with the mem ber states of 
the ECSC alongside w ith and as supplem ent to the conclusion of 
cooperation agreements between the EEC and the respective countries. 
With this as a background, Lebanon too concluded with the member states 
of the ECSC an Agreement aimed at establishing a "free trade area".
The present Chapter analyses the legal aspects of the Agreem ent 
between Lebanon and the member states of the ECSC. In addition, the 
substantive provisions of the Agreement and its relationship to the Treaty 
of Paris and norm s of international law are scrutinised. The major 
elements of this Agreement and subsequently this Chapter, are similar to 
the previous Chapter IV, not least because of the common provisions 
betw een the tw o Agreem ents (the Cooperation A greem ent and  the
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Agreem ent w ith the ECSC), therefore the stress will be on areas not 
discussed in the earlier Chapter IV. The reason behind the incorporation 
of this Chapter in the analysis is to provide as complete picture as possible 
on the relations between Lebanon and the European Communities.
The Agreem ent on products covered by the Treaty of Paris was 
nam ed an "Agreement between the Member States of the European Coal 
and Steel Community and the Lebanese Republic".1 This means that the 
ECSC was, as an organisation, denied participation in the conclusion of the 
Agreement. This raises a question as to to w hat extent the conclusion of 
the Agreement between Lebanon and the member states of the ECSC is, or 
is not, a matter falling outside the ECSC treaty-making powers. W hy was 
it concluded as an instrum ent exclusively betw een Lebanon and the 
member states of the ECSC?
II-THE LEGAL PERSONALITY AND THE TREATY MAKING- 
POWERS OF THE ECSC
The Treaty of Paris established in 1952 the European Coal and Steel 
C om m unity2 (ECSC), as an international organisation entrusted to fulfill 
certain  functions in ternationally , that is, independen tly  from  its 
individual m ember states. As such, it possesses an international legal 
personality  by v irtue  of norm s of in ternational law .3 This legal 
personality is recognised in the Treaty of Paris: Article 6, "The Community 
shall have legal personality". Although this Article does not provide 
details of the legal personality of the ECSC w ith respect to external 
competences, it constitutes a conspicuous proof of the intention of the 
parties to the Treaty of Paris to recognise the personality of the ECSC.4 
However, the legal personality of an international organisation m ay 
imply, but does not carry with it, explicit treaty-making powers. The latter 
are attributes based on its constitutional docum ents and, not least, 
recognised practice. In such a context, the ICJ considered the U.N as
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possessing a competence not expressly provided for by its Charter, but 
nonetheless conferred upon it by necessary implication as essential to the 
perform ance of its duties.5 Correspondingly, the ECJ in the ERTA case 
followed a similar teleological reasoning when dealing w ith the treaty- 
m aking powers of the EEC. It considered that the EEC treaty-m aking 
pow ers in  the field of external relations relate to the w hole range of 
objectives of the Treaty of Rome.6
For the purpose of achieving objectives entrusted to it, the ECSC too 
was endow ed by certain powers to act at the international level. It can 
exercise, how ever, such powers only in accordance w ith  provisions 
anchored in the Treaty of Paris.
The question w hether the Agreement betw een Lebanon and the 
members of the ECSC is or is not a matter lying within the ECSC treaty- 
making powers may be answered by examining the express provisions of 
the Treaty of Paris in addition to an evaluation of the purposes of the 
ECSC and functions assigned to it. However, the point should be taken 
into consideration that the powers possibly inferred from the purposes 
and functions of the ECSC should not be contradicted by explicit clauses 
found in the Treaty. To assess fully the treaty-making powers of the ECSC, 
no t least the practice of the ECSC w ith respect to its contractual 
relationships with third parties has to be probed.
A-CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT ON TREATY-MAKING POWERS
By and large, the Treaty of Paris has empowered the ECSC to enter 
into international agreements with third parties in limited areas. In the 
express area of the treaty-making powers of the ECSC, the Com munity is 
em pow ered to conclude agreements with third parties in two fields. A 
first competence which the Treaty expressly confers upon the ECSC relates 
to the pow er to establish contractual relationships w ith th ird  parties 
pertaining to the financial sector. Article 49 ECSC expressly empowers the
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High Authority (H.A); (after the Merger Treaty the H.A m erged with the 
Commission)7 to "procure the funds it required to carry out its tasks". 
The apparatus provided for in this Article, inter alia, to secure financial 
funds, enables the ECSC to "contract loans".8 ‘ Therefore, the H.A m ight 
conclude loan agreements with third parties. In fact, in the early stage of 
its inception, the ECSC concluded a loan agreement exclusively w ith the 
USA in (1954).9
The other area where the ECSC is expressly empowered to conclude 
agreements w ith third parties relates to the accession of new  members to 
the C om m unity .10 The Treaty of Paris authorises the Com m unity to 
receive applications from any European state w ishing to accede to the 
ECSC. The relevant provision states that such agreements on accession to 
the ECSC fall expressly within the exclusive power of the ECSC.
However, the treaty-making powers of the ECSC are not confined to 
these areas. Unlike the respective two Treaties of Rome (1957) which 
specifically provide for the competence of the EEC and the Euratom  to 
conduct their external relations,11 the Treaty of Paris does not contain 
express provisions for the conclusion of agreements w ith th ird  countries 
w ith  respect to areas other than the above m entioned tw o (loans, 
accession). It contains, however, provisions which are directly related to 
the conduct, by the ECSC, of external relations by concluding agreements 
w ith th ird  parties in areas other than those which can be teleologically 
identified w ith reference to the (necessary) attainm ent of the objectives 
and purposes of the ECSC Treaty. The Treaty requires the ECSC to 
maintain all necessary relations with different international organisations. 
Articles 93 and 94 ECSC stipulate that the H.A has to m aintain  all 
appropriate relations with the U.N and the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation". In addition, the Treaty requests the H.A to 
m aintain similar relations with the Council of Europe. It is thus clear 
that, although these provisions do not include plain language sim ilar to 
that used by the earlier enumerated articles or other articles em bodied in
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the EEC Treaty (Art 111, 113 and 238 EEC), maintaining "all appropriate 
relations" with other organisations embraces necessarily the conclusion of 
agreements w ith them or their specialised organs. Correspondingly, the 
ECSC concluded an agreement with the International Labour Organisation 
in 1953.12
B-TELEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO TREATY-MAKING POWERS
The treaty-m aking powers of an international organisation extend 
inevitably to embrace all areas essential to enable it to perform  the 
functions and the purposes entrusted to it. The ECSC Treaty (Article 6) 
provides for a general competence (wider than those expressly provided 
for) to engage the ECSC at an international level. This Article states that 
"in its international relationship the Com m unity shall enjoy the legal 
capacity necessary to exercise its functions and achieve its purposes". This 
Article does not define the treaty-making powers of the ECSC, but it does 
provide for the capability of the ECSC to conclude, where necessary, 
agreements with third parties. The ECSC has thus a general competence to 
conclude agreements with third parties necessary to achieve its objectives, 
provided that such derived competences are not overridden by other 
express provisions. This approach suggests the question as to w hat are the 
objectives of the ECSC w ith respect to w hich additional im plied  
competences for the conduct of the external relations of the ECSC, may be 
assumed to exist.
The founding  m em ber states of the E uropean C om m unities 
established the ECSC and the EEC to regulate different categories of 
m atters. W hile these Communities have some resemblance in form, 
there is correspondingly less affinity and resemblance in the substance and 
purposes of the two Communities.
The ECSC and the EEC were, in principle, established to contribute to 
"the economic expansion, growth of employment and rising standard  of
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living in the member states" of the Communities. The two Communities 
chose the common m arket as the form to achieve these objectives.13 
Beyond such a common ground, the two Communities are different as to 
the objectives and the means provided for their achievement. The Treaty 
of Rome provides for a w ider spectrum  of objectives for the EEC; its 
m em ber states in tend  to achieve an ever closer un ion  betw een 
themselves. In addition, the EEC has been provided with more tools to 
attain its objectives. The introduction by the EEC, of, inter alia, the four 
freedoms and the common policies has no comparable arrangem ent in the 
ECSC Treaty. An essential differences between the ECSC and the EEC is 
that the former was directed towards an inward looking policy. As such, 
the member states specifically undertook to eliminate and prohibit, within 
the Community, import and export duties and quantitative restrictions, or 
charges or measures having equivalent effect on coal and steel products, 
and to prevent any restrictive or discrim inatory practices im peding 
normal competition so far as they relate to coal and steel products.
To achieve the tasks given to it, the EEC was entrusted with functions 
which reflect the outw ard looking dimensions of the EEC. This outw ard 
dimension, beside its internal policies, highlight an essential difference 
between the two Communities. In addition to the functions entrusted to 
the ECSC, the EEC is empowered to set up common external tariffs and 
m aintain a common commercial policy tow ards th ird  countries and 
pursue association policies with overseas territories.
Chapter one of the EEC Treaty deals w ith the customs union, laying 
down in detail the elimination of customs duties between the m ember 
states. It prescribes procedures for the establishm ent of a common 
customs tariff. Chapter two of the EEC Treaty deals with the elimination 
of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect between 
the m ember states. The EEC Treaty eliminates, as far as im ports and 
exports of goods are concerned, all custom s duties, quan tita tive  
restrictions, and all charges and measures having equivalent effect to
256
duties and quantitative restrictions betw een its m em bers states. It 
p rov ides for a com m on external custom s tariff regim e and  the 
establishment of a common commercial policy towards third countries.14 
These elements constitute and meet the requirements of a customs union 
to substitu te  "a single custom s territory  for tw o or m ore custom s 
territories so that duties and other restrictive regulations to commerce are 
elim inated w ith  respect of substantially  all the trade betw een the 
constituent territories of the union, or at least with respect to substantially 
all the trade in products originating in such territories. Substantially, the 
same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied  by each 
m em ber of the union to the trade of territories not included in the 
union".15 Moreover, the EEC Treaty specifies four areas w here the EEC 
has exclusive treaty-m aking powers designed particularly to conclude 
agreem ents w ith  th ird  parties for the conduct of the EEC external 
re la tio n s .16 Consequently, the EEC was established to function as an 
organisation not lim ited to a customs union. As such it has been given 
more powers than the ECSC.17 The EEC treaty-making powers have also 
been shaped with reference to the theory of implied powers.18
In contrast, the ECSC has sought to reach its objectives (in principle) 
merely through the creation of a free trade area. The Treaty of Paris has 
provided for the creation of the common m arket fundam entally  in 
accordance with Article 4 ECSC. It has specifically committed the member 
states to eliminate and prohibit between themselves all im port and export 
duties and all quantitative restrictions, charges and m easures having 
equivalent effect to duties and quantitative restrictions on coal and steel 
products. The Treaty of Paris provides for no common external tariff 
towards third countries. It provides only for powers to set m inim um  and 
maximum external tariffs toward third countries.
Art XXIV para 8 (b) GATT defines the above outlined elements from 
a legal perspective, as the characteristics of a free trade area. In a report,19 
GATT considered the ECSC Treaty, in the light of an analogy w ith
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procedures adopted with respect to interim  agreements leading to the 
formation of a free trade area,20 and asked to receive annual reports on the 
measures taken towards the full application of the Treaty. This means 
that the GATT deemed the ECSC to be in line with Article XXIV GATT as 
regards the formation of a free trade area (FTA).
In the light of the differences between the ECSC and EEC, the 
founders of the ECSC, by establishing a FTA, dissociated the ECSC from 
common customs tariffs as a prerequisite to the establishm ent of a 
common commercial policy towards third countries. Accordingly, the 
conclusion of all external commercial agreem ents is left w ithin  the 
jurisdiction of the member states of the ECSC, though m arginal powers 
were entrusted to the H.A, by virtue of which the H.A could interfere 
internally (within the member states of the ECSC via recommendations) 
in order to secure stability in the ECSC markets. However, this marginal 
power could by no means give the ECSC the powers to conduct its external 
relations in contradiction with non-existent express provisions necessary 
for a common commercial policy.21
On the other hand, Article 3 (f) ECSC reads that the ECSC is 
em powered to prom ote the growth of intem atipnal trade. This means 
that the ECSC has to cooperate with other subjects of international law  
which have the same objectives of promoting the growth of international 
trade, such as UNCTAD and GATT.22 However, such competence may 
not conflict with the traditional competences of the member states. In case 
of conflict, the competences and the powers of the m ember states m ay 
prevail.
In the ligh t of the above exposition, there are b u t lim ited  
competences which the ECSC may derive or claim with reference to the 
objectives of the Treaty of Paris, all the more as general competence would 
be derived from Articles 6 and 3 (f) ECSC. The ECSC used its objectives as 
a legal basis for the conclusion of a consultation agreem ent w ith  
Sw itzerland.23 However, as far as the commercial links of the ECSC are
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concerned, the Com m unity could not claim any im plied pow ers to 
conclude agreements in this field with third parties.
C-RECOGNISED PRACTICE AS A BASIS FOR TREATY- 
MAKING POWERS
Throughout its practice, the ECSC has been party  to a num ber of 
agreements with different subjects of international law. These agreements 
were concluded in the early years of its inception.24 The ECSC is directly 
involved in concluding agreements, exclusively, w ith a th ird  party  and 
has also partic ipated  w ith  its m em ber states in concluding other 
agreements (in the form of mixed agreements). Other agreem ents were 
concluded by the member states of the ECSC in their capacity as members 
of the Community. The agreements in question can be classified into 
three categories.
W ith reference to the first category, the ECSC concluded a few 
agreem ents exclusively for the conduct of its external relations in 
accordance w ith its constitutional treaty-m aking powers. In 1953, an 
agreement was signed concerning cooperation with the I.L.O in Geneva.25 
In 1954 a loan agreement w ith the U.S.A,26 and in 1956 an Accord of 
Consultation with Switzerland were concluded.27
The "mixed form" agreements constitute the second category of 
agreements linked with the activities of the ECSC. They were concluded 
with different states and emerged in the last two decades. That is to say, 
the ECSC participated alongside its member states in the conclusion of the 
agreements. In 1972 an agreement for unlimited duration was signed with 
the Portuguese Republic.28 Another similar agreement w ith the same 
legal characteristics was concluded w ith Sweden in the same year.29 In 
1973 an agreement was concluded with Norway;30 in 1974 w ith Finland;31 
and in 1980 with Yugoslavia 32 Two protocols concerning commercial and 
economic cooperation were signed with Canada and India in 1976 and 1981
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respectively.33
Furthermore, the member states of the ECSC, as member states of the 
latter, have been involved in further commercial and trade agreements 
relating to products covered by the Treaty of Paris. The ECSC has been 
excluded from participation in the conclusion of such agreements. The 
most relevant agreements in this respect are the ones concluded in 1977 
between the member states of the ECSC, on the one hand, and each of the 
Mashreq and Maghreb countries respectively on the other. The agreement 
w hich was concluded betw een the mem ber states of the ECSC and 
Lebanon in 1977 is no exception to this practice.
The purpose of the evaluation of the treaty-m aking practice of the 
ECSC is to answer the question whether the ECSC assumed treaty-making 
powers as a consequence of its practice. In the light of practice one may 
consider w hether the ECSC witnessed any developm ent in its treaty- 
making competences as regards the conduct of its external relations.
A sam ple of agreements relevant to the above will be discussed 
briefly. They are agreements concluded w ith Sweden, Yugoslavia and 
Lebanon.
The justification for choosing these agreements as examples is, firstly, 
the fact that these agreements are similar to each other. For example, the 
agreement w ith Sweden is identical to the agreements w ith Austria and 
Portugal, whereas the agreement with Lebanon is a carbon copy of the 
agreements with the Mashreq and Maghreb countries.
Secondly, each agreement corresponds to a type of classification. The 
first set includes agreements with the U.S.A, I.L.O and Switzerland. They 
w e re  concluded by the ECSC on the legal basis of exclusivity (ECSC only 
w ithout the participation of the member states). However, no reference to 
any relevant article of the ECSC was thereby m ade.34 The other set of 
agreements, which includes the EFTA countries, was concluded in the 
form of mixed agreements, but the agreements w ith Lebanon (Mashreq 
and Maghreb) were exclusively concluded by the m ember states of the
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ECSC (no participation of the ECSC). These three types of agreements 
provide a clear understanding of the legal bases by virtue of which the 
differentiation between them  has been made in practice. In this respect, 
the mixed procedure (the second set of the agreements) is of particular 
interest.
Thirdly, in term s of a chronological order, the agreem ent w ith 
Sweden was concluded prior to the agreement w ith Lebanon, while the 
la tte r agreem ent was concluded earlier than  the ag reem ent w ith 
Yugoslavia. This enables us to point out any legal developments (if any) 
in the ECSC treaty-m aking competences in the sphere of its external 
relations.
The agreement with Sweden opens with a preamble emphasizing the 
objectives of the Agreem ent which aimed at treating products falling 
w ithin the am bit of ECSC in a m anner similar to those under the EEC 
Treaty. Nonetheless, no provisions of the Agreement could be considered 
as a waiver from the application of international norms incum bent upon 
the contracting parties. The Agreement with Sweden relates to tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. It calls for a standstill on the introduction of new  
duties or charges having equivalent effect; of new quantitative restrictions 
or m easures having similar effects, on imports or exports betw een the 
contracting parties. The agreement then provides for som e safeguard 
m easures should difficulties arise as far as the balance of paym ents 
between the contracting parties is concerned. Moreover, it defines some 
practices as incompatible w ith the proper functioning of the agreem ent 
and confers upon the ECSC, in the final Act, the pow er to assess any 
practice as being contrary to Art 19 of the agreement “on the basis of 
criteria arising from Arts 4(c), 65, and 66(7) of the ECSC Treaty". The 
contracting parties established a joint committee representing them  and 
expected to act by mutual agreement.
The Agreement with Yugoslavia, commences with a pream ble which 
is identical to the pream ble of the agreem ent w ith Sw eden. The
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Agreement is divided into two titles: Trade and General Provisions, in a 
similar form as the Agreement with Lebanon. Save with respect to certain 
products m entioned in A rt 3 (2) of the Agreem ent, the A greem ent 
abolishes all customs duties and quantitative restrictions, in addition to all 
charges and m easures having equivalent effect to customs duties and 
quantitative restrictions. Moreover, it sets up rules of origin and some 
safeguard measures against conditions of competition governing prices. 
Last bu t not least, the Agreement establishes a joint committee. Thus, 
broadly speaking, most of the articles of the agreement w ith Yugoslavia 
are similar to those found in the Agreement with Lebanon.
The Agreement between Lebanon and the Member states of the ECSC 
governs m ainly trade cooperation as regards products covered by the 
Treaty of Paris offering free access for Lebanese exports to the ECSC 
markets. As preferential treatment, it provides for the elimination of all 
customs duties and quantitative restrictions affecting Lebanese exports to 
the ECSC markets. In addition, safeguard measures are envisaged against 
any detrim ental effects in the functioning of the com m on m arket. 
Moreover, the contracting parties set up a special joint-committee w ith its 
own rules of procedures. Furthermore, the Agreement is interrelated with 
the Cooperation Agreement concluded between Lebanon and the EEC as it 
provides for the applicability of Articles 21-46 of the Cooperation 
Agreement, mutatis mutandis to the Agreement with the ECSC.35 These 
Articles refer to financial issues, rules of origin, non discrimination policy, 
transfer of payments, M.F.N treatment applicable to the interests of the 
C om m unity, safeguard m easures against dum ping  practices, and  
disturbances of the common m arket, balance of paym ents, security 
measures, guarantee measures and review.
The Agreement with the Swiss confederation36 is titled "Agreement 
betw een the M ember states of the ECSC and Swiss Confederation". 
However, when the contracting parties are listed, the ECSC is m entioned
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as a contracting party. This may give the impression that the agreement is 
a m ixed agreem ent, but no signature by the ECSC is found for the 
conclusion of the agreement. On the other hand, all the agreements with 
A ustria, Portugal and Sweden (which copy each other) have been 
concluded by the Commission (H.A) on behalf of the ECSC. However, 
unlike the above three agreements, although the ECSC participated in the 
agreement with Yugoslavia, the Council appears as the organ qualified to 
conclude the final Act of the Agreem ent as an integral p a rt of the 
Agreem ent itself, whereas the Agreement itself was concluded by the 
"Community" without any particular reference to any specific organ.
In the conclusion of the agreement w ith any of the M ashreq or 
Maghreb countries, the ECSC as a Community was not involved, despite 
its participation in the joint-committee with a representative of the ECSC 
rather than of the member states.
The other remarkable point as regards the legal basis of the these 
agreements is that, apart from the case of the agreem ent w ith Canada, 
where Articles 6 and 8 were d ted  as a legal basis to conclude the protocol,37 
there was no specific reference to any provision of the Treaty of Paris as a 
legal basis for such a conclusion. The citation of the whole Treaty of Paris 
as a legal basis to conclude these agreements reflects the general approach 
of A rt 6 ECSC, which confers upon the ECSC the pow er to conclude 
treaties w ith th ird  parties to attain its objectives.38 Besides, all the 
agreements which the ECSC an d /o r its member states concluded with 
th ird  parties were concluded in conjunction w ith  o ther agreem ents 
concluded with the EEC and its member states, and the agreements with 
the EEC were cited as an additional legal basis beside the whole ECSC 
Treaty to every agreement concluded with the ECSC.39
The common features of the agreements focus, inter alia, on tariff 
and non tariff barriers in addition to other trade issues and some other 
technical arrangements necessary to implement the agreements. All the 
above m entioned agreements include provisions on M.F.N treatm ent.
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M oreover, all agreem ents establish joint-com m ittees w ith  specific 
adm inistrative tasks. Furthermore, the agreements set up nearly similar 
rules of origin and adopt certain safeguard measures against detrimental 
functioning of the ECSC market. Consequently, it may be concluded that 
thereby the agreem ents fall w ithin the jurisdiction of the commercial 
policy of the ECSC, but this policy provides no competence for the ECSC to 
conduct its external relations.
However, the participation of the ECSC in the conclusion of some 
agreements but not in others raises the question as to the legal justification 
for such participation, or non-participation. Is the participation perhaps 
based on customary powers assigned to the ECSC?.
It is clear that the contents of the agreements deal with issues relating 
to commercial policy with respect to which the ECSC lacks explicit powers. 
If this is the case, why then have some of the agreements been concluded 
as mixed agreements, that is involving, the member states as well as the 
ECSC as contracting parties? In other words, the ECSC has participated in 
the agreements concerned despite its lack of powers in this area. On the 
other hand, the ECSC did not participate as a party in the agreements with 
the M ashreq and Maghreb countries even though the same m atters are 
treated  in the agreem ent w ith Sweden, on the one hand  as in the 
agreem ents w ith the M ashreq and M aghreb countries on the other. 
Furtherm ore, one m ay add that the agreem ents w ith  the latter are 
considered to be interim agreements on the road to the formation of a free 
trade area, gradually  abolishing all customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions between the contracting parties, bu t the relationship with the 
Mashreq and Maghreb countries is not based on reciprocity.*” Be that as it 
may, it cannot be concluded that this practice confers upon the ECSC a 
regime whereby it may participate as a party in a commercial agreement 
w ith one country and not participate in the conclusion of a sim ilar 
agreement w ith another country
Legal consideration cannot cement together convincing argum ents to
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explain and anchor the legal logic of this incongruous practice and state of 
affairs. One m ay guess that, in the absence of clear-cut provisions 
governing the external relations and thereto related treaty-making powers 
of the ECSC, different legal officers a n d / or experts may have evaluated 
the competences of the ECSC differently at different times in relation to 
the power to conclude treaties. The result is an incongruous and legally 
unconvincing situation, which may be summarised as a table as below:
TABLE AND CHART OF COMPARISON
1- Country
Switzerland Sweden Yugoslavia Lebanon
2- Reference by the agreement to:
M. S41+ (M.S+ECSC) (M.S+ECSC) M.S+Leb.
Switzerland + Sweden + Yugoslavia
3- List of contracting parties
(M.S + ECSC) As above As above As above
+ Switzerland
4-Signature for conclusion of the Agreement
M.S + (M.S+Comsion)(M.S+Comty) As above
Switzerland + Sweden + Yugoslavia
5-Final Act
M.S + (M.S+Council) (M,S+Council) As above
Switzerland + Sweden + Yugoslavia
The fact rem ains that the ECSC is an international organization, 
which has legal personality and has been involved in treaty-m aking 
practice w ith some customary aspects. Incoherence in its treaty-m aking 
practice m ay disappear anyhow when after one more decade (2002), the 
ECSC possibly merges with the EEC.42
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Ill-LEGAL BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
ECSC MEMBER STATES AND LEBANON
A-INTERNAL OR COMMUNITY LEVEL
The Council of the ECSC d ted  no particular provision nor the Treaty 
of Paris as a whole as a legal basis for the conclusion of the Agreement 
betw een the m em ber states of the ECSC and Lebanon w hen the 
Agreement was published in the European Communities' Official Journal. 
The Agreement is noted as an "act whose publication is not obligatory".43 
This reflects the view that the Agreement is not within the powers of the 
ECSC.44
The Agreement between Lebanon and the member states of the ECSC 
involves tariff and trade issues, the establishment of a joint-committee, 
w ith , in addition , som e safeguard m easures to ensure the proper 
implementation of the Agreement. All the matters of the Agreement fall 
within the market policy of the ECSC.
As discussed above, the ECSC was established as a free trade area 
which does not embrace the adoption of common external tariffs towards 
a th ird  country as the foundation of a common commercial policy. A 
com m ercial policy of the ECSC has been left to the in ternal the 
jurisdictions of the member states. As such, the competence of the ECSC 
for the conduct of its external relations has been circum scribed. 
N onetheless, very  lim ited powers in exceptional cases have been 
conferred upon the ECSC in this field.45
Article 71 ECSC provides in its general approach that "the powers of 
the governm ents of the member states in matters of commercial policy 
shall not be affected by this Treaty, save as otherwise provided therein". 
This shows that, despite the general approach of the Article, the candid 
intention of the authors of ECSC Treaty was to refrain from surrendering
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sovereignty from m ember states to the ECSC in the field of commercial 
policy. While the Treaty expressly provides for exceptions, any envisaged 
exception in favour of the ECSC "may not exceed those accorded to 
member states under international agreements to which they are party".46
The Treaty of Paris confers upon the ECSC powers to supervise the 
administration of im port and export licenses, but the administration itself 
is left w ithin the jurisdiction of the member states.47 The ECSC through 
the H.A (now the Commission) is entitled to "make recommendations to 
m ember states to ensure that"48 the administration of im port and export 
licenses is not more restrictive than is required. Furthermore, the ECSC is 
em powered to impose further restrictions on imports into the ECSC and 
exports from it, if difficulties in its market arise. For example, in the event 
of a decline in dem and, and following certain procedures, the H.A. is 
authorized to establish a system of production quotas.49 These restrictions 
are subject to extension in the light of Art 58 (1) ECSC in conjunction with 
A rt 74 ECSC, which confer upon the.H.A a competence to take any 
appropriate m easure in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty.50 In 
the case of dum ping practices, or if imports cause or threaten to cause 
injuries to production within the ECSC market,51 the High Authority may 
also im pose restrictions on exports from all mem ber states in case of 
shortage of products covered by the ECSC Treaty".52
O ther issues forming part of commercial policy are tariff and non­
tariff agreements. The member states of the ECSC have vested in the latter 
no power to conclude tariff or trade agreements w ith third parties. The 
treaty of Paris leaves the power of determining the tariff of each member 
state to its national legal system.53 However, the Treaty of Paris empowers 
the ECSC through the Council on a proposal from  the H .A to fix 
m inim um  and maximum rates which the member states m ay not ignore 
w henever an envisaged tariff agreement w ith th ird  parties m ay take 
place.54
Thus, powers conferred upon the ECSC in the field of commercial
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policy could be interpreted as being internal technical functions for the 
purpose of ensuring proper im plem entation of the comm on m arket. 
However, this power does not constitute by any means a legal basis for the 
ECSC to conclude agreem ents w ith th ird  countries in  the field of 
commercial policy in general and trade and tariff agreements in particular. 
As such the Agreement with Lebanon had to be concluded exclusively by 
the member states of the ECSC.
B-EXTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The Agreement between Lebanon and the member states of the ECSC 
aimed at providing products originating in Lebanon and falling within the 
ambit of the ECSC Treaty a free access to ECSC markets. These tariff 
preferences were non-reciprocal in nature. That is to say, Lebanon did not 
m ake sim ilar tariff concessions to the ECSC mem ber states in return. 
Instead, it offered the member states of the ECSC the most favoured nation 
treatm ent applicable to other developed countries.55
Preferential trade arrangements which discriminate between different 
countries conflict w ith norms of international trade and in particular the 
MFN clause operating under the GATT. N onetheless, the  GATT 
witnessed different developments towards waiving certain preferential 
treatments with respect to the application of Article 1 GATT.56 However, 
these new  waivers were form ulated as binding standards and  thus a 
preferential treatm ent offered by one country to another should be in 
conformity with such standards. In this context, the contracting parties to 
the Agreement m ade clear that "no provision of the Agreement shall be 
considered as exem pt of the international obligation of the contracting 
parties".57
In the preceding Chapter IV, the compatibility of the Cooperation 
A greem ent w ith  in ternational standards was exam ined. Since the 
Agreement w ith the ECSC resembles the Cooperation Agreement in most
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of its provisions (trade provisions); there is no need to repeat w hat has 
already been discussed above. Instead, the main points shall be briefly 
recapitulated.
The observer of Lebanon and the representative of the ECSC to GATT 
deem ed the present Agreement as an interim  agreem ent leading to the 
form ation of a free trade area and, as such, falling within the am bit of 
Article XXIV GATT.58 However, the Agreement does not meet, entirely, 
the requirements of Article XXIV GATT for a waiver from the application 
of Article 1 GATT. The Article requires, inter alia, for qualifying an 
agreem ent as 'interim", the incorporation of a schedule and p lan  for a 
reasonable length of time. Therefore, the Agreement lacks two essential 
elements to be in line with Article XXIV GATT as regards a FTA -schedule 
plan and reciprocity. Thus, the Agreement could be considered, from a 
legal angle, to be formally an interim agreement leading to the formation 
of a free trade  bu t in fact disguising preferential treatm ent. The 
contracting parties to GATT always look sceptically on such forms of 
agreements despite the little consideration they give to the legal issues 
raised by such agreements.
IV-THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE 
MEMBER STATES OF THE ECSC.
A-AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Alongside the conclusion of the overall Cooperation Agreem ent, 
Lebanon as one party  and the member states of the ECSC as the other 
parties concluded an Agreement of unlimited duration covering products 
which are not included in the Cooperation Agreement and fall w ithin the 
ambit of the ECSC Treaty.
The Agreement with the member states of the ECSC (hereafter called 
the Agreem ent) opens w ith a pream ble involving no theoretical or
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political objectives. The preamble is interrelated thoroughly with the 
pream ble of the Cooperation Agreement. It confirms that international 
trade norms override the provisions of the Agreement if they contradict. 
It further aims at pursuing objectives and intentions similar to those of 
the cooperation Agreem ent for the sake of establishing a system  for 
products not encompassed by the EEC, and falling within the range of the 
ECSC Treaty. The products in question are specified in an Annex attached 
to the Agreem ent. The Agreement is divided into tw o titles: Trade 
Cooperation and General and Final Provisions.
The section on Trade Cooperation which is sim ilar to the trade 
section of the Cooperation Agreement, aims to prom ote trade relations 
betw een the contracting parties w ith a view to increasing the rate of 
grow th of Lebanon’s trade, and improving the conditions of access for 
Lebanese products into the ECSC market.
B-SUBSTANTIVE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT
Trade cooperation betw een both parties focuses on provid ing  
Lebanon with non-reciprocal preferential treatment by the member states 
of the ECSC. However, it involves some safeguard measures to ensure the 
"better performance" and proper implementation of the Agreement.
The Agreement abolished, on its date of entry into force, all customs 
duties and charges having equivalent effect to customs duties, on products 
covered by the Treaty of Paris and originating in Lebanon and im ported 
directly into the ECSC market. The trade preferences provided by the 
ECSC mem ber states to Lebanon are not confined to tariff barriers; all 
quan tita tive  restrictions and m easures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions would be lifted on the same products. According 
to Art 5 of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Member states of the 
ECSC, the undertak ing  of liberalising quantitative restrictions and 
measures having equivalent effects bears no exceptions.
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Steel and coal products originating in Lebanon might not be treated 
more favourably than the products of the member states of the ECSC are 
treated internally. In other words, if ECSC products are subject to certain 
lim itations or exceptions, Lebanese products w ould be subject to similar 
restrictions.
In re tu rn  for tariff concessions granted to Lebanon, the latter 
undertook to grant the member states of the ECSC most favoured nation 
treatm ent. However, some traditional exceptions were waived from the 
application of the m ost favoured nation treatm ent. M oreover, trade 
cooperation involves, mutatis mutandis, provisions sim ilar to those 
found in the Cooperation Agreements. Article 6 of the Agreem ent 
provides that "Arts 21 to 34 of the Cooperation Agreement shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to this Agreement". The articles in question relate to 
the M.F.N clause, to Lebanon's right to introduce or increase tariff and 
non-tariff m easures, rules of origin, non discrim ination policy, free 
transfer of rem ittances, as well as safeguard m easures against anti­
dum ping practices.59
The Agreement retains, however, some safeguard m easures, other 
than those adopted against dumping practices, to be taken in a few cases. If 
the tariff concession offered to Lebanon results in a detrim ental 
functioning of the ECSC market as regards the conditions of competition 
and prices, the member states may take appropriate measures to remedy 
the situation. However, prior to the selection of such measures, the Joint 
C om m ittee shall be supplied  w ith all the relevan t and  requ ired  
in form ation . The Joint Com m ittee shall exam ine the p roposed  
complaints and reach a conclusion. The contracting parties w ent further 
in the safeguard measures by assuming that if Lebanon failed to meet the 
suggested measures laid down by the Joint Committee or if the Committee 
reached no agreement, then the member states of the ECSC may adopt the 
necessary measures which might embrace withdrawal of tariff preferences.
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C-INSTITUTIONAL CONTENT
G eneral and  final provisions provide for estab lish ing  a Joint 
Committee for the task of adm inistration and for ensuring the proper 
im plem entation of the Agreement. The Joint Com m ittee com prises 
representatives of the ECSC and Lebanon (excluding representatives of the 
M em ber states). Its chairm anship  is headed  alternate ly  by the 
representative of each party. It lays down its own rules of procedure and 
acts by m utual agreement. It convenes once a year unless either of the 
contracting parties requests extraordinary sessions. The Com m ittee is 
em powered to take decisions binding on the contracting parties and m ay 
m ake recom m endations pertinen t to fields p rov ided  for in  the 
Agreem ent.
V-THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOUTHWARD 
ENLARGEMENT OF THE ECSC ON THE AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE MEMBER STATES OF THE 
ECSC.
The southw ard enlargement of the ECSC, though it d id  not have 
repercussions for trade between the members states and Lebanon (as 
regards products falling within the ambit of the ECSC Treaty), involves 
legal implications arising from the provisions of the Treaty of Paris which 
provide that any European state may apply to accede to the Community.60
Concerning the accession of new members states, the Council is the 
organ qualified to determine the conditions of accession and to conclude 
such agreements after consulting the H.A (Commission). In joining the 
Com munity, the new member state has to accede w ithout reservations 
affecting the "acquis communitaire" adopted by the representatives of the
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G overnm ents of the m em ber states in the Council.61 The "acquis 
communitaire" to be accepted by a new member state included also the 
Agreem ent w ith Lebanon. The three countries acceding in the 1980s, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, thus acceded also to the Agreement concluded 
between Lebanon and the earlier member states of the ECSC in 1977.62
On the 12th of December 1980, an additional Protocol to the 
Agreem ent betw een Lebanon and the member states of the ECSC was 
c o n c lu d ed .63 It aimed at adjusting the original Agreement, whereby 
Greece became a contracting party, and provided for transitional measures 
for the application of substantive matters arising from the accession by 
Greece. The Protocol was suggested to enter into force on the first of 
January 1980, provided it was approved by the contracting parties in 
accordance w ith their own national procedures. This, however, w ould 
possibly delay the operation of the Protocol. Consequently, pending the 
ratification of the Protocol, the contracting parties laid dow n provisional 
arrangem ents to be in operation on the first of January 1980. These 
arrangem ents are identical to the transitional measures em bodied in the 
Protocol.
These measures provided for the progressive elimination of customs 
duties and charges having equivalent effect to duties over a reasonable 
length of time, ending by the first of January 1986. If Greece suspended or 
reduced , o ther than  originally p lanned, duties or charges having 
equivalent effect to duties on products imported from the mem ber states 
of the ECSC it should offer Lebanon no less favourable treatm ent. The 
Protocol progressively eliminated, over a three year period ending by first 
of January 1984, im port deposits and cash paym ents in force against 
Lebanese exports to Greece. Finally, the Joint Committee, established by 
the Agreement, amended the rules of origin consequent to the accession of 
Greece.
Portugal and Spain similarly acceded to the Agreem ent betw een 
Lebanon and the member states of the ECSC, by virtue of a protocol
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concluded on 9th of July 1987.64 The substantive contents of the Protocol 
are similar to those embodied in the Protocol with Greece. The Protocols 
dismantle, over a given period of time, ending at the latest by the first of 
January 1993, customs duties and charges having equivalent effect to 
duties.
VI-CONCLUSIONS
The Agreement between Lebanon and the member states of the ECSC 
governing products falling within the ambit of the Treaty of Paris was 
concluded in 1977 alongside the Cooperation Agreements. Despite its 
(legally) unjustified precedent in concluding commercial agreem ent in 
m ixed form w ith the EFT A, the ECSC as a Com m unity was denied 
participation in the conclusion of the Agreem ent with Lebanon, as it 
lacked express or implied competence in the field of commercial policy. 
Such a competence is left within the jurisdiction of its member states.
The Agreem ent suppressed all customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions as well as all charges and measures having equivalent effect on 
Lebanese exports to the ECSC markets. It promoted free access of products 
originating in Lebanon and exported directly into the ECSC markets. In 
such a context, it marked progress on the road to the formation of a free 
trade area. Notw ithstanding, the Agreement fell short of m eeting the 
entire requirements of Article XXIV GATT for being completely a genuine 
interim  agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area w ithin a 
reasonable length of time.
The Agreement was adjusted by three protocols consequent to the 
accession of the M editerranean European countries, p rov id ing  a 
transitional period for liberalising their m arkets for Lebanese exports 
entirely.
The Agreement between Lebanon and the member states of the ECSC 
can be evaluated from two angles; legal and as to substance.
2 7 4
From a legal point of view, the Agreement established possibly the 
m ost p referential treatm ent p rovided by developed countries to a 
developing country. Although it suggests the establishment of a free trade 
area betw een Lebanon and the mem ber states of the ECSC, such an 
envisaged free trade area is factually inconceivable in the foreseeable 
future, no t least owing to the lack of a schedule and p lan  w ithin a 
reasonable length of time. It marked, however, a new development in the 
relations between the two parties, despite the rigidity of the rules of origin. 
However, as a matter of substance, the Agreement covered products which 
do not constitute a m atter of primary interest to Lebanon. Therefore, it 
rem ains unlikely to influence trade relations between the contracting 
parties. Moreover, similar agreements have been adopted betw een the 
ECSC and  all the M editerranean countries. This m eans tha t the 
relationship  betw een Lebanon and the European Com m unities has 
witnessed no special individual, development, consequently, qualitatively 
no special contractual relationship between Lebanon and the ECSC and its 
member states exists.
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EEC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY AND LEBANON
l-INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Rome did not stipulate for a development policy when it 
was framed by its founders. Changes in attitudes and approach took place 
in the C om m unity over several years, particularly  as regards EEC's 
international responsibility towards developing countries. Consequently 
various policies were introduced in the sphere of Com munity law. The 
EEC, following its first enlargement, during the Paris Sum m it (1972), 
undertook to m eet the international responsibilities incum bent upon 
Europe tow ards developing countries. Hence, the M editerranean Global 
Policy w as introduced (which recen tly . came to be known as a new  
M editerranean Policy). This policy was designed to meet the needs of the 
special relationship between the EEC and the M editerranean countries. 
The main feature of this policy is to provide free access of certain, mainly 
industrial, products originating in the respective non-member countries 
to the EEC m arkets with a view to bringing about the conditions for a 
successful econom ic developm ent process in the region. It was 
supplemented by a financial and technical cooperation policy by which the 
EEC undertook to finance operations in these countries, in accordance 
with ad hoc financial protocols, with a view to contributing to their efforts 
in economic development.
Financial cooperation between Lebanon and the EEC w as first 
in troduced  into their relationship w hen a financial pro tocol was 
incorporated into the Cooperation Agreement of 1977 for a duration of a 
five year period of time expiring in 1982. Since then, three m ore 
generations of financial protocols have been concluded for a sim ilar 
duration in 1982 and 1987 respectively. A new financial protocol is
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expected to be concluded between both parties by early 1992.1 Additional 
financial cooperation  is foreseen u n d er special em ergency aid  
arrangements dating from 1977 and 1982 respectively.
The EEC food aid policy emerged in 1969, w ith a view to combating 
hunger in the world, particularly in Africa. The aim of this policy evolved 
towards reducing the food import dependence of developing countries. It 
p u t the em phasis on the contribution of this aid to the efforts of 
developing countries in their economic development. The EEC food aid 
policy consists of a normal annual food aid program m e and emergency 
food aid. In 1976, following the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon the 
EEC dispatched its first consignment of food aid to Lebanon, as part of its 
emergency aid. The continuation of the civil war m ade Lebanon a regular 
receiver of EEC emergency aid, embracing food aid. In 1978 and thereafter, 
Lebanon was included in the list of countries eligible for EEC annual food 
aid program m es. As such, financial cooperation and food aid  (both 
norm al and emergency aid) formed the essential elements of the EEC 
development policy.
The first financial and technical cooperation protocol was appended 
to the Cooperation Agreement as an integral part of it. That is to say, the 
Cooperation Agreement was concluded in a mixed form and Article 238 
EEC was d ted  as a legal basis to it. The same Article was cited as a legal 
basis for the other financial protocols, which were concluded however, 
exclusively betw een the EEC and Lebanon. The financial protocol 
com m itted the EEC to finance operations in Lebanon from  financial 
resources other than the EEC budget. This gives rise to several questions.
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the legal framework of the 
EEC development cooperation policy and its particular significance for the 
relationship between the EEC and Lebanon, i.e development cooperation 
in financial and food aid fields. This entails on the one hand , an 
exam ination of EEC competences to conclude exclusively financial 
protocols, w ithin which the EEC undertook obligations on behalf of the
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European Investment Bank (hereinafter referred to as the EIB or the Bank) 
towards a third party, and on the other, to design and dispatch food and 
other emergency aid. Lastly, the substantive contents of the development 
cooperation between Lebanon and the EEC will be scrutinised below.
II-GENERAL BACKGROUND TO EEC-LEBANESE FINANCIAL 
COOPERATION
The financial cooperation policy of the EEC began in the early sixties 
w ith the Agreem ent between the EEC and each of Greece and Turkey 
which aimed at strengthening their economies as a preparatory stage for 
their accession to the European Communities. This policy developed and 
expanded following the Paris Summit (1972), which m arked a turning 
point in EEC external relations with developing countries in general, and 
with the M editerranean countries in particular. During that Summit, the 
heads of states and governm ents p ledged to establish an overall 
M editerranean Policy. This policy emphasized "the prim e necessity of 
going beyond the purely commercial aspects of the question"2 aiming, 
inter alia, at contributing to bringing about the conditions for a successful 
econom ic developm ent in the M editerranean countries. The EEC 
M editerranean policy has been operating, though less successfully than 
was expected, through a series of cooperation agreem ents w ith  all 
M editerranean countries wishing so. It included financial cooperation by 
which the EEC pledged to finance operations in the respective countries 
with a view to contributing to their economic development. EEC financial 
cooperation involved finances from both the EEC budget and  the 
European Investment Bank's own resources.
Lebanon concluded three financial protocols w ith the EEC in 1977, 
1982 and 1987 respectively.3 A fourth protocol is expected to be concluded 
by early 1992.4 By virtue of these protocols, the EEC was committed to 
offer Lebanon financial aid worth EUA 30m in 1977.5 This financial
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contribution increased to ECU 50m and ECU 73m in 1982 and 1987 
respectively. However, in the envisaged protocol of 1991, the EEC 
financial contribution, contrary to the expected Lebanese needs in the 
aftermath of the devastating civil war, decreased to ECU 69 m.6
The first financial protocol was concluded in 1977 for five years, 
w ithin the context of the EEC M editerranean policy when the Council 
issued supplem entary directives to the Commission to negotiate financial 
co o p era tio n  a lo n g sid e  the  coopera tion  ag reem en ts w ith  the  
M editerranean countries.7
The negotiations for the renewal of the first financial protocol 
between the EEC and Lebanon were held in Brussels upon Lebanese 
request, and in accordance with the ad hoc directives issued by the EEC 
Council to the Com m ission.8 On 18 March 1982, the Commission 
transm itted to the Council the result of these negotiations. Lebanon 
expressed its disappointm ent (like m ost of the M ashreq and M aghreb 
countries) at the am ount of finances allocated to it, particularly w hen it 
was seen at that time that Lebanon was expecting lasting peace.9 It urged 
the Com munity to consider further measures to develop other forms of 
cooperation.10 The financial protocol was formally concluded on 17 June 
1982. It replaced the earlier protocol and ran for a further five years 
expiring in October 1987.
The third generation of financial protocols between the EEC and the 
M editerranean countries and, consequently Lebanon, was initiated on 25 
Novem ber 1985 w hen the Council adopted new  negotiating directives 
authorising the Commission to enter into negotiations w ith, inter alia, 
Lebanon w ith  a view  to concluding a new protocol on financial and 
technical cooperation.11 The Commission, following the negotiations 
w ith  Lebanon, recom m ended to the Council the conclusion of the 
p ro toco l.12 After the assent of the European Parliament,13 the Council 
concluded the third financial protocol in December 1987 for a duration of 
five years expiring in October 1991.14 It is noteworthy that the period of
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negotiating the protocol coincided with the southern enlargement of the 
EEC in 1986. Following this enlargement, the advantages derived from 
the Mediterranean policy proved to be eroded.
After the negotiations which took place between the M editerranean 
countries and the EEC on the one hand, and w ithin the EEC institutions 
on the other, a new trend of relations between these countries and the EEC 
began to emerge. The EEC is currently, developing the M editerranean 
policy w ith a view to m aintaining the advantages accorded to these 
countries in 1977.15 Against this backdrop, the financial protocols were 
concluded w ithin the scope of other protocols concluded w ith  other 
M editerranean countries adjusting the cooperation agreem ents to m eet 
the envisaged repercussions of the enlargement. W ithin such a context, 
specific attention was directed to specific areas of cooperation:
- The developm ent of agricultural p roduction  w ith  particu lar 
emphasis and support for national food strategies designed to increase self 
reliance and reduce food dependence.
- Industrial, scientific, technical and commercial cooperation, w ith 
particular attention to support for appropriate training operations in all 
the priority sectors. To this end, emphasis was pu t on practical project- 
related trainings, in companies and research institutions.16
The fourth financial protocol between Lebanon and the EEC, was 
negotiated within the context of the new M editerranean policy and the 
development cooperation policy of the EEC laid down by the Council.17
On 19 December 1990, the Council adopted negotiating directives with 
a view to the conclusion of a fourth generation of financial protocols with 
all Mashreq and Maghreb countries and Israel. On 25 February 1991 the 
Council supplied  these directives to the Commission and the latter 
conducted the negotiations with each country individually, including 
Lebanon. Following the completion of these negotiations betw een 
Lebanon and the Commission, the protocol was initialed in July 1991 and 
recom m ended to the Council for conclusion.18 In conformity w ith the
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SEA, the European Parliament has to ratify any agreement, based on Art 
238 EEC, involving the EEC and a third party, in addition to its condusion 
by the Council of Ministers.19 Disapproval by the European Parliament 
w ould resu lt in blocking the ratification of such an agreem ent. The 
European Parliament has, in fact, approved the fourth financial protocol 
between Lebanon and the EEC at its session on 14 January 1992. The 
finandal protocol in question is supposed to be currently underw ay for its 
conclusion betw een the EEC and Lebanon w ithout any foreseen legal 
barriers. It is w orth m entioning that, following European Parliam ent 
deliberations on the fourth generation of the financial and technical 
cooperation protocols concerning the Mashreq and the Maghreb countries 
in addition to Israel, the European Parliam ent failed to approve two 
financial protocols, initially concluded between the EEC and Syria and 
Morocco respectively. The European Parliament justified its disapproval 
on the basis of its dissatisfaction with the hum an rights situation in these 
two countries, requesting Syria and Morocco to improve their respective 
hum an rights records as a prerequisite to approval of the financial 
protocols in question, ignoring the hum an rights record of Israel 
condem ned frequently  by Am nesty In ternational.20 Following the 
Council decision on the breakdown of finances allocated betw een the 
M ashreq and M aghreb countries and Israel, the Council p ledged to 
supplem ent the new generation of financial protocols by other types of 
measures with scope to extend beyond the context of a single country and 
particularly in areas which concern the environment.21
The finances allocated to Lebanon w ere no t of considerable 
significance, particularly w hen compared w ith its huge needs in the 
aftermath of the civil war. Lebanon requested the EEC to develop other 
areas of financial cooperation through increasing its financial contribution 
to the process of the reconstruction of Lebanon's economic infrastructure. 
The EEC responded twice by offering Lebanon emergency aid in the form 
of loans from the EIB's own resources in* 1977 and 1982, worth ECU 20 m
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and ECU 50 m respectively.
Ill-THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL PROTOCOLS
The financial protocols concluded between Lebanon and the EEC 
involve financing operations in  Lebanon from  a com bination of 
resources. Grants and long term loans on special conditions were offered 
to Lebanon from the EEC's own resources; other forms of loans were 
granted from the EIB's own resources, in accordance with the terms of the 
ad hoc financial protocols w ithout prejudice to the Bank's Statute attached 
to the Treaty of Rome. This gives rise to a question as to the legal basis on 
which the EEC exclusively concludes a financial protocol w ith a th ird  
country, particularly when the protocol involves finances other than the 
EEC’s budgetary resources.
A-THE LEGAL BASIS OF FINANCES FROM THE EEC OWN 
RESOURCES
The EEC has cited Article 238 EEC as a legal basis to conclude the 
financial protocols. This Article provides for association agreem ents 
"involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and special 
procedures". In addition, it stipulates for specific procedures to be 
followed for the conclusion of such agreements. The legal aspects of this 
Article have been discussed elsewhere in this thesis,22 and they will not be 
repeated here. Reference will be made only to the subm itted conclusion 
that the Cooperation Agreement w ith Lebanon dealing w ith financial 
cooperation, could have also been concluded with reference to Article 113 
and 235, because the Agreement is a cooperation and not an association 
agreement. If it had been in substance an association, it would have been 
based on Article 238 EEC. However, a final conclusion may depend on 
how extensively Article 238 EEC is interpreted so as to also include or not
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to include financial cooperation. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
Article 238 EEC is insufficient for the EEC to conclude, exclusively, 
financial protocols with a third party.
B-THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE EEC AND THE EIB
The EIB was established by virtue of the Treaty of Rome as an 
independent financial body23 possessing its own legal personality with a 
view to working towards the attainment of EEC objectives laid down in 
Articles 2 and 130 of the Treaty.24 The degree of independence which the 
Bank enjoys is provided for in the Treaty of Rome and the Statute of the 
Bank which takes the form of a protocol annexed to the Treaty, and which 
is deem ed to be an integral part of it with similar legal authenticity.25 
H ow ever, the Statute of the Bank and the Treaty of Rome leave 
u nansw ered  questions on the position of the Bank w ith in  the 
Com m unity. This issue was raised in a w ritten question from  the 
European Parliam ent to the Commission 26 The Commission considered 
the Bank as a "public body under Community law",27 i.e subject to the 
Treaty of Rome rather than subject to international law  as an independent 
international organisation established between states. The European 
Parliam ent on the other hand accords the Bank an "autonomous status 
w ithin the Com m unity structure".28 The ECJ described the Bank as an 
"organism e com m unautaire".29 "Organisme" is a French w ord which 
bears different meanings as a legal term and consequently the ECJ left the 
definition of the Bank in ambiguity. In 1988 the ECJ concluded that the 
position  of the  Bank w ith in  the C om m unity is "am bivalent".30 
Nonetheless, the Bank’s operational and institutional autonom y does not 
mean that it is totally separated from the Community and exem pt from 
the rules of Community law.31 However, the Board of Governors of the 
Bank view s it as being an independent in ternational o rganisation
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established between sovereign states, maintaining special links with the 
C om m unity .32 In addition, some writers consider the Bank as "Glied" or 
as a legally autonom ous part a generally independent organ of the 
Com m unity.33 The importance of defining the position of the Bank, from 
a legal perspective, stems from the fact that Article 228 EEC makes 
Com munity decisions and agreements directly binding on the member 
states and Com m unity institutions. Consequently, if the EIB is a 
C om m unity institu tion , then the Bank w ould be bound  by EEC 
Regulations and, subsequently, the EEC may undertake obligations on its 
behalf. However, Article 4 EEC, which lists the Community institutions, 
does not refer to the Bank as such.
The founding fathers of the EEC did not include the Bank within the 
EEC institutions. This means that they had in m ind, at the time when 
they fram ed the Treaty, to detach the EIB from other Com m unity 
institutions. Yet, the EIB protocol is treated as an integral part of the 
Treaty of Rome. Therefore, it could be concluded that the EIB, bound by its 
Statute which governs its activities, may be considered to be a body like the 
other Community bodies, and the Statute is its constitutional document. 
This gives rise to the point that the Communities have one Council, one 
Commission and one Assembly, whereas the Bank has its own decision 
making bodies. The member states, in establishing one single Council, 
Commission and ECJ, had as their aim the limitation of the num ber of 
similar institutions. However, the jurisdiction or the functions of the 
same institution in each Community has remained unchanged. In other 
w ords, a lthough  the sam e person is in office in each of these 
Communities, the rules to be applied in each field of activities belongs to 
the respective Treaty, i.e the Merger Treaty effected the fusion of the 
institutions and not the constitutional documents. Therefore, the EIB 
could be considered to be an autonomous body within the Communities' 
family. Consequently, there could be no authority to be exercised by any of 
the Com m unity institu tions in relation to the Bank's independen t
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decision-making powers.
Consequently, since the EIB is not a Community institution in the 
strict legal sense, the Community cannot undertake any commitment on 
its behalf, i.e the Bank is not bound by Community agreements w ith a 
third party. Subsequently such agreements would be binding only upon 
the Com munity and its member states under public international law and 
the Treaty of Rome.34 Therefore, as the Bank stands in the Community as 
an independent financial organisation endowed w ith its own decision­
m aking bodies, and possesses its own legal personality, it can only be 
bound by obligations which are incurred by itself.
Therefore, since the Community cannot undertake obligations on 
behalf of the EIB, a question arises as to w hat legal basis the EEC 
undertakes obligations to provide Lebanon (or a third party) with financial 
assistance through financing operations with a view to developing its 
economy from the EIB’s own resources.
C-THE LEGAL BASIS OF FINANCES FROM THE EIB'S OWN 
RESOURCES
The Bank's m ain task is to contribute to attain the Com m unity 
objectives specified under Article 2 and 130 EEC. These Articles do not 
impose upon the Bank's financial activities any geographical limitation as 
long as they serve the Community objectives. W ithin such a context, the 
Bank m ay finance operations m ounted outside the Com m unity by a 
special authorisation from the Bank's suprem e decision m aker, i.e the 
Board of Governors, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Board of 
Directors.35
The Board of Governors comprises m inisters designated by the 
member states. It is entrusted with the power to lay down, inter alia, 
general directives for the credit policy of the Bank in accordance with its 
objectives and the set objectives of the Community.36
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On the other hand, the decision m aking body in the EEC is the 
Council of Ministers. The fact is that, both the Council and the Board of 
Governors represent the same member states when the political decision 
is adopted. Therefore, the decision of the Bank's credit policy in general, 
and its consistency w ith the objectives of the EEC specially tow ards its 
external relations in particular, is presumably taken at the political level of 
the governm ents of the m em ber states rather than at the technical 
institutional level. As such, a formula of cooperation assumingly exists 
and works between the two institutions, that is the EEC Council and the 
EIB Board of the Governors. This form of cooperation presents itself in 
the form of an invitation or recommendation from the EEC Council to the 
Board of Governors to participate in achieving the objectives of the EEC as 
regards its development aid policy towards a third party.37 The Board of 
Governors then has to respond to such an invitation and take a decision 
in this area38 and set up a ceiling for financing operations from the Bank's 
own resources outside the Community. W ithin such a context, the EIB 
undertakes binding commitments towards a third party  on a triangular 
basis, i.e it undertakes binding obligations tow ards the EEC under 
Com m unity law, which concludes w ith a th ird  party  an agreem ent 
binding under international law. This gives rise to a hypothetical 
question as to the possible refusal of the EIB to respond positively to the 
EEC invitation or recommendation.
The EIB's m ain task is to assist to attain Com m unity objectives 
within or outside the EEC. The objectives are not confined by geographical 
limitations; they are merely subject to Community interests. The EEC 
founders did not foresee a Community development policy at that time 
w ithin w hich financial cooperation w ould operate. H ow ever, the 
Community has witnessed various levels of development policies, inter 
alia, developm ent aid policy which recently has become of v ital 
importance to EEC interests. Therefore, refusal to respond to an EEC 
recommendation would not serve the interests of the Community. On
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the contrary, it w ould be considered an action against the Com m unity 
interests, thus contradicting the tasks entrusted to the EIB. Such a case 
w ould  give the EEC Com m ission to invoke the righ t to institu te  
proceedings against the EIB before the ECJ.39
Moreover, the EEC Council consists of the m inisters of the m ember 
states whose task is, inter alia, to ensure the attainm ent of EEC objectives 
and to safeguard the interests of the m em ber states. The m inisters are 
usually the ministers of foreign affairs, bu t nothing prevents the Council 
from being convened as the Council of any other m inisters w hen the 
agenda relates to their powers. Therefore, w hen the issue discussed relates 
to the financial field, the Council would comprise the finance ministers of 
the member states, i.e the members of the Board of Governors of the EIB. 
Hence it w ould be illogical to find a situation w here the Council of 
Finance M inisters could adopt a recom m endation or invite the Bank to 
participate in an action, and  the same m inisters, w earing another hat, 
could or would reject such a recommendation.
Furtherm ore, the financial protocols are concluded by v irtue of 
Article 238 EEC. This Article includes a reference to Article 236 EEC, where 
there is a justified reason for the possibility of am ending the Treaty of 
Rome. If such a case of disagreem ent were to arise, and the Council 
considered such a developm ent policy necessary together w ith  the 
relevant financial protocols concerned, then the possibility w ould arise of 
amending the Treaty with a view to bringing the EIB under commitments 
to take part in the implementation of such policy.40
In practice, however, such a situation has never arisen and, since 
1977, the EIB has provided Lebanon, like other third countries, particularly 
M editerranean and ACP countries, with finances from its ow n resources, 
in accordance w ith the respective financial protocols concluded betw een 
the EEC and Lebanon.
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IV-THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE FINANCIAL 
PROTOCOLS
A-THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FINANCIAL PROTOCOLS
Each of the four financial protocols opens by a pream ble of two 
p a rag rap h s h igh ligh ting  the general objectives w hich  gu ide  the 
contracting parties in the implementation of the protocol. The objectives 
reaffirm  the resolve of the contracting parties to im plem ent financial 
cooperation w ith a view  to contributing to the social and  economic 
developm ent of Lebanon. The third and fourth financial protocols have 
in particular defined the objectives behind EEC's financial contribution in 
accordance with the new approach of the EEC to redirect its M editerranean 
policy consequent on enlargement. Accordingly, the EEC has aim ed to 
reduce the food dependence of Lebanon. To this end, as regards the 
agricultural sector, the protocols have pu t an emphasis on developing the 
production of agricultural products in short supply such as food crops. 
M oreover, the EEC has pledged to contribute financially, w ithin a set 
ceiling and prre-determ ined criteria, to M editerranean countries which 
undertake to execute program m es for structural adjustm ents. The EEC 
expects that its financial contributions m ay prom ote and strengthen the 
relationship between Lebanon and the EEC.
The preambles laying down the objectives of the contracting parties 
reflect the EEC's intention to undertake obligations, w ithin a set ceiling, to 
finance operations in Lebanon. These com m itm ents are of a binding 
nature under rules of international law, since the preambles constitute an 
integral part of the protocols. Yet, this does not m ean that Lebanon has 
the right to claim the allocated finances once the protocols enter into 
operation. The pream bles bind Lebanon as well not to use the EEC 
financial contribution arising from the protocols, except tow ards specific 
areas "reinforcing' the social and economic developm ent of Lebanon.
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Just as the Treaty of Rome did not leave it to the EIB to set the criteria 
for determ ining w hether or not a project contributes to the Community's 
overall harm onious developm ent, so the financial protocols have taken 
this m atter ou t of the Bank's hands. The Statute of the Bank, as an 
integral part of the Treaty of Rome, has laid down the principles within 
which loans and guarantee operations for specific projects w ould qualify 
for credit by the Bank and accordingly contribute to the achievement of the 
overall economic developm ent of the EEC.41 These principles are to be 
applied w ith regard to projects designed to develop the common m arket 
in the EEC. As regards projects outside the EEC, loans and guarantee 
operations are  p rov ided  from  the Bank's resources u p o n  special 
authorisation from the Board of Governors. The Statute of the Bank 
rem ains silent concerning any criteria for qualifying such projects for 
Bank's credits. O ther than that, they correspond to EEC interests. 
Moreover, as the Bank operates on a non-profit basis, that is to say when 
granting loans, the EIB has to ensure that these loans are in line w ith the 
set objectives behind EEC financial contributions. As such, loans and 
operations financed by the EEC and the EIB are granted on the basis of 
criteria laid down and agreed upon in the respective financial protocols.
The financial protocols betw een the  EEC and  L ebanon have 
determ ined the activities and the fields which contribute to social and  
economic developm ent in Lebanon. In addition, they have laid dow n 
criteria for determ ining w hether or not a suggested project and  various 
groups or organs established in Lebanon seeking loans from  the EIB, 
beside the Lebanese state and its organs, are in line w ith the set economic 
objectives of the financial protocols and consequently qualify for loans 
from the Bank 42
The first and the second financial protocols have laid dow n the 
criteria for granting loans qualifying for "capital projects in the field of 
production and economic infrastructure which contributes to prom ote 
industrialisation and m odernisation of the agriculture sector in Lebanon
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as fields of activities eligible for finances from the EEC". The third and 
the fourth financial protocols have reinforced a similar a ttitude towards 
the possible use of the available finances w ith  the em phasis p u t on 
develop ing  agricu ltu ral p roducts in sho rt supp ly , thus m itigating  
Lebanon's food dependence. Economic infrastructure  and  industrial 
developm ent com plem entary  to projects in the field of p roduction  
(agricultural and industria l projects) are considered to be eligible for 
finances. More emphasis has been placed on technical cooperation, be it 
p re lim inary  or com plem entary to capital projects. Thus, technical 
cooperation in the field of training has been considered a priority field to 
be, partly  or entirely, a beneficiary from EEC financial assistance. This 
technical cooperation has aim ed at strengthening the economic links 
betw een Lebanon and the EEC in the fields of industry , train ing and 
research, technology and services. Furthermore, two more areas eligible 
for the EEC financial contribution have been added  to the areas 
established in the first and second protocols, dealing w ith regional and 
m ultilateral cooperation and protection of the environm ent. A novel 
developm ent in the fourth financial protocol is the introduction of a new 
package of finance operations in the form of non-refundable grant aid 
w orth  ECU 300 m designed to help the respective countries in the 
M editerranean  reg ion  in carrying ou t the ir s tru c tu ra l ad justm ent 
program m es, in accordance with and complete agreem ent of the Bretton 
Woods institutions.
The financial protocols concluded betw een Lebanon and the EEC 
constitute part of the EEC’s package of financial contribution to Lebanon 
w ithin EEC global M editerranean policy. The EEC has designed the 
objectives of its financial cooperation in such a m anner as to m eet the 
need for a m ore coherent and constructive approach  tow ards all 
M editerranean countries concerned. The central objective has been to 
contribute to the social and economic developm ent of these countries. 
However, an ultim ate aim is also to prom ote and strengthen relations
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between the EEC and these countries.
The M ed ite rranean  policy  has been  designed  to take in to  
consideration different levels of economic developm ent in the respective 
countries w ith respect to achieving determ ined objectives. As such, the 
in ternational legal instrum ent of the M editerranean policy has been 
broken dow n in to  three categories of agreem ents: (1) A ssociation 
agreements based on reciprocal preferential trade arrangements leading to 
possible accession to the EEC; (2) reciprocal preferential trade arrangements 
leading to the formation of a full free trade area w ithin a defined period of 
time, for example w ith respect to Israel, and (3) cooperation agreem ents 
based  on un ila te ra l preferen tial trad e  arrangem ents. The m ain  
justification for designing these three sets of agreem ents has been the 
desire to meet the individual requirements of different levels of economic 
developm ent in the M editerranean countries.
EEC policy as regards financial cooperation has not, how ever, 
followed the same path. All the financial protocols are similar. However, 
if this could be held to be beneficial, if not non-detrimental, as in the case 
of all the M editerranean countries, it cannot be said to be so as regards 
Lebanon. The first three generations of financial protocols ceased to 
operate in Lebanon, (rightly possibly), owing to the con tinu ing  civil war. 
On the eve of the conclusion of the fourth financial protocol, Lebanon is 
witnessing a new  era of peace, and is expecting to meet the requirem ents 
of the process of reconstruction as a prerequisite step for its social and 
economic recovery and development.
A part from the value of finances allocated to Lebanon, the fourth 
financial protocol includes two novel areas of cooperation: protection of 
the environm ent and a package for backing structu ra l ad justm en t 
program m es, beside the m ain objective of reducing Lebanon's food 
dependence. These objectives give rise to the question as to w hether they 
satisfy the "urgent" needs of Lebanon for economic development, nam ely 
reconstruction.
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Reducing Lebanon’s food dependence is not an urgent objective for 
L ebanon, requ iring  ind ispensab le  in fra-structu ra l p rep a ra tio n s for 
achieving such an objective. These requirem ents interrelate, partly, w ith 
th e  p ro cess  of re c o n s tru c tio n  w h ich  e n ta ils , in ter alia , the 
im plem entation of capital projects such as, an energy supplies (Lebanon 
cannot currently produce electricity for m ore than six hours per day) 
telecom system, transport system, drinking w ater and irrigation projects. 
O ne m ay w onder w hat advantages the o ther tw o novel objectives 
(structural adjustm ent program m e [SAP] and environm ental program m e) 
m ay achieve for Lebanon, particularly w ith respect to short term , urgent 
needs.
The EEC environm ental program m e for the M editerranean is based 
on a joint initiative draw n up in 1988 betw een the EIB and the W orld 
Bank aim ed at reducing pollu tion in the M editerranean sea and at 
com bating problem s ra ised  by env ironm ental d eg rada tion .43 This 
program m e has set up  an operational instrum ent, the M editerranean 
Environm ental Technical Assistance Program m e (METAP). W ithin this 
context, the Com mission of the EEC has established its C om m unity 
Programme for the Environment in the M editerranean region (MEDSPA). 
This programme identifies four priority areas for action:
- integrated water resources m anagem ent (watershed management);
- management of solid and hazardous wastes;
- the prevention and control of m arine oil and chemical pollution; 
and
- coastal zone management.44
This program m e is far from being close to Lebanon's im m ediate 
requirements. It is a program m e of main concern to the m ember states of 
the EEC rather than to Lebanon.
S tructural ad justm ent p rogram m es are policies w hich  began 
em erging in 1979 in response to the th ird  w orld economic crisis and 
international debt crisis. This policy was established by the Bretton Woods
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institu tions requiring  the countries seeking W orld Bank a n d /o r  IMF 
financial assistance to undertake reform program m es as a preliminary step 
preceding financing specific projects, since no successful project could be 
im plem ented in a corrupted economic system. Structural Adjustm ent 
Program mes "embody m easures which aim at achieving viability in the 
m id-term  balance of paym ents while m aintaining the level and rate of 
growth of economic activity at as high a rate as possible".45 They mainly 
deal w ith  questions as to "how, th ro u g h  changing  policies and  
institutional arrangem ents in a country, can existing productive capacity 
be more efficiently used?".46 The W orld Bank defines the purpose of its 
loans under reform programmes (SAL) as "Non project lending to support 
program m es of policy and institutional change necessary to m odify the 
structure of an economy so that it can m aintain both its grow th rate and 
the viability of its balance of payments in the m edium  term "47 Most of 
the countries seeking W orld Bank help are from the developing countries 
applying socialist economic policies. The reform program m es (structural 
adjustm ent program m e) aim eventually to liberalise the economies of 
these countries and transform  them  into profit m aking economies; free 
m arket economies. As regards the EEC's novel objective, an assistance 
package, it is m ostly concerned with two countries undertaking economic 
reform programmes, Algeria and Egypt.
From  the ou tse t Lebanon has enjoyed a free m arket econom y 
combined w ith a unique financial (banking) system. This gives rise to 
some doubts as to the impact of the novel arrangem ents on Lebanon. In 
other words, w ould Lebanon be considered a potential beneficiary country 
from  such a financial assistance package? If not, then  w hy is a 
corresponding article incorporated in the financial protocol betw een the 
EEC and Lebanon?
The financial protocol between Lebanon and the EEC links directly 
the potential beneficiary of such a package w ith the implementation of the 
structural adjustm ent program m e agreed upon w ith the Bretton W oods
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in stitu tions.48 M oreover, w ithin the structural adjustm ent program m e, 
some specific elements are taken into consideration in providing loans 
from this financial package, in particular, the level of indebtedness and the 
charges of the debt services, the balance of paym ents situation and the 
availability of hard currency, the budget situation, m onetary situation; the 
level of general dom estic  p ro d u c t per capita , and  the  level of 
u n e m p lo y m en t.49 The fourth financial protocol explains tw o ways of 
approving loans w ithin this package. EEC financial assistance could be 
sought to finance;
-imports of capital projects designed to contribute to the expansion of 
the productive capacity in these countries, in conformity w ith the 
respective structural adjustm ent programme;
-technical assistance to reinforce structural adjustm ent program m es 
in the area of macro-economic policy.
Since Lebanon is not undertaking any reform program m e and is not 
conducting negotiations w ith the Bretton W oods institutions for such a 
purpose, it w ould hard ly  be conceivable as being concerned w ith this 
financial assistance package.
Therefore, Lebanon m ay benefit from an EEC financial contribution 
only if it presents projects in areas in line w ith  the objectives of the 
protocols. However, since these objectives have been tailored to m eet 
regional needs rather than specific individual requirem ents of Lebanon, 
Lebanon is unlikely to be seen to be active in these areas before its 
economic infra-structure is reconstructed.
B-COND!T!ONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
FINANCIAL PROTOCOL
The financial protocols provide the general fram ework w ithin which 
the EEC may participate in financing operations, w hether partly or wholly, 
in Lebanon. They lay dow n the areas and the criteria of activities deem ed
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to contribute to the objectives of the protocols; that is the social and 
econom ic developm ent of Lebanon. In  addition, they establish the 
fram ew ork w ith in  w hich firm s or organisations, w hether public  or 
private, w ould be considered bodies eligible to benefit from EEC financial 
contributions.50 Only meeting all these requirements would p u t Lebanon, 
the beneficiary country or the eligible organ in that country, on the right 
track to  soliciting financial assistance from  the EEC by m eans of 
im plem enting the financial protocols. Once the financial protocol enters 
in to  force, the governm ent looking fo rw ard  to securing loans, in 
particular from the EIB, is required to com ply w ith a set of technical 
conditions (rules of procedures), beside specific conditions tailored to the 
nature of the project. These conditions are contained partly in the Statute 
of the EIB and partly  in the respective financial protocols concluded 
betw een the EEC and Lebanon. H ow ever, both  are insp ired  by the 
objectives of the EEC financial contribution.
i-RULES ON PROCEDURES AND GENERAL CONDITIONS
As the financial contribution is a combination of finance from  EEC 
budgetary resources and EIB's own resources, the rules and procedures 
applied for envisaged loans are a combination of rules incorporated in the 
financial protocols as well as the Statute of the EIB. Loans granted by the 
EIB from its own resources are granted in accordance with the conditions 
and  procedures em bodied in its S tatute, w hereas loans on special 
conditions, and grant aid from the EEC, are granted and m anaged by the 
Commission of the EEC in accordance w ith the rules laid dow n in the 
respective protocols. Article 205 EEC confers upon the Commission an 
exclusive competence to implement the Com m unity budget. This means 
that decisions on committing EEC budgetary funds cannot be delegated to 
other institutions or organisations. However, under Article 105 (3) of the 
Financial Regulations of 21 December 1987 applicable to the general
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C om m unity  budget, "the C om m ission m ay au thorise  the  EIB to 
adm inister interest rate subsidies and risk capital operations".51 Thus, 
loans for risk capital operations are m anaged by the EIB upon  special 
m andate from the EEC according to the rules embodied in the Statute and 
protocols, notwithstanding their source, EEC budgetary resources.52
The protocols lay dow n the procedures through w hich loans and 
guarantee operations could be applied for and  granted thereafter. The 
Lebanese state, or the body soliciting loans, has to submit its request for the 
loan, w hether from the EIB's own resources or EEC budgetary resources, to 
the Commission. The Commission appraises the request for financing in 
collaboration w ith the competent Lebanese body and delivers its opinion 
to the EIB 53 If the body soliciting the loan is other than the Lebanese state 
or its organs, whether a private or semi-private entity, the request for the 
loan is to be transmitted to the Commission through the interm ediary of 
the Lebanese state or its organ to ensure its assent for such a request.54
As regards loans from EEC budgetary resources, they are subject to 
conditions incorporated in the respective protocol. Loans on special 
conditions have been subject to 40 years reimbursement, with the first ten 
years free of repaym ent installments, w ith a fixed interest rate of 1 per 
cent. This kind of loan was considered in the first and the second financial 
protocols only. They were dropped in the th ird  and the fourth financial 
protocols.
Loans to approved projects from the Bank's resources are subject to 
conditions laid down in the Statute. The Board of Directors of the EIB is 
the body entrusted with the exclusive power to take decisions in respect of 
gran ting  loans and guarantee operations, follow ing the favourable 
opinion of the M anagement Committee of the EIB.55 The M anagem ent 
Com mittee and the Commission, deliver a favourable opinion tow ards 
the proposed project. If either body delivers an unfavourable opinion on 
the proposed project, the Board of Directors has to take its decision 
unanim ously. If both bodies delivers an unfavourable opinion, the
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project is dropped.56
EIB loans attract interest rates subject to the conditions of the capital 
m arket, (i.e the cost of borrowing), and are determ ined on the day of the 
signature of the loan. The EIB cannot grant any reduction in the interest 
rate.55 However, if such a reduction in the interest rate appears desirable, 
an in terest rate  subsidy m ay be provided by the EEC. W ithin such a 
context, the first protocol specified that interest rate subsidies of 2 per cent 
are to be granted from the EEC grant aid. However, interest rate subsidies, 
unlike the protocols w ith other M editerranean countries, and to the 
disadvantage of Lebanon, were provided only in the first protocol. Interest 
rate subsidies and loans on special conditions were excluded from  the 
th ird  and fourth financial protocols. Instead, the EEC introduced loans 
from  risk capital resources granted from EEC budgetary resources and 
m anaged by the EIB upon special mandate.
The EIB only provides loans on the capital market, though on a non­
commercial basis, worth 50 per cent of the value of the project. Therefore, 
the financial protocol has to specify w hat part of the project should be 
covered by an EEC financial contribution.
The decision on financing such a project is taken on a case by case 
basis, according to the nature and particular economic characteristics of the 
project. Thus, the EEC financial contribution m ay cover the necessary 
costs incurred in carrying ou t approved projects including feasibility 
stud ies and  consultation. H ow ever, the  loans do no t cover any 
adm inistrative, maintenance or operational costs.
In addition to the set of rules laid dow n in the Statute of the Bank 
and adopted by the protocols, the protocols have laid down further rules 
governing the rights and procedures for tendering for projects financed by 
the EEC.
All natural and legal persons of the EEC and Lebanon are eligible for 
such tenders, provided  that they have their headquarters and  are 
registered in either the EEC or Lebanon. Moreover, tendering for projects
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of prim ary interest to Lebanese undertakings are subject to accelerated 
procedures, provided that the proposed project is estim ated at less than 
ECU lm . This ceiling was increased to ECU 3m in the th ird  financial 
protocol in order to encourage the participation of Lebanese firm s in 
tendering activities. M oreover, w ith  a view  to encouraging regional 
cooperation, natural or legal persons of th ird  developing countries 
associated w ith  the EEC through overall cooperation agreem ents or 
association agreements, m ay be exceptionally authorised by the EEC on a 
case by case basis to participate in tendering on similar and equal terms as 
nationals of Lebanon and the EEC.
ii-SPECIFIC CONDITIONS (FEASIBILITY)
In financing projects, both inside and outside the EEC, the EIB takes a 
strictly developmental approach. The viability of each project is assessed by 
"teams of qualified financial analysts, economists and engineers able to 
draw  on wide ranging experience built up by the Bank over the years".58 
The EIB adopts a rigorous approach to project appraisal inside the EEC, to 
assess investm ent in countries outside the EEC. Through an in-depth  
analysis of the economic, financial and technical viability of each project, 
the Bank ensures that the successful execution of the investm ent it 
finances will enable the receiver country to raise money back from the 
project for reimbursement purposes, and have a long term positive impact 
on social and economic development of the borrower country. This kind 
of condition is familiar in m odem  financial relations particularly w ith the 
W orld Bank and IMF. The creditor institu tions, w hether p rivate  or 
public, resort to such conditions for "safety reasons" to ensure that the 
borrowing organs have sufficient resources to refund the debts and service 
the charges. They sometimes get involved in the economic process of the 
project through various forms of "cooperation", ranging from suggestions
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to common feasibility studies including sometimes direct supervision of 
the envisaged project, let alone evaluating the projects to ensure that the 
outlined objectives have been achieved.59
Since these conditions are specifically tailored to the nature of the 
envisaged project, they cannot be contained in the respective protocols or 
in the Statute of the Bank. Therefore, the best m ethod to examine these 
conditions is to illustrate two projects proposed by Lebanon to be financed, 
one in the form  of a loan from EIB's ow n resources and the other from 
EEC budgetary resources in the form grant aid.60
The energy project:
Following the m odest value of EEC finances allocated to Lebanon in 
the first financial protocol, Lebanon requested the Commission to identify, 
as a practical response to its needs, other resources for furthering the 
proportion of aid available to Lebanon in the EEC financial contribution. 
The Com m ission recom m ended the Lebanese request to the Council, 
which is em pow ered to invite the EIB to participate in financing projects 
in Lebanon. The Council asked the EIB to make EUA 20 m available from 
its ow n resources as exceptional , aid to Lebanon in the form of loans for 
reconstruction projects.61 The Board of Governors adopted a favourable 
reso lu tion  tow ards the  Council inv ita tion  u n d e r the  head ing  of 
"exceptional aid".62 Consequently the EEC and Lebanon signed the "first 
emergency financial protocol" allocating EUA 20 m in the form of loans, 
attracting no interest rate subsidy, from EIB's own resources.
A m ongst the projects needed in Lebanon an energy project was 
identified. A t that time and consequent to the civil war, the production of 
electricity power was reduced to six hours per day. Lebanon forw arded a 
request for a loan for building 30 additional 70 M W turbines at the Jieh 
and Zook thermal power stations.
The ap p ro p ria te  Lebanese au th o rity  subm itted  to the  EIB a
3 0 3
docum entation file justifying the loan for the project, concluding that the 
project represents one of the key m easures adopted  by the Lebanese 
governm ent to revive the econom y in the country. The project was 
necessary if anything resembling normal life was to be re-established and 
m ain tained  in Lebanon. M oreover, increasing electricity  o u tp u t is 
essential to cope with the expected growth in industrial and commercial 
activity and to m eet increasing private domestic dem and. Following a 
v isit to Lebanon by the  Com m issioner in  charge of developm ent, 
accompanied by a representative of the EIB, the Bank advanced the funds 
of EUA 20 m under the first emergency aid allowing for different loans in 
three stages; in June 1978 and in August and December 1979.63 The loans 
were for ten years attracting interest rates of 5.15 per cent and 5.9 per cent.64
Drinking water project:
Similar means were applied as regards the second project, under a 
second emergency protocol, following another m odest value allocated in 
the second financial protocol.
In  1982, a m em ber of the C om m ission65 v is ited  L ebanon, 
accom panied by an EIB representative, to exam ine Lebanon's needs 
following the Israeli invasion in June 1982 and consequent destruction in 
Lebanon, and to identify actions which the EEC m ight take. Am ongst 
different projects p u t forw ard by the Lebanese governm ent, ready for 
external financing, an urgent project was selected, consisting of pum ping 
and piping drinking w ater for the capital Beirut.66 The C om m ission 
appraised the project from three angles. Political, environm ental and 
econom ic aspects w ere taken into account w hen the Com m ission 
recommended the project to the Council.
Politically, the project w ould have a maximum political im pact as an 
EEC gesture for the support of Lebanon. The project would, m oreover, 
reduce the risk of pollution of the distribution system resulting from the
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disruption of the water supply.67
The project w as classified as part of the reconstruction process 
undertaken by the Lebanese Governm ent and thus non-direct income 
producing. Consequently, the project could not be funded by ordinary 
loans at m arket price w ithout interest rate subsidies. It is w orthy of note 
that the second financial protocol d id  no t provide for in terest rate  
subsidies from EEC grant aid. The cost of the project was estim ated at 
around ECU 35 m  of which it was suggested that ECU 20 m  m ay be 
financed by the EEC, and ECU 15 m by Lebanon. The proposal of the 
project called for international tendering procedures for its essential 
com ponents, w hereas tendering as regards pipes was restric ted  for 
tendering by Lebanese firms in accordance w ith the rules of the second 
financial protocol w ith  a view  to encouraging the partic ipa tion  of 
Lebanese firms. Hence, the Commission recom mended to the Council to 
provide Lebanon w ith ECU 20 m as non-refundable exceptional grant aid 
from EEC budgetary  resources. On 14 M arch, the Council adopted  a 
decision granting Lebanon an exceptional aid of ECU 20 m for a project to 
supply drinking w ater to the capital Beirut.68 This decision did  not take 
effect until Lebanon and the EEC signed the "Financing Convention" for 
this purpose on 22 Novem ber 1983.69 However, the continuation of the 
civil w ar prevented the implementation of the project.
C-THE IMPACT OF EEC FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION ON 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EEC AND LEBANON
The four financial protocols together p rov ided  L ebanon w ith  
operations financing resources reaching ECU 292 m from a combination of 
the Bank's own resources in the form of loans, i.e own paid-up capital and 
borrowings, and from EEC budgetary resources in the form of a m ixture of 
loans from risk capital resources, loans on special conditions and grant aid. 
The breakdow n of the EEC financial contribution from  the European
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Investment Bank and the EEC budget has been as follows:
Fig 6.1
The breakdown of the EEC financial contribution to Lebanon
loans from loans from 
EIB's own risk capital 
resources conditions
loans on grant aid total
special aid
1st F.P (78-81) 20
1st Emergency aid(77-78) 20 
2nd F.P (82-86) 34
2nd Emergency aid (82- ) 50 
3rd F.P (88-91) 53
4th F.P (92-96) 45
222
8
11
19
22
60
30
20
50
50
73
69
292
Source: EIB Information No 66 (1988) and EIB Annual Report (1990).
Lebanon was allocated finances amounting to ECU 223 m  over 15 
years, save in the fourth financial protocol. However, as the situation in 
Lebanon was deteriorating owing to the continuation of the civil war, the 
EIB ceased to apply the respective protocols, except for ECU 40 m for energy 
projects implemented between 1978 and 1983.70
In 1990 a new era of peace dawned enabling Lebanon to initiate and 
proceed with a process of reconstruction. The civil war has resulted, inter 
alia, in com plete destruction of Lebanon's economic infrastructure. 
W ithout launching the process of reconstruction, the process of social and 
economic development would hardly take off. W ithin such a context, an 
International Fund for Reconstruction of Lebanon was launched. It is 
evident that rebuilding Lebanon's economic infrastructure, such as energy
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supply projects, drinking w ater and irrigation projects, transport projects, 
telecom m unication system , etc., are prerequisite  capital projects for 
im plem enting any successful economic developm ent plans in Lebanon.71 
Even if w e assum e that the EIB rightly ceased to apply the first three 
financial protocols, w e m ay still evaluate, the effectiveness of EEC 
con tribu tions to the  process of reconstruc tion  in L ebanon and  
consequently  to the  coun try 's  social and  econom ic recovery  and  
development, particularly as concerns the fourth financial protocol.
The first financial protocol contributed, in principle, ECU 30 m. This 
contribution represented 4.4 per cent of EEC's financial aid to the Mashreq 
and  M aghreb countries and Israel. This sm all am ount of finance 
contribu ted  little if any to the process of rebuild ing the economic 
in frastruc tu re  of Lebanon.72 C onsequently, Lebanon expressed its 
disappointm ent as to its share in the EEC finance pledge to Lebanon and 
urged the EEC to use all possible means to re-form ulate its theoretical 
objectives into practical means. The EEC furthered ECU 20 m  in 1978 as 
"exceptional aid". This aid m arked the first emergency aid. EEC financial 
assistance was diversified, as the table above shows, between loans and 
grants. The loans were allocated to Lebanon from EIB resources in accord 
w ith m arket conditions and prices. However, the interest rate of that loan 
was to be subsidised by 2 per cent from EEC grant
The second generation of financial protocols concluded betw een the 
EEC and the Mashreq and Maghreb countries and Israel provided for a 
total of ECU 1015 m. This represented an increase of 51 per cent over the 
first generation of financial protocols. Lebanon's share from this financial 
contribution did not acceed ECU 50 m. The increase of the Lebanese share 
was calculated using the same criteria as those applied in respect of the 
M ashreq  countries, w ithou t tak ing  L ebanon's special needs in to  
consideration. In addition to disadvantages for Lebanon, and contrary to 
the case in all the loans from the Bank to other countries, the second 
financial protocol dropped the interest rate subsidy to Lebanon funded
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from EEC budgetary grants.
In 1987, the EEC decided on a m uch larger package of loans from the 
Bank and budgetary aid than under the second protocol, comprising ECU 
1003 m in loans from the Bank’s own resources and ECU 615 m from EEC 
budgetary resources advanced in the form of outright grants or risk capital 
granted  and  m anaged by the Bank. C om pared w ith  the preceding  
generation, this was tantam ount to a 67 per cent rise in lending from  the 
Bank and 48 per cent in fund from the EEC. As regards Lebanon, however, 
its total financial assistance rose by 46 per cent compared w ith the level 
under the earlier financial protocol. This increase was less significant than 
the increase in the share of other M editerranean countries. This means 
that the percentage of financial resources allocated to Lebanon, w ith 
references to total EEC financial contributions, fell to 4.5 per cent, i.e 0.5 per 
cent less than the earlier share in 1982.72
The fourth  generation of financial protocols w itnessed , w ith  
reference to the third generation of financial protocols, a further increase 
in EEC financial con tribu tions for financing  opera tions in  the 
M editerranean countries, as regards both loans from the Bank's ow n 
resources and EEC budgetary resources. However, Lebanon's share under 
the fourth protocol did not only remain less significant; it even decreased 
from the level of the preceding protocol. The EEC financial contribution 
to Lebanon's "social and economic development" represented only 3.3 per 
cent of the total EEC financial assistance package to the non-European 
M editerranean countries.
An innovatory feature of the fourth financial protocols signed w ith 
the M aghreb and Mashreq countries has been the allocation of a specified 
am ount of financing operations from risk capital resources. The use of 
risk capital methodology provides a versatile means aimed at prom oting 
the im plem entation  of investm ent schem es undertaken  jo in tly  by 
national enterprises w orking w ith com panies from  the EEC in the 
industrial sector.74 The EEC considers the provision of risk capital as a
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clear indication of its intention of fu rther exploring and  developing 
industrial cooperation w ith the M editerranean countries in a flexible and 
risk sharing manner.
Recent studies carried out by the Council for Reconstruction and 
Development (a Lebanese public organ) estimate the bill for reconstruction 
to be at about $ 17 bn.75 A comparison betw een the estim ated bill for 
reconstruction and the EEC financial assistance shows how  m odest the 
EEC contribution to the "social and economic development" of Lebanon 
is. Just as the objectives and the general fram ework w ithin w hich the 
financial protocols operate, in particular the fourth financial protocol, fail 
to take into account Lebanon's level of economic developm ent o r its 
special needs, so did the criteria in accordance w ith which finances to 
Lebanon under the fourth protocol were allocated. The corresponding 
am ount of finances represents the sm allest portion am ongst all the 
M editerranean countries. The decrease in the EEC financial contribution 
to Lebanon clearly indicates that the financial resources allocated to 
Lebanon w ere once again calculated w ithou t taking, besides o ther 
elements, Lebanon's special and urgent needs into account.
There are different interpretations for the EEC's position tow ards 
Lebanon. The EEC has already m ade over the past years financial 
allocations to Lebanon reaching ECU 292 m which Lebanon has not been 
able to use. Nonetheless, these finances have not to be w ritten off, and 
Lebanon would remain eligible to use these resources, in accordance w ith 
the respective protocols, until they are exhausted. This assum ption holds 
true, bu t involves some weaknesses. The European Council, m eeting in 
M adrid in 1989, issued a statement "reaffirming the commitments of the 
EEC and its member states to help provide Lebanon with assistance needed 
to build its future and viewed favourably the participation of the EEC in 
the pledging conference for the creation of the Lebanon A ssistance 
F u n d " .76 A lthough legally non-binding, the statem ent is of extrem e 
political significance. It reflects the EEC will to take Lebanon's special
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needs in to  account w hen a decision is to be taken in  th is field, 
subsequently neutralising any legal barriers, which may obstruct progress. 
This means that the EEC has pledged to provide Lebanon w ith the needed 
assistance regardless of unexhausted financial resources. The unused 
financial resources were already allocated to Lebanon in "harmony" w ith 
other M editerranean countries.
A nother in terpretation m ight be that the EEC has not taken into 
consideration the special needs of Lebanon for "harmony reasons" to keep 
the  ad o p ted  criteria  in calcu lating  the  finances a llocated  to the 
M editerranean countries operative. This should not, however, debilitate 
the possibility arising from the previous positive attem pts to extends 
funds to Lebanon under an "emergency or exceptional aid" protocol.
A second explanation for the EEC's poor perform ance under the 
fourth financial protocol is political in nature. It could be construed that 
the EEC did  not increase, or even keep at the same percentage, financial 
m eans allocated to Lebanon owing to its lack of confidence that Lebanon 
was treading the path of lasting dvil peace. Subsequently, Lebanon w ould 
not be able, as the case of previous protocols, to make use of the resources, 
particularly in fields of activities laid dow n in the respective protocols. It 
w ould be altogether a different assum ption to think that the EEC lost its 
interest in Lebanon altogether. W hichever assum ption holds true  w ould 
consequently involve questions about the EEC's intentions to contribute 
to the  Lebanese efforts tow ards the process of reconstruction  as a 
prerequisite for economic development.
VI-THE EEC FOOD AID POLICY AND LEBANON
The Treaty of Rome has conferred, as far as food aid is concerned, no 
powers upon the EEC to conduct food aid policy towards a third party. The 
idea  of prov id ing  food aid first surfaced in 1969, to do aw ay w ith  
agricultural production surpluses generated by the CAP.77
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C o n seq u en t to in te rn a tio n a l com m itm en ts in v o lv in g  EEC 
participation in defined food aid programmes,78 the Commission prepared 
its first detailed policy program m e for food aid to developing countries.79 
This plan "marked an innovation in the EEC policy, since the EEC granted 
food aid only on an exceptional b asis , and always at national level".80 The 
m ain purpose of the Commission proposal was to set up  a m edium -term  
target program m e of three years w ithin which food aid commitments of 
the EEC would be determ ined annually. In addition, the proposal set up 
general p rinc ip les fo r im p lem en ting  th e  EEC food a id  policy . 
Furtherm ore, the Com m ission in tended to acquire au thority  to take 
executive decisions, if necessary w ith the assistance of governm ent experts 
on developm ent and  cooperation m atters. C onsequently , ad  hoc 
regulations were adopted annually by the EEC Council of Ministers laying 
down general rules for the supply of cereals and skimmed milk pow der.81 
In addition, the Council adopted an annual program m e of food aid.
U nder these arrangem ents, the Council centralised the decision­
m aking process for food aid policy. It was entirely responsible for 
structuring and m anaging EEC food aid. It was em pow ered to take 
decisions, and fix quantities to be allocated to each recipient country. Its 
authority covered every detail in food aid operations.82 The EEC food aid 
policy and management was thereby suffering from unw ieldy procedures 
and shortcomings.83
Developments in the field of food aid policy were effected w hen the 
food aid policy was integrated with the EEC developm ent policy based 
rather on purely hum anitarian considerations to combat hunger in  the 
world, "mainly in Africa". The Commission proposed84 to the Council a 
regulation which was, after approval by the European Parliam ent,85 
adopted by the Council in 1982.86 It am ended Regulation 2750/7587 on 
food aid policy and management.
The Regulation was the first to d raw  up an independen t policy 
concerning food aid. It highlighted EEC food aid policy as a new
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comm unity policy not defined in the Treaty of Rome. The Council cited 
Art 235 EEC as a legal basis for the Regulation. This Article authorizes the 
EEC to take action in areas where it lacks the necessary powers to do  so, 
p rov ided  that the Council acts unanim ously  on a proposal from  the 
Com mission after consulting the European Parliam ent. The EEC has 
usually used Article 235 as a legal basis for action in the absence of treaty- 
m aking competences. For it, however, the political will o r a comm on 
position between the mem ber states m ust exist to provider the EEC w ith 
the necessary background to act, pre-em pting m ember states from doing 
so.88 The Regulation of 1982 established a new  instrum ent of Com m unity 
policy for cooperation with the developing countries. It has the following 
m ain characteristics:
1-The Regulation established the main objectives of food aid policy.
It defined them as raising the standard of nutrition of the recipient 
peoples; helping in emergencies and  contributing tow ards the 
balanced econom ic and social developm ent of the  rec ip ien t 
countries. By setting up  defined objectives for its policy, the EEC 
m arked a move from mere disposal of surplus to the construction 
of an independent policy targeted at defined objectives relating 
directly to development.
2-The Regulation laid down specific criteria for supplying food aid as 
a basic need in recipient countries. The criteria take the basic needs 
of the recipient countries, such as per capita income and the balance 
of paym ents situation  of the a id  receiving coun try , in to  
consideration w hen a decision is taken to break dow n to tal 
quantities to recipient countries.
The centralisation of the decision m aking process rem ained the m ain 
feature of the Regulation. The Council reserved to itself m ost of the 
power regarding food aid policy. It remained empowered to lay dow n the 
general rules and procedures for implementing food aid operations.89 On 
the other hand, and as far as the m anagem ent of the policy is concerned,
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the Regulation delegated  som e of the adm inistrative  pow er to the 
Commission. It provided the Commission w ith a lim ited pow er to take 
action in case of emergency. However, the adm inistrative pow er of the 
C om m ission w as restric ted  by the pow er of the ad  hoc Food Aid 
Com m ittee established for the task of delivering its opinion to the 
Commission on a given action. The power of the Committee is sufficient 
enough to block action by the Commission if its opinion contradicts that of 
the Commission. In such a case, the Commission w ould be unable to take 
a decision since the m atter would be transferred to the Council for a final 
decision which m ay be contrary to the Commission’s proposal as both the 
Council and the Committee represent the interests of the m em ber states. 
This holds true because although the Food Aid Committee is chaired by a 
representative of the Com mission, its m em bers, who solely have the 
voting rights, are representatives of the member states.
W ithin such a context, the Regulation has divided the powers in the 
field of food aid policy and food aid m anagem ent between the Council and 
the Commission. It has allocated to the Council the pow er to act by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, after consulting 
the European Parliament:
-To decide on total quantities of each p roduct on an annual or 
m ultiannual basis
-To determine the countries and organisations to which food aid may 
be supplied on an annual or m ultiannual basis 
-To define the basic products to be supplied as aid, taking into account 
the available stocks of the production question 
-To determine the derived products to to be supplied as food aid 
-To lay down general criteria for the transport of food aid beyond the 
f.o.b stage.90
The Regulation thus confers upon the Council the pow er to decide 
on the general framework w ithin which specific food aid apportionm ent
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and management may be effected by the Commission. There exists in this 
way a general background against which specific decisions are to be taken 
by the  Com mission on the  allocation and  m anagem ent of food aid. 
W ithin such a context, the Com mission, subsequent to "compulsory" 
consultation w ith the Food Aid Committee, decides on the allocation of 
food aid  to recipient countries and  organisations and am ends such 
allocation during the im plem entation of the annual program m e. The 
Commission may, in addition, define the quantities and the nature  of the 
cereals products w hich the m em ber states have to m ake available for 
em ergency action.91 Furthermore, the competence of the Commission is 
extended to cover the pow er to take action in case of emergency.
The EEC emergency aid is targeted (outside the EEC) at those facing 
exceptional and serious economic and social difficulties as a resu lt of 
na tu ra l disasters or extraordinary  circum stances w ith  sim ilar effects. 
There are two categories of emergencies to which the Com mission may 
refer in the im plem entation of action for food aid policy. The first 
category may apply when certain countries are facing serious difficulties 
generated by sudden unforeseeable natural disasters. In such a case, the 
Commission has the pow er to take action and then inform  the m em ber 
states. The second category is defined as applicable w hen countries face 
serious difficulties as a result of exceptional circumstances com parable to 
n a tu ra l d isa s te rs .92 The Com m ission m ay decide on action after 
consulting the m em ber states w hich m ay com m unicate an objection 
within 48 hours.
The Commission has felt that this Regulation involved am biguities 
as a source of frequent conflict between the Community institutions.. The 
Regulation of 1982 left the Commission far from controlling food aid 
m anagem ent, let alone policy making. Seeking to incorporate food aid 
policy more effectively into EEC development aid policy, besides avoiding 
fragm entation of m anagem ent responsibilities spread  too w idely , the 
Com m ission has sought to strengthen the Com m ission's pow ers of
314
implementation of EEC food aid policy. The Commission has presented a 
new  proposal to the Council aiming at reform ing the Regulation of 1982 
on food aid policy and food aid management. The Commission's proposal 
involves am endm ents to the basic fram ew ork of the Regulation and 
changes in  the  o rgan isa tion  of the d ep artm en ts  responsib le  for 
im plem enting the policy.93
After reaching a common position and following the assent of the 
E uropean Parliam ent,94 the Council formally adopted on 22 December 
1986 a new  Regulation on food aid policy and food aid m anagem ent, 
initially concluded for one year expiring on 31 December 1987.95 The short 
va lid ity  of the R egulation provided an oppo rtun ity  to rev iew  the 
applicability of the Regulation in the light of experience. However, it was 
first extended for a period of six months, and then extended twice for a one 
year period each tim e until June 1990.96 The Regulation of 1986, in 
addition to repealing the Regulation of 1982, transferred the EEC food aid 
policy to the sphere of EEC policy of cooperation w ith the developing 
countries. The Regulation of 1986 enhanced the objectives of the earlier 
Regulation by aim ing at prom oting food aid security in the recipient 
countries and  regions, and  supporting efforts in itiated  by recipient 
countries to im prove their own food production.97 Moreover, the new  
Regulation strengthened the criteria for providing food aid. In addition to 
the criteria provided in the Regulation of 1982, the new Regulation added 
to per cap ita  incom e the "existence of pa rticu larly  im poverished  
population  groups" w ith  respect to which the "economic and  social 
impact" and financial cost of the proposed action are to be taken into 
consideration when supplying food aid.
As regards the procedures for im plem enting food aid operations, 
(division of pow ers betw een the Com m ission and the Council), the 
Regulation of 1986 has transferred certain m anagerial pow ers to the 
C o m m iss io n ,98 particularly  in the area of decisions relating to total 
quantities of each offered product, defining the basic products to be
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supplied as food aid and determining the derived products to be supplied 
as food aid. H ow ever, the im portance of the developm ent in the 
Com m ission's pow er to im plem ent such operational tasks has been 
reduced by the power of the ad hoc Food Aid Committee. The Food Aid 
C om m ittee has to be consulted prio r to any  action taken  by  the 
Commission. Like the previous Regulation of 1982, both the Commission 
and Food Aid Committee are to have a common position as a basis for the 
Commission’s power to take decisions. However, if the two bodies differ 
in their views, the Commission loses its pow er to make a decision, by 
referring the issue to the Council which m ay decide in a w ay contrary to 
Com mission intentions. However, the Regulation of 1986 has indeed 
enhanced the powers of the Commission to take action in emergency 
cases."
In 1990, before the expiry of the Regulation, the Com m ission 
proposed a new regulation amending the Regulation of 1986 and seeking a 
streng then ing  of the m anagerial and  opera tiona l pow ers of the 
C o m m issio n .100 To achieve this, the role of the Food A id Committee 
would be that of a consultative committee in accordance w ith Regulation 
373/8 7 101 which lays dow n various types of procedures for committees 
assisting the Commission in the exercise of pow ers conferred on it by 
various Council decisions.
The Council adopted  the new  Regulation, at p resen t in force, 
regulating EEC food aid policy and food aid m anagem ent.102 The present 
Regulation is of unlim ited duration, and is intended to adapt the role of 
the Food Aid Committee to the types of committee roles established by the 
Council in its Regulation 373/87, for making the decision-making process 
more appropriate and efficient. The present Regulation retains the pow er 
of the Commission concerning managing and operating the EEC food aid 
policy under emergency circumstances.
C urrently , a debate is taking place in the Com m ission on the 
rationalisation of the EEC hum anitarian aid system  and to im prove its
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organisation. The debate is aimed at defining a "unified fram ework for 
em ergency aid and the possible establishm ent of a European Office for 
H um anitarian aid; and  defining a specific financial system  adapted to 
hum anitarian  operations".103
Hence, the EEC food aid policy currently constitutes an integral part of 
the EEC developm ent and cooperation policy w ith developing countries. 
The Council has the power to set up the general framework w ithin which 
the Commission is em pow ered to operate the policy.
W ithin such a context, Lebanon was not considered as an eligible 
beneficiary country as regards EEC food aid w ith respect to categories of 
food aid, normal annual food aid programme and emergency food aid.
As far as the norm al annual food aid program m e is concerned, the 
criteria set up by the Council to determ ine w hether a country is to be 
classified as a recipient country did not apply to Lebanon. Prior to the 
eruption of the civil w ar in Lebanon in late 1975, the per capita income in 
Lebanon was higher than  the average set up  by the C ouncil.104 In 
addition, Lebanon had no problems as regards its balance of payments; its 
economic stability was not endangered. However, following the outbreak 
of the dv il war, Lebanon became for the first time necessarily included in 
a field relevant for food aid. As such it qualified for EEC emergency food 
aid.105
It is worth mentioning that political instability and war are included 
in the second category for eligibility for emergency food aid, whereby the 
Commission has to consult the member states by telex, giving them  48 
hours to reject the proposal. In 1976, after the outbreak of the civil war, 
the Commission, after consulting the member states, arranged for the first 
emergency dispatch of food directly to Lebanon. It am ounted to ECUlOm, 
com prising aid in the form of food and m edicines and other general 
supplies. Since then, and consequent to the continuous tragedy of the w ar 
in the country, Lebanon has been a frequent recipient of EEC emergency 
food aid. This aid has amounted to ECU 55.9 m  until 1990.
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The emergency food aid was distributed directly by the Commission 
or by specialised organisations such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the League of the Red Cross Societies,106 and  other non­
governmental organisations meeting the conditions laid down by the EEC 
and accredited by the Commission.107
The following tables show the details of the EEC emergency aid and 
annual food aid to Lebanon.
Fig 6.2
Emergency food aid by the EEC to Lebanon
year value vo lum e products reference
000ECU tonnes Bull EC
21.12.76 10280 .■ - General 12-76,2325
12.02.76 25 Skimmed milk pow der 2-7,2324
= = = = = J Medical supplies = = =
= = = 1000{ 3589 cereals = = =
= = = { 250 Skimmed milk pow der = = =
= = = { 2 butteroil = = =
22.03.78 100 medical supplies 3-78,2.2.31
Nov.78 400 • ■ medical supplies 11-78,2.2.21
April. 78 300 _ medical supplies 4-81,2.2.34
21.06.82 4200 20000 cereals 6-82,2.2.27
29.06.82 10000 general 7/8-82,22.37
6.10.82 8900 — general 10-82,2.2.23
21.09.83 500 general 9-83,2.2.24
23.11.83 1000 general 11-83,2.2.37
30.11.83 1000 _ general 11-83,2.2.49
June 85 70 Skimmed milk pow der 6-85,2.3.51
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Dec,86 500 — General 12-86,2.2.34
12.02.87 500 medical supplies 2-87,2.2.31
19.02.87 400 __ medical supplies = = =
11.12.87 2000 __ N on govt'l Org. 12-87,2.2.51
April 89 300 __ general 4-89,2.2.50
= = = 1500 M aronite W elfare Fund
= = = 2500 basic needs(medicines) = ====
16.08.89 500 medical supplies 7/8-89,2.2.46
31.08.89 8600 __ general = = =
March 90 800 __ Medical supplies 3-90,1.2.59(ii)
Feb. 90 275 __ medical supplies 1/2-90,1.2.65
= = = 359 Govt’l organisations = = = =
year
Fig 6.3
Annual food aid from the EEC to Lebanon 
Cereals Skimmed milk Butteroil others reference
1978
powder
350 650
Bull EC 
4-78,2.2.24
1979 10000 350 650 5-79,2.2.32
1980 10000 1100 700 ■ _
1981 10000 1100 1000 5-81,2.2.23
1982 token entry 1100 _ 1000 4-82,2.2.20
1983 10000 800 _ 7/8-83,2.2.67
1984 8000 600 _ 7/8-84,2.2.46
1985 8000 500 _ 7/8-85,2.3.45
1986 10000 300 200 — 7/8-86,2.2.36
1987 10000 3000 200 4-87,2.2.33
1988 10000 800 200 3000
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VII-CONCLUSIONS
The Treaty of Rome did  not provide for a developm ent cooperation 
policy. Such a policy based on Article 235 EEC evolved over the years, 
involving in ternational responsibilities incum bent upon the European 
Com m unities and calling for action. It com prises essentially food aid 
policy, bo th  em ergency aid  and annual food aid  program m es, and  
financial and technical cooperation policy.
Food aid policy first appeared in 1969 with a view to doing away with 
agricu ltural surpluses. It developed th rough  different stages to an 
in s tru m en t con tribu ting  to the efforts lead in g  to the  econom ic 
developm ent of the receiver countries. Sim ilarly, the EEC financial 
cooperation policy, follow ing its em ergence in the A greem ent w ith  
Greece, w itnessed progressive developments tow ards the same objectives. 
Recently, w ithin the fourth generation of the financial protocols, the EEC 
has taken a further innovative step in this field introducing, inter alia, 
two financial assistance packages concerning the environm ental problems 
in the M editerranean Sea and structural ad justm ent program m es, in 
cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions, in particular the W orld 
Bank.
It is against this backdrop, that the EEC developm ent cooperation 
policy operates in the Mediterranean region and consequently in Lebanon.
As the EEC food aid policy was designed to combat hunger and 
fam ine in the w orld, particularly w ith respect to Africa, the receiver 
countries were restricted to compliance w ith specific criteria. As such, 
Lebanon received its first EEC food aid consignment under an emergency 
heading following the eruption of the civil w ar in 1976. Thereafter, it was 
included w ith in  the beneficiary countries in the EEC food annual 
p rog ram m e receivers. Lebanon how ever, has its ow n special 
circumstances generating special needs. The continuation of the civil w ar
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for over 16 years m ade Lebanon's need for survival a first priority. As 
such, basic needs were matched by the EEC food aid for direct consumption 
for survival purposes, in particular by displaced people. Yet, nothing 
argues against the assum ption that if the EEC had not contributed to these 
needs, as far as food aid is concerned, the balance of payments in Lebanon 
could have m et further difficulties, since Lebanon had to spend its own 
hard  resources in purchasing and supplying urgent basic needs. Indirectly, 
therefore, the EEC food aid policy, particularly  em ergency food aid  
consignm ents contributed  to easing Lebanon's balance of paym ents 
difficulties.
The financial cooperation betw een Lebanon and the EEC has its 
origin in the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement of 1977 in line 
w ith  EEC’s M editerranean  global approach. In princip le , financial 
cooperation was directed tow ards contributions to Lebanese efforts in 
economic developm ent. How ever, the erup tion  of the civil w ar in 
Lebanon two years prior to the conclusion of the first financial protocol 
and its continuation then for sixteen years, m ade the im plem entation of 
this protocol, in particular if the rules em bodied in the protocols were 
strictly taken into consideration, impossible. Nonetheless, Lebanon and 
the EEC continued to conclude further financial cooperation protocols 
w ith no chance for im plem enting them , presum ably for "harm ony or 
political reasons".
Recently, the political situation in Lebanon has im proved allowing 
for launching the revival of civil peace in Lebanon. The destruction of the 
civil w ar in Lebanon generated special and urgent needs in Lebanon, 
which m ust be met. W ithout which, anything resem bling basic and 
norm al life to be resum ed in Lebanon w ould hardly be conceivable, let 
alone operating any social and economic developm ent. The fourth  
financial protocol, however, which is expected to be concluded between 
Lebanon and the EEC, has not taken these special Lebanese needs into 
consideration.
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EEC innovatory steps in the fourth generation of financial protocols 
could be of great significance for countries like A lgeria and  Egypt 
undertaking structural adjustm ent program m es under the surveillance of 
the Bretton W oods institutions. But, how ever significant and  indicative 
these m easures m ight be, they do not correspond to Lebanon's urgent 
needs. M oreover, the am ount of finances allocated to Lebanon w ere 
w orth only ECU 69 m com pared w ith Lebanon’s bill for reconstruction 
estim ated to be at about $ 17 bn. Consequently, the statem ent of the 
European Council meeting in M adrid reaffirming an EEC com m itm ent to 
undertake an obligation to contribute to Lebanon's effort in its process of 
reconstruction has as yet failed to translate into action.
As one Lebanese official expressed it to the Commission of the EEC: 
the Com munity does not forget to produce always its highest concern as 
regards Lebanon; however, no resolute action yet is taken. Too m any 
words and too little action, if any. W ould the EEC respond to Lebanon's 
special and urgent needs under em ergency in the form of exceptional 
financial assistance in the near future?. One may hardly claim that the 
perform ance thus far by the EEC can prom ote optimal relations betw een 
the EEC and a country like Lebanon, which has been claimed to have a 
"special and historical" relationship with the EEC .
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
It is widely recognised by academic w riters that not only economic 
considerations make relations between the EEC and the M editerranean 
countries so im portant, b u t that "historical links [too] betw een these 
countries and several m em ber states of the EEC have been particularly 
close either because of past colonial links or because of shared cultural 
heritage. These links continue to represent a factor largely determ ining 
the attitude to policy of decision-making elites in both Europe and in the 
non-European M editerranean".1 EEC interests towards the M editerranean 
countries underlined  the EEC developm ent of a special relationship  
between the EEC and the countries of the region. The C om m unique' of 
the Paris Summit in 1972 called upon the Com m unity to respond m ore 
than in the past to the expectations of all developing countries, and  
p a rticu la rly  to fu lfill its com m itm ents to the  coun tries of the  
M editerranean region, w ithout "detracting from the advantages enjoyed 
by countries with which it has special relations".
The relationship betw een the m em ber states of the EEC and the 
countries of the M editerranean basin involves m ore than  p u re ly  
economic and trade relations. In fact, m ost of the countries share some 
historical, political, cultural and geographical characteristics as common 
with the member states of the EEC. However, there is no other country in 
the M editerranean basin which may possess all these elements at any one 
tim e, than  Lebanon. The E uropean Parliam ent in endorsing  the 
Cooperation Agreement of 1977 drew the attention of the EEC to the close 
economic and historical relations between the Community and Lebanon.2
The analytic exam ination undertaken in the present thesis w ith  
respect to the legal framework of trade relations between Lebanon on the 
one hand, and the EEC and the ECSC on the other, dealt with the question
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of w hether Lebanon had, at any time, special treatm ent from the EC as 
reflected in the legal rules which provide the framework for EC-Lebanese 
trade and  commercial relations. The special characteristics of Lebanon 
invoked in its m em orandum  requesting special treatm ent from  the EEC 
were parallel to the, close economic, political, cultural and historical 
relations between Lebanon and (some of) the m em ber states of the EC. 
Moreover, the thesis focuses on the developm ent of the legal fram ework 
of these relations in the light of the evolution of international trade law. 
The analysis evaluates the contribution of the treaty relationships between 
the EC and Lebanon to the prom otion of trade between them  involving, 
m ore than the prom otion of EC im ports to Lebanon, the expansion of 
Lebanon's exports to EEC markets to offset a stubborn trade deficit between 
the two parties, contributing thereby to the economic developm ent of 
Lebanon.
L ebanon 's con tractual trade  re la tio n sh ip  w ith  the  E uropean  
Communities, first established with the EEC in 1965, has passed through 
three stages in its form of development, from a non-preferential trade 
relationship to a partial reciprocal preferential trade relationship and 
thereafter to a non-reciprocal preferential trade relationship.
The non-preferential trade arrangem ents stage represented sim ple 
succession by the EEC of the six to trade and technical cooperation 
agreements between Lebanon and the relevant original m em ber states of 
the EEC, w ith  no developm ental contribution  to the then  existing 
relationships. The EEC denied Lebanon's request for better access to the 
EEC markets out of a fear of violating the rules of GATT, namely the MEN 
clause, no tw ithstand ing  the offer it m ade to Israel involving m ore 
favourable access for Israeli products to the EEC m arkets via various 
unilateral tariff cuts.
The second stage of the contractual relationship between the EEC and 
Lebanon claimed to be leading to the formation of a free trade area, despite 
the lack of two essential elements namely, schedule and plan w ithin a
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reasonable length of time. The so called interim  free trade area included 
no express provision referring to the suggested intention. Furtherm ore, 
the agreem ent d id  n o t en ter in to  force for lack of the  necessary 
ratifications! There can be found no legal or any other argum ent to justify 
the fate of the agreement. The agreement was the production of the quid 
pro quo deal invoked by France aiming at approaching m ore balanced 
relations betw een the EEC on the one hand, and each of the Arab states 
and Israel on the other whose agreement with EEC w ent into force at the 
intended time. The "interim agreement leading to the formation of a free 
trade area" was, moreover, short of providing the advantages arising out 
of the developm ents in international trade rules, particularly the notion 
of non-reciprocity of preferences in trade relations between developed and 
developing countries.
The non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangem ents stage was the 
product of the M editerranean policy. The "new m odel of relations 
betw een developed and developing countries", as claimed by the EEC, 
involves free access to industrial products under the jurisdiction of both 
the EEC and the ECSC, originating in Lebanon and exported directly into 
the EC m arkets. In addition, this new  m odel of relations includes 
financial and technical cooperation and food aid at both em ergency and 
annual program m e levels. By concluding the Cooperation Agreem ent 
w ith Lebanon, the EEC considered that the M editerranean policy had been 
rounded off.
It seems, at first sight, that the contractual relationship betw een 
Lebanon and the EEC w itnessed a significant developm ent, from non- 
preferential trade arrangem ents to non-reciprocal preferential trade 
arrangem ents. It w ould in fact, be a gross m istake to assum e that this 
developm ent was due to elements forming the natural basis for a special 
relationship between two parties. The developm ent of the relationship 
was basically due to developments in the rules of international trade law, 
and to the necessity of implementing a "more balanced approach" between
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the EEC on the one hand, and the Arab countries and Israel on the other.
Indeed, the EEC show s great sym pathy tow ards Lebanon. This 
sym pathy was manifested in more than fifty political statements issued by 
the EEC, in particular w ithin European Political Cooperation, supporting 
Lebanon. These statem ents involved com m itm ents to respond  and  
contribute to Lebanon’s urgent and special needs, in addition to defend 
Lebanon's positions in the context of its regional conditions. M oreover, 
the response of the EEC emergency aid to Lebanon may represent a real 
EEC endeavour to stand by Lebanon. However the new model of relations 
betw een the EC and  Lebanon failed once again to respond  to the 
expectation of a developing country, like Lebanon, sharing  w ith  the 
Com m unity common characteristics, for three m ain reasons. The new  
contractual model of relations did not take into consideration the special 
needs of Lebanon, particularly the aftermath of the civil w ar in Lebanon; 
as one Lebanese official p u t it, "the EEC developm ent aid and cooperation 
represent a drop in the Ocean".3 Moreover, the free access of Lebanese 
industrial products and preferential tariff cuts for agricultural products 
w ere neutralised ow ing to the severe rules of origin w ith  respect to 
industria l products and the quotas and im port calendar as regards 
agricultural products. Furtherm ore, the EEC M editerranean policy 
pledged to take into account the level of economic developm ent in 
undertaking its comm itm ents in each cooperation agreem ent w ith  the 
relevant M editerranean countries. The great similarities betw een m ost of 
the cooperation agreem ents contradicts such a pledge. The perm anent 
legal fram ework betw een Lebanon and the EEC m ay scarcely shows a 
reflection of the EEC’s political sym pathy and support for Lebanon into 
special or even close relationship between them. It is even suggested that 
Lebanon was treated less favourably than the EEC treats other third parties, 
let alone its next door country Israel.
The developm ents in the legal fram ew ork of the EEC and ECSC- 
Lebanese relationship was in parallel to the developm ent in the legal
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aspects of relationships betw een developed and developing countries. 
Rules of international trade have experienced a m arked developm ent 
w hich have u ltim ately  had  profound  effects on reshaping  relations 
betw een developed and  developing countries. Part IV GATT has been 
adopted and it has been the first to introduce the notion of non-reciprocity 
of preferential treatm ent between developed and developing countries as 
a response to the needs of the economically w eaker m em bers of the 
international com m unity of states. The legal effectiveness of the non­
reciprocity  notion  has h ad  to w ait fo r fu rth er developm ents in  
in ternational trad e  law  in  o rder to exem pt th is notion  from  the 
application of the MFN clause. A generalised system of preferences has 
also evolved, bringing about, unilaterally, legal conditions for better access 
of products originating in developing countries, to the m arkets of the 
developed countries. The GSP has set up  a legal fram ew ork of non­
reciprocal non-extendible preferential treatm ent for developing countries 
waiving the application of the MFN clause to special arrangem ents under 
Article XXV GATT, initially for ten years. Following the Tokyo Round, 
the Enabling clause has been inserted  in to  the GATT system  as a 
perm anent legal fram ew ork for the differential and  m ore favourable 
trea tm en t of develop ing  countries in in ternational trad e  re la tions 
notwithstanding the provisions of the MFN clause.
The analysis of the legal fram ework of relations betw een Lebanon 
and the EEC shows developm ent in their relations parallel to those of 
international trade rules, however, only in the third stage. The first stage 
of non preferential trade arrangements between two parties took place at 
the time when the notion of non-reciprocity was first debated. The second 
stage offered Lebanon reciprocal trade arrangements contrary to the notion 
of non-reciprocity despite the adoption of Part VI GATT and the GSP and 
o ther relevant legal instrum ents for non-reciprocal non-ex tendib le  
preferential treatm ent between developed and developing countries. In 
the third stage, the EEC and the member states of the ECSC w ithin the
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Com m unity responded "more than ever to the expectations of developing 
countries" and  in  p a rticu la r the ir special re la tionsh ips w ith  the 
M editerranean countries. Nonetheless, the substantial affects of the EEC 
offer of free access of products originating in Lebanon to the EEC markets, 
were neutralised by other provisions, nam ely the rules of origin, quotas 
and im port calendar. Therefore, it w ould be safe to suggest that although 
the EEC-Lebanese legal fram ew ork of relations w itnessed theoretical 
developm ents, these developm ents w ere, in  substance, less than  
developments witnessed in international trade rules.
Changes in patterns of trade betw een the preference offering and 
receiving countries m ay be used as a m easure of the im pact of trade 
preferences on the receiving country, notw ithstanding that the data  that is 
needed  to exam ine is the difference betw een actual trade  w ith  the 
preferences and the trade that would have occurred w ithout them. This 
can not be observed even by applied economists, it is a customary problem 
for them.4 Trade flows between Lebanon and the EEC did not show  any 
im provem ent as regards the exports of the preferences receiving country, 
that is Lebanon, to the m arkets of the preferences offering countries, be it 
w ith the EEC of six, nine, ten or twelve. In fact, Lebanese exports to the 
EEC markets decreased following the preferential treatm ent offered by the 
EEC to nearly all developing countries. The proliferation of preferential 
trade agreements between the EEC and th ird  countries had an adverse 
affect on Lebanese exports to the EEC. Prior to the establishment of trade 
contractual relationships, Lebanon enjoyed a small share in the EEC 
m arkets w ith an average of 11 per cent of its total exports. Thereafter, 
(1967 onward) Lebanese exports to the EEC decreased to an average of 6.6 
per cent of Lebanese total exports. These exports never w itnessed any 
fu rther progress, after the proliferation of the EEC tariff preferential 
agreem ents w ith third countries, until 1986, com pared to the increase in 
Lebanon's imports from the EEC which am ounted to an average of 50 per 
cent of total Lebanese im ports particularly between 1978 and 1990. This
334
acute imbalance of trade is not likely to be reduced significantly or even 
m arginally in the short term.
There are different interpretations for the imbalance of trade. It is 
suggested that the w ar in Lebanon hindered the proper implementation of 
the Cooperation Agreement. However, the increase in total Lebanese 
exports at different intervals during the w ar minimised the affect of the 
w ar on Lebanese exports to the EEC. Independently from it, preferential 
trade arrangements offered to Lebanon were subject to two main obstacles, 
that is to say, rules of origin as regards industrial products and  im port 
calendar as regards agricultural products. M oreover, the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreem ents betw een the EEC and third developing 
countries in general and the M editerranean countries in particular led to a 
transfer in trade competition from the developing countries, w here their 
m arkets are heavily protected, to the EEC m arkets w here all these 
developing countries enjoy, in principle, favourable access to the EEC 
markets. For these reasons, it is inconceivable for Lebanese producers to 
develop their share in the EEC markets in the foreseeable future to which 
they are originally marginal suppliers. Furthermore, trends in Lebanon's 
trade w ith the EEC have shown special characteristics. Im ports from the 
EEC have possibly served the major purpose of supporting  Lebanese 
export activities to third countries and capital projects. The conclusion is 
justified that any equilibrium in the trade balance between the contracting 
parties is not be expected. Therefore, the endeavour of the Lebanese 
governm ent should be reoriented tow ards bringing about the conditions 
under which the EEC may undertake with greater commitment to support 
efforts of reconstruction in  Lebanon as a p relude  to satisfy ing the 
economic developm ent in the country.
A twenty five year experience of relations between Lebanon and the 
EEC may enable the draw ing of conclusions and the raising of other 
questions with respect to both parties, Lebanon and the EEC.
The experience gained from the Greek and Israeli relationship w ith
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the EEC shows that where right terms and suitable conditions were given, 
relations between a group of developed economies and a less developed 
economy can be fruitful and contribute to the economic developm ent of 
the less developed economy. Indeed, the increase of Lebanese exports in 
1988-1989 owing to the of the abuse the rules of origin indicated that these 
rules and the im port calendar constituted an obstacle to achieve the trade 
objectives of the relationship betw een Lebanon and the EEC. However, 
should Lebanon persist in this direction, or should it abandon its fervent 
request for seeking m ore preferential and  liberal term s in  the  legal 
framework of its trade relations with the EEC? Is Lebanon in a negotiating 
position to enable her to achieve any progress along this path? Experience 
show s negative resu lts, unless Lebanon prom otes and  adheres to 
collective Arab action in this direction. Collective Arab action possesses 
tw o strong cards, a very w ide m arket need for EEC p roducers and  
subsequently exporters and the strategic im port products needs of the EEC. 
This assumption is far from being workable at the present time, not only 
because of the fruitless results of Euro-Arab dialogue, but also because of 
the experience gained from  the in tra-A rab  political and  econom ic 
relationship and failure to adhere to legal term s m ade by them . In the 
present circumstances, Lebanon has to devote all the efforts and  all the 
experience of its international lawyers and skillful diplomatic relations to 
gain better terms in its legal fram ework of relationship w ith  the EEC 
bringing about the conditions for greater commitments to be m ade by the 
EEC for increasing technical financial assistance for direct developm ent 
purpose. M oreover, one w ould w onder w hether it is necessary for a 
country like Lebanon to seek better access to the EEC markets, is it not the 
tim e for "regional" dialogue for better legal fram ework for in tegrating 
the ir m arkets and in general w hen South-South d ia logue w ou ld  
substitute South N orth dialogue!
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